Little historical attention has been given to the Mexican-American War and its ramifications on the United States. Aside from significantly increasing the size of the United States, the war had a peculiar cultural effect on the legal status of Mexican residents in America. Through the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo of 1848, Mexico ceded a significant portion of their land, and Mexicans were offered U.S. citizenship, becoming “incorporated into the Union of the United States” [1]. Through doing so, the Mexicans became “legally white” because no such bill had been introduced before regarding the naturalization of non-white residents of the United States. The Naturalization Bill of 1790 explicitly only listed “free white people” who reside in the U.S. for two years as citizens [2]. Although the naturalization of Mexicans may at first seem like a step in a positive direction, the early legal designation of Mexican residents of the U.S. as “white” failed to protect Mexicans by creating superficial legal protection without truly defending Mexicans’ rights.

This paper addresses the fundamental question of marriage: status or contract? American law evolved from British common law, which, in turn, had its origins in Catholic law—a status-based system where the power to marry was vested in the church. However, in recent history, American law has shifted towards increased freedom to contract in marriages. Despite the clear positive motivators for such a shift, taking the freedom to contract to its logical extreme could threaten the integrity of marriage as an institution of commitment. The Rabbinic system provides guidance to the American system on this issue. Despite a commitment to a contractual framework, Rabbinic marriage maintains a distinct character of marriage, preserved by the marital finance contract, distinguishing it from mere cohabitation contracts. Similar categorial contract distinctions exist in American law. Therefore, American law has the opportunity, and impetus, to set marriage as a distinct option within a menu of alternatives in structuring relationships.

The intersection of sports and competition law constitutes a multifaceted and continually evolving domain within legal discourse. The increasing commercialization of the sporting sector has led to questions about whether certain practices undertaken by sporting authorities are in line with competition law norms. As such, it becomes crucial to scrutinize the restrictions imposed by national sporting federations and their state affiliates on sportspersons and different stakeholders. National sporting federations benefit from a dominant position in the market, largely due to their ability to undertake various decisions, including the restriction of players from participating in tournaments or leagues that are not recognised by sports federations. These authorities thereby curtail the market and affect different key stakeholders such as players, coaches, referees, technical staff, support staff, sponsors, broadcasters, tournament organizers and others. This article will address the need for the Competition Commission of India’s (‘CCI’) regulatory intervention to prevent the abuse of dominant position by sporting federations so as to preclude players and other stakeholders from being unfairly disadvantaged. The article will also provide an in-depth analysis of the ongoing allegations of abuse of dominance in the conduct of the Grand Prix Badminton League (‘GPBL’) and analyze the feasibility of submitting before the Court of Arbitration for Sport in order to resolve competition law-related disputes in the Indian sports sector.

This paper explores the intersection of artificial intelligence (AI) and First Amendment rights, focusing on the legal protection of speech generated by artificial intelligence. As AI technologies like ChatGPT become increasingly human-like, questions about their legal status and implications for free speech arise. The paper introduces the current state of AI-powered speech models, highlighting their autonomy and the challenge of differentiating AI-generated speech from human communication. It raises questions about the extent of First Amendment protection for AI-generated speech and the implications of applying current free speech laws to this technology. The analysis examines the evolving First Amendment landscape, emphasizing the shift from content-based restrictions to considerations of speaker identity. It discusses the Citizens United v. FEC (2010), ruling, which discussed corporate speech and speaker identity. The paper asserts that extending First Amendment protections to AI-generated speech presents unique challenges to U.S. speech law due to AI's independent speech generation and lack of direct ties to human constitutional rights. It evaluates the necessity of safeguarding AI speech, considering the consequences of granting it constitutional rights, and suggests potential government remedies, including disclosure requirements. In conclusion, the paper recognizes the rapid advances in AI and the pressing legal challenges they pose, emphasizing the need to balance protected speech and accountability in the era of AI-generated expression.

Misogynistic propaganda is not a new concept, but with the establishment of the internet, it has become especially rampant. Over the years, the internet and online platforms have radically grown in performance and influence, and have fundamentally changed how society interacts and communicates. Despite this, many of the fundamental ways gender discrimination is platformed and affects women have not changed. Misogyny has always been a societal issue, but now, with the changes in online communication, it has taken a new form, one that is massively unregulated. The under-regulation of violent and misogynistic online vitriol demonstrates the need to reevaluate what “freedom of speech” constitutes, especially in an age where the spread of information is increasingly extremist and fast-paced.

In this article I will first provide a theoretical background of the legal and democratic underpinnings of the public education system in the United States up until the late 19th century. I will then analyze how the ruling of Brown v. Board officially interpreted education to be a public good with the purpose of supporting America’s democracy, thus ruling “separate but equal” schooling unconstitutional. I will discuss how this decision marks a radical shift in American educational theory by considering social equality a necessary component of democratic education. I will then highlight how 21st century perceptions of public schools have contributed to a broader lack of faith in the competency of public education and encouraged a competing interest in privatization of education, undermining the efficacy of education as a public good.. Finally, I conclude with the implications of these concerns on the participation and maintenance of American democracy.

The majority opinion of Loving v. Virginia declared state laws on interracial marriage unconstitutional by the Fourteenth Amendment upon reviewing a series of 1920s statutes in Virginia. Forty years prior, the case of Buck v. Bell had upheld the sterilization of institutionalized white woman Carrie Buck because she was deemed “incompetent” by 1920s standards. This case was about another 1920s Virginia statute originally deemed constitutional. By evaluating Buck v. Bell through the lens of the statutes established by Loving v. Virginia, however, it becomes clear that the ruling of Buck v. Bell was ultimately meant to legally manage race relations in the state.

Hundreds of thousands of Americans are admitted to psychiatric institutions without their consent each year. While policies vary by state, courts can order the admittance of adults and children to hospitals if they are detained by law enforcement officers and mental health professionals for showing signs of being unable to keep themselves safe. The intention of these state laws is to provide necessary mental health treatment, as many individuals lack the agency to admit themselves due to stigma, unawareness of resources, or other financial and logistical barriers. However, the implementation of involuntary psychiatric commitments in the real world is legally and morally questionable in terms of constitutionality and consent.

The Major Questions Doctrine (MQD) is a statutory interpretation of U.S. administrative law that stipulates that courts must presume that Congress does not delegate matters of major political or economic significance to executive agencies. As such, when it comes to a “major question” such as substantial loan grants or nationwide mandates, courts have the power to veto actions by executive federal agencies such as the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) or the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). However, the implications of this doctrine become more obscure when considering questions that emerge pertaining to what specifically constitutes a “major question,” as well as whether the doctrine impedes the progress of elected officials by favoring the opinion of judicial courts.. In this article, I argue that the Major Questions Doctrine should be abolished as it enables the Supreme Court to seize disproportionate control over federal policy and ultimately reduces the efficacy of federal agencies.

The Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment declares that “No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.” Ratified in 1868, the Fourteenth Amendment was one of the Reconstruction Amendments added to the Constitution after the Civil War. Within a decade of the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court made three major rulings that effectively erased the Clause from the Constitution, undermining the Clause’s original intent, and compensating by expanding the scope of other Fourteenth Amendment provisions. Reorienting American jurisprudence to integrate the intended function of the Privileges or Immunities Clause would bring about positive benefits.

Ron DeSantis said it “teach[es] kids to hate our country” and targets kids “as young as kindergarten.” Yet, the Chicago Teachers Union has called it a form of “teach[ing] truth.” The American Civil Liberties Union has called the bans of it a “supress[ion] of free speech.” Some people fear it, others laud it, and many aren’t sure it's even happening. That’s right, it’s critical race theory. Since January 2021, 44 states have taken some kind of action either banning or effectively banning critical race theory (CRT) from being taught K-12, spearheaded by groups such as the Moms for Liberty who staged protests nationwide. With all of the controversy that critical race theory has created, it’s become increasingly important to know what it is and more importantly, if it violates people’s constitutional rights.

As book challenges rise, so does the debate on whether those books should be banned or not and what consequences would result from such bans. However, there seems to be little discussion about if books can be banned. What does the Constitution say about it? What do previous cases say about it? How much can politics influence judicial decisions? In this short article, I will argue that legally, no book can be banned based on its content from public school libraries.

Felon disenfranchisement, affecting millions in the US, traces its roots to post-Civil War strategies aimed at suppressing Black votes by employing discriminatory tactics such as poll taxes. Today, felon disenfranchisement disproportionately impacts Black Americans—with 1 in 16 of the disenfranchised being Black—meaning this issue is intricately woven into systemic racism, particularly related to the impacts of the War on Drugs. The Voting Rights Act of 1965 prohibits voting rights violations and therefore should prohibit felon disenfranchisement. The landmark case Hayden v. Pataki (2006) emphasizes the urgency for the Supreme Court to accept its responsibility in protecting the voting rights of all citizens, particularly those historically marginalized. The case's ruling that felon disenfranchisement does not violate the Voting Rights Act is met with criticism, especially given the alarming escalation in incarceration rates. The Supreme Court has a responsibility to safeguard the voting rights of all citizens, particularly historically marginalized groups, and urge the elimination of felon disenfranchisement to realize the democratic vision of the Voting Rights Act.

As the Dobbs decision was announced in 2022, the Supreme Court’s blatant reversal of precedent shocked many Americans. How could a decision, widely regarded as “settled law” and “precedent” by the conservative Justices on the court, be so easily overturned? When evaluating the legitimacy of the Supreme Court’s pre-2022 rulings on abortion, two distinct areas must be addressed in tandem – the constitutional logic of the Court’s principles, and the actions taken to operationalize said principles.

Amidst recent reports of intellectual property (IP) espionage and heartbreaking stories of entrepreneurs who have had their intellectual property stolen, one must reevaluate how international arbitrations function. International arbitrations were intended to achieve peace in a divided world. While international arbitrations may sometimes work in the cases of disputes between agents of two countries in favorable standing or agents conducting business within a country where they are being sued, the system is inherently flawed when it comes to disputes between ill-disposed nations. This calls for a modification of the system. I propose one of two solutions: either accept that the system is flawed and engage in competitive sanctioning or attempt a diplomatic approach. In either case, there is hope that one day we may have a better system as more nations engage in international business in our increasingly global society.

Technology is one of the most prominent fields in society today, with social media being a big factor. Social media allows citizens to have the freedom to write or say whatever they want behind a screen. Because of this, it is important to implement strict regulations that filter items said online to protect citizens and their right to feel safe. The First Amendment protects freedom of speech, religion, press, assembly, and the right to petition the government. In regard to freedom of speech, there is a fine line as to whether certain words can be considered protected or not. Threatening and harmful messages should not be protected by the First Amendment. This is discussed in Counterman versus Colorado when a man stalked an online influencer and sent numerous threatening messages that negatively affected her personal and professional life. However, the Supreme Court concluded that one’s punishment should not just involve the effect a threat had on a victim but should instead take the speaker's intent into account.

In Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization (2022), the Supreme Court overturned Roe v. Wade (1973), the case that guaranteed a constitutional right to abortion. The Supreme Court’s Decision is unconstitutional as it goes against the right to privacy established by the Fourth Amendment, the case Griswold v. Connecticut (1965), and the Equal Protection clause established by the Fourteenth Amendment because it targets a certain group of individuals — particularly, biological women. The Supreme Court's decision opens the door to dangerous laws being made by the states, giving the fetus personhood that can further lead to dangerous situations for pregnant people who would like or need an abortion.

This article focuses on Montana’s effort to completely ban the social media platform TikTok across the state, regardless of whether devices are state-owned or privately owned. As of June 2023 (the time of this article’s writing), TikTok’s lawsuit against Montana and a class action lawsuit by several TikTok content creators against the state have been consolidated and will be heard in the United States District Court for the District of Montana. In this article, I outline the arguments offered by the plaintiffs (TikTok and content creators on the app), followed by an elaboration of the arguments offered by the state. In analyzing the strength of the constitutional arguments presented by both parties, I consider the unprecedented nature of Montana’s TikTok ban and argue that regulation of social media platforms is categorically different from regulation of social media expressions.

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution aims to protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures, and in the digital age, this protection is more important than ever. Despite this protection, the United States government can still obtain information on civilians without a warrant simply by buying data. This article considers the legal implications of the U.S government's and third parties' purchases of consumer data.

Since the Industrial Revolution saw a sharp rise in the wealth gap in the US, there have been tensions between the rich and the poor. How much do the wealthy “deserve” their money? Do they owe anything to society? This article explores these questions and considers the constitutionality of a wealth tax.