In Reconsideration of South Dakota v. Dole

The history of minimum drinking ages in the U.S. is storied, with most individual states setting age limits above 18 until 1971, when the voting age was lowered. In 1971, states started lowering their minimum drinking ages, arguing that if citizens were old enough to vote and fight overseas, then they should be considered of age regarding alcohol consumption. According to CNN's Brandon Griggs, as state legislatures discovered that lowering the minimum drinking age correlated with more traffic accidents in the late ’70s, many states reversed course. In 1984, Congress passed the National Minimum Drinking Age Act, requiring states to have a minimum drinking age of 21 (preventing those below 21 from purchasing or possessing alcohol) or else lose a portion of highway funding, and by 1995, all 50 states complied [1].

While South Dakota v. Dole (1987)—a case wherein the Supreme Court determined that the federal government may promote states following a federal policy using the threat of spending cuts— has upheld the National Minimum Drinking Age Act (NMDA), there should be a more clearly defined definition of relatedness denoting the acceptability of conditional funding. The relatedness and coerciveness requirements should be defined with more specificity. Further, a sorely needed re-examination of the relatedness requirement should consider the 21st Amendment, which grants states the right to regulate alcohol. Before expanding upon this argument, the details of the test established in Dole must be defined. This five-part test determines whether a given federal act to condition state funding is constitutional: It must serve the general welfare, be unambiguous in what states must do to receive the funding, the condition must relate to the federal program receiving funding, the spending cannot be used to solicit unconstitutional action, and the amount of spending cannot be so great as to be considered coercive [2].
In Dole, the Supreme Court considered the NMDA's mechanism of encouragement (threatening to cut federal highway funding) reasonably related to a federal interest in limiting youth drunk driving [3], but that argument deserves further scrutiny. In her dissent, Justice O’Connor states that “establishment of a minimum drinking age of 21 is not sufficiently related to interstate highway construction to justify so conditioning funds appropriated for that purpose [4].” Justice O’Connor's disagreement isn’t about the acceptability of the federal government conditioning funds on a given state policy; rather, it is about how reasonable relation is undefined by any test or objective measure. This reasonable relation is judged primarily on the basis of personal belief rather than precedential guidance, leading Justice O'Connor to disagree about the sufficiency of the relationship between federal highway construction and limiting youth drunk driving. Justice O'Connor's view is defensible, and the majority opinion does not establish a specific test for determining the relatedness of future funding conditions beyond mandating that the conditional funding is related to the federal program that receives funding. To that end, a novel relatedness test should mandate that the release of contingent federal funding is sufficient to establish a causal link in ameliorating the policy problem, which would ensure federal funding is legitimately related to the problem it is trying to solve. For this mechanism to work, Congressional committees would need to strike any contingent funding programs that are insufficiently related to improving a policy issue. Using the standard of clear and convincing evidence (i.e., that something is highly likely to be more true than untrue [5]) to this end is justifiable, as it splits the difference between the preponderance of evidence standard (which could be too low a bar for a possible constitutional issue) and the standard of beyond a reasonable doubt (which would hamper Congress's ability to utilize conditional funding beyond what Dole intended). A novel relatedness test would preserve the spirit of the Dole ruling, ensuring that the Federal Government's efforts in shaping state policy are reasonable, and that the Federal Government is aiding states effectively in solving specific problems. In this case, a causal link in Dole is difficult to establish because the funding is insufficiently related to solving the problem the Federal Government hoped to reduce: youth drunk driving. If a new rule mandating a causal link between policy improvement and federal funding were adopted, the NMDA would be struck down.

Further, Dole mandates that conditional spending must not be coercive, as it would serve as a federal mandate. This mandate would violate the 10th Amendment, which reserves rights not granted to the federal government for states or the people [6]. Legislators who were opposed to this act discussed the notion that alcohol policy was within the domain of states, and that the act represented a federal intrusion into the established rights of states, with Senator Max Baucus arguing during floor debate that "How can it be said realistically that the States are free to choose their own drinking age when they face the immediate cutoff of Federal funds if they make the wrong choice [7]?"Dole initially found the NMDA non-coercive, arguing the funding is a small percentage and that the program's success should not be taken to mean the NMDA was coercive [8].

Precedentially, coercion regarding federal compulsion of state action is remarkably ill-defined. National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius (2012) held that a federal threat to strip states of all Medicaid funding if they did not comply with novel Medicaid coverage expansions was unconstitutionally coercive [9]. While Dole did not consider the NMDA coercive, where the Supreme Court draws the line is unclear. There has only been one instance wherein aid has been considered coercive, Sebelius [10], so any percentage cut of funding from 9% to 99% could be construed as acceptable given the current precedent (as the percentage of federal highway funding considered non-coercive for the federal government to threaten cutting was 8% via Dole, and the only percentage of government fund withholding considered to be coercive by the Supreme Court was 100% regarding Medicaid via Sebelius), and the lack of an applicable test for future conflicts regarding the coerciveness of funding cuts. On a different note, the Dole ruling could lead the federal government to influence state decision-making procedures often, threatening states with deprivation of funding sufficient to effectively pressure states but low enough to comply with the Supreme Court's nebulous definition of coercion. John Kincaid, PhD, writing for the Center for the Study of Federalism, notes that there was a rise in congressional "earmarking" for grants-in-aid, particularly after Dole until 2011 (when the policy was ended, though earmarking is presently acceptable as of 2021), which reduces local authority to allocate monies, so the Federal Government is shaping state policy through the power of the purse [11]. Specifically, the number of earmarks used in 1998 was approximately 2000, but by 2011 (post-Dole), thousands more were adopted [12].

President Trump has attempted to force states to comply with his executive orders through contingent funding, but his actions have been limited because the funding he sought to restrict was unrelated to the action he sought from the states (e.g., conditioning disaster preparation funding on willingness to cooperate with Federal immigration policy) [13]. If the Supreme Court stated a percentage value or alternative test to determine what qualified as coercion, and defined coercion in this circumstance in a manner that made it harder for the federal government to compel state action, the traditional balance of power between states and the federal government would be better protected.

The NMDA and Dole ruling should be contextualized by the 21st Amendment, which states that states have "broad authority over the regulation of alcoholic beverages [14]..." This also limits the federal government's ability to regulate alcohol with the Commerce Clause, albeit to some undetermined extent [15]. By that logic, the constitutionality of the NMDA could be called into question because it limits a power granted to states, or encourages states to cede an area of their constitutional dominion to the federal government for monetary gain. The Dole Majority argues, "Were South Dakota to succumb to the blandishments offered by Congress and raise its drinking age to 21, the State's action in so doing would not violate the constitutional rights of anyone." [16], but this is a source of error in the Court's ruling. Because the 21st Amendment grants states the authority to regulate alcoholic beverages, the Supreme Court erred because the Dole decision fails to recognize that the NMDA asks states to strip themselves of that established constitutional right, so South Dakota accepting "blandishments offered by Congress" would deprive South Dakota of its constitutional rights. The Dole majority contends that Congress's constitutional limitations are fewer when exercising its spending power than when undertaking direct action, so the NMDA does not violate the 21st Amendment. In countering that sentiment, Justice O'Connor's dissent argues that the federal government is nevertheless attempting to co-opt a power the states specifically reserve (which cannot be defended by the commerce or spending clauses), so the NMDA's compliance incentive is unconstitutional, even though it achieves its aims indirectly.

In conclusion, the Dole ruling would benefit from a definition of coerciveness and relatedness, which would clarify future acceptable Federal action regarding conditional funding.

REFERENCES

[1] Griggs, Brandon. 2014. “Should the U.S. Lower Its Drinking Age?” CNN. July 16, 2014. https://www.cnn.com/2014/07/16/us/legal-drinking-age.

[2] “Spending Power.” n.d. LII / Legal Information Institute. Accessed October 4, 2026. https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/spending_power.

[3] South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987)

[4] Ibid.

[5] “Clear and Convincing Evidence.” n.d. LII / Legal Information Institute. Accessed October 18, 2026. https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/clear_and_convincing_evidence.

[6] U.S. Const. amend. X.

[7] Liebschutz, Sarah F. “The National Minimum Drinking-Age Law.” Publius 15, no. 3 (1985): 39–51. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3329976.

[8] 483 U.S. 203 (1987)

[9] National Federation of Independent Businesses v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012)

[10] Kincaid, John. 2021. “Coercive Federalism.” Center For The Study Of Federalism. 2021. https://federalism.org/encyclopedia/no-topic/coercive-federalism/.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Bulman-Pozen, Jessica. 2026. “Commandeering, Coercion, and Executive Power.” Just Security. August 21, 2026. https://www.justsecurity.org/149211/commandeering-coercion-executive-power/.

[14] George, Robert, and David Richards. 2017. “Interpretation: The Twenty-First Amendment | Constitution Center.” National Constitution Center – Constitutioncenter.Org. 2017. https://constitutioncenter.org/the-constitution/amendments/amendment-xxi/interpretations/151.

[15] Ibid.

[16] 483 U.S. 203 (1987)

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