On October 20, 2025, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in United States v. Hemani. The case questions the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3), the federal statute that makes it a felony for anyone who “is an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance” to possess, ship, or transport a firearm. Interestingly, this is the very same law that Hunter Biden was convicted under in June of 2024 in Delaware. Biden was found guilty of three counts arising from his 2018 purchase of a revolver, during which he allegedly lied on the ATF Form 4473 by denying unlawful drug use. The prosecution argued that, at the time, he was using and addicted to crack cocaine, violating §922(g)(3). While Biden raised a Second Amendment defense, the district court rejected his facial challenge to the statute, citing an existing Eighth Circuit precedent upholding the statute to be a relevant historical analogue to firearms restrictions.

On November 2nd, 2025, President Donald Trump expressed on NBC’s 60 Minutes that “tariffs are incredible because they really give us great national security and great wealth.” The national security part is perhaps arguable, but the family-owned Learning Resources Ltd., as well as countless other American businesses, did not experience great wealth—quite the contrary. After Trump imposed his “Liberation Day” tariffs in April 2025, which involved a “baseline” tariff of 10% on almost all imports into the U.S, over half (57%) of U.S. companies surveyed by KPMG reported declining gross margins as a direct result of these tariffs. Small and mid-sized businesses were hit especially hard because, unlike large firms with abundant inventories, they are more vulnerable to cost shocks and supply chain disruptions. With such daunting economic consequences, how did Trump justify his policies? He imposed his tariffs through the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) of 1977, which grants President authority during times of emergency. In this specific instance, the two emergencies are the U.S. trade deficit and the inflow of fentanyl and opioids, which he called “country-killing emergencies.” However, it is uncertain whether Trump’s tariffs fit the conditions of IEEPA as the recent Supreme Court oral arguments demonstrate. 

In August 2021, Thomas Keathley was seriously injured in a car collision in Mississippi. He sued the driver’s employer, Buddy Ayers Construction (BAC) for negligence. But Keathley never saw his day in court—not because he lacked evidence, but because he had failed to disclose the pending lawsuit in his Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceedings, a process in which individual debtors propose a three-to-five-year plan to repay creditors while retaining their property under court supervision. The Fifth Circuit dismissed his case entirely under the doctrine of judicial estoppel, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Fall 2025 upon Keathley’s appeal. The question now before the Court could reshape how strictly federal courts police the intersection of bankruptcy disclosure duties and substantive litigation rights.

In 2008, Michael Bowe was charged, and convicted, with conspiracy to commit a Hobbs Act (18 U.S.C. § 1951) robbery, attempted Hobbs Act robbery, and use of a firearm in a violent crime. In 2009, Bowe pleaded guilty to all charges and received a 288-month sentence, 120 of which are associated with the conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), a federal mandate law for a minimum time served for carrying a firearm during a violent crime. In 2015, the Supreme Court ruled in Johnson v. United States that the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA)—mandating a minimum of 15 years for convictions of those committing a violent crime with 3 or more prior convictions for violent felonies—had an unconstitutionally vague residual clause. The residual clause, defined in 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), defined a “violent felony” as one involving “conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another” which was determined to be too vague to give notice to what constitutes a violent felony and thus 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) was struck down. Spurred by the growing question of what qualifies as a violent crime or felony, Bowe began his appeal process in 2016, arguing that Johnson v. United States serves as precedent to which his crimes are no longer classified as “crimes of violence” necessary for his firearm conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). 

The Supreme Court’s 2025 oral arguments in Louisiana v. Callais have ignited a national debate over the future of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA), the cornerstone of federal protections against racial vote dilution. The case stems from Louisiana’s creation of a second majority-Black congressional district following a lower court’s ruling that the prior map violated Section 2—a move later challenged as unconstitutional racial gerrymandering under the Equal Protection Clause. During oral arguments, the justices wrestled with whether Section 2’s “results test,” rooted in the 1982 VRA amendments and Thornburg v. Gingles (1986), impermissibly compels race-based redistricting or simply permits it as a remedy for proven vote dilution. Discussion centered on the Gingles framework itself, as several justices considered whether its application inadvertently forces states to prioritize race over traditional districting criteria. The Court’s questions suggested less interest in overturning Section 2 outright than in recalibrating its implementation to ensure compliance with constitutional limits on racial classifications. Ultimately, Callais may mark a pivotal moment in defining how states balance race-neutral districting principles with the VRA’s mandate to protect minority voting strength—potentially signaling the emergence of a refined “Gingles 2.0” standard that preserves Section 2’s protections while constraining the use of race in redistricting.

This paper explores how Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Corporación Cimex, S.A. could redefine the boundaries of sovereign immunity and turn U.S. courts into arenas for foreign policy battles. Born from Cuba’s 1960 nationalization of American oil refineries and revived by President Trump’s 2019 activation of the Helms–Burton Act, the case asks whether that Act overrides the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA)—or whether Exxon must still satisfy one of FSIA’s narrow exceptions. Beneath the legal question lies a geopolitical one: should private corporations act as proxy enforcers of U.S. sanctions against foreign governments? Drawing on precedents like Republic of Austria v. Altmann (2004) and Rubin v. Iran (2018), this paper argues that Congress never clearly authorized such an abrogation of immunity. If the Court sides with Exxon, it risks weaponizing U.S. courts as instruments of diplomacy, blurring the line between justice and geopolitics in an increasingly volatile world.

On June 12, 2023, the Texas legislature passed H.B. 1181, a law that would require any website whose content contains more than one-third sexual material harmful to minors to incorporate age verification methods. Before taking effect, plaintiffs sued, claiming that H.B. 1181 violated their First Amendment right to free speech. The district court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, ruling that the age-verification requirement failed strict scrutiny, and launched an injunction. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Texas, ruling that the age verification requirement only called for a rational basis review, and they vacated the district court’s injunction. The case was then appealed to the Supreme Court, which granted certiorari on July 2, 2024. The question before the court is whether H.B. 1181’s age verification requirement is subject to a rational basis review or strict scrutiny.