Over the past twenty years, the United States has spent more than six billion dollars in reparations for nuclear testing in the Freely Associated States (FAS), which consists of three Pacific Island nations: the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI), and the Republic of Palau [1]. Beyond the monetary amount the FAS receives, however, lies another vital transaction between the Freely Associated States and the US: a military compact that guarantees the US “full authority and responsibility for security and defense matters in or relating to the Federated States of Micronesia” [2]. Each compact for each FAS country reiterates this clause, so it applies not only to the FSM. Initiated by Congress, the Compacts of Free Association (COFA) have been in effect since 1986, and this agreement affects the three countries in the FAS.
To be considered “sovereign,” a nation must have the agency in determining its military strategy and migration policy, and must have freedom within its own economic zone. While the precise definition of “national sovereignty” is not rigorously defined in one document, over time, the United Nations and international treaties have similarly asserted that national sovereignty is more than a vague legal concept. Specifically, this article will look at three documents that outline the general historical development of national sovereignty and its relevance when considering the COFA case. This article will explore the question: Does the COFA’s terms, with all of the barriers it creates and adherence to US military strategy mean FAS countries are legally sovereign? When considering the extensive funding and foreign policy dictation the United States has over the Freely Associated States, the Compacts of Free Association creates tensions between the FAS’ legal sovereignty and practical autonomy concerning external sovereignty, monetary sovereignty, and its implied constraints on FAS’ contract-making powers.
In the compact, Article V and VII retains FAS’ external sovereignty, but contains restricting language with Article II, which places FAS’ foreign policy in the hands of US interests. External sovereignty is an integral component of national sovereignty, as outlined in the treaties of the Peace of Westphalia. The Peace of Westphalia, a set of two treaties created in 1648, is often regarded as the advent of nation-state sovereignty. The treaties essentially enabled independent states in Europe to govern independently after the Thirty Years’ War. They detailed a nation’s jurisdiction in its own territory and held the principle of non-interference from other nation-states [3]. However, recent legal scholarship undermines the merit of pinpointing the Peace of Westphalia as the exact birthplace of the modern nation, as the language of the document alludes to these key principles, which were not realized by European nation-states until later [4]. For instance, the territorial jurisdiction frequently cited through Article V §30 is a byproduct of its vague rhetoric of “the Right of the Territory and Superiority” [5]. The claim for non-interference is similarly found in Article VIII §2’s vague establishment of “the Right of making Alliances among themselves, or with Foreigners, for the Preservation and Security of every one of them” [6]. Yet, despite this revisionist critique of this “Westphalian sovereignty,” the general principles of non-intervention and territorial integrity are still underscored as vital to a nation’s sovereignty. Considering these vital components of national sovereignty, it becomes clear that the United States’ military claims on FAS through COFA undermines the island-nations’ agency. Specifically, § 311 grants the US “full authority and responsibility for security and defense matters in or relating to the Federated States of Micronesia” [7]. In effect, while FSM (along with RMI and Palau) are able to exercise military operations, the practical autonomy of their military operations may be impeded by American military interests. Moreover, § 313 outlines necessary "appropriate consultations" FAS nations must conduct with the US. Such consultations can restrict FAS’ agency in their actions if the US deems them "incompatible with its [American] authority and responsibility for security and defense matters” [8].
On the other hand, the FAS voluntarily entered the compacts and negotiated its terms to receive reciprocal benefits. In exchange for the provisions that make the three nations heavily impacted by the US—regarding official currency, EEZs, external trade, etc.—the citizens of each state received the right to study, work, and reside in the United States. [9] Article IV § 141 of COFA illustrates this benefit, which declares FAS citizens who migrate to the United States as “nonimmigrants” with special status. The compact, in its preamble, emphasizes the “voluntary association” of the Federal States of Micronesia and its people’s “right to enjoy self-government” [10]. Where this claim arguably deteriorates is in Article II, § 123 (a): “In recognition of the authority and responsibility of the Government of the United States under Title Three, the Government of the Federated States of Micronesia shall consult, in the conduct of its foreign affairs, with the Government of the United States” [11]. This consultation requirement may give the United States meaningful influence over FSM’s foreign affairs, but it does not itself require FSM to agree with US positions. Accepting the terms of COFA that place limitations on FAS sovereignty, the citizens of the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, and the Republic of Palau receive benefits through nonimmigrant status and monetary grants, albeit monitored by US agencies. While FAS does indeed maintain legal autonomy, COFA substantially limits their ability to exercise autonomy in economic and military affairs.
The open language of COFA’s territorial constraints on the United States and Article I’s description of US funding undermines FAS’ economic autonomy in external trade and domestic monetization. Closely tied to the FAS’ ability to conduct their own foreign policy initiatives is their right to exercise activity freely in their Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and economic development. EEZs are sea zones that belong to a coastal nation, determined by the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), where said nation has authority over the resources within that zone and the activities conducted within it. These two economic criteria are outlined in the 1982 UNCLOS and the United Nations General Assembly Resolution of February 23, 1998. The former document contends that in one’s EEZ, a nation shall “enjoy…the freedoms referred to in article 87 [referenced later]…and other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to these freedoms…” [12]. Further, Article 87 enumerates the freedoms of navigation, overflight, laying of submarine cables and pipelines, fishing, and so on, in the “high seas,” a term for all other areas of the sea not classified as an EEZ [13]. Article 58 is more relevant to this paper’s argument, but it is still assertable that both sections of the UNCLOS contradict the COFA agreement of 2023. In 1988, the EEZ belonging to the FSM was determined to be 200 nautical miles around its coastline. Moreover, within this area, consistent with the definition of an EEZ, the Federated States of Micronesia claims "sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting…with regard to other activities for the economic exploration and exploitation of the zone” [14]. COFA’s Title III Article I § 331 contradicts this, as it grants the US a broad option “to establish and use military areas and facilities in the Federated States of Micronesia” [15]. Second, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 52/119 adopted in 1997 reaffirms that Member States must adhere to and allow other nations “the right to self-determination, by virtue of which all peoples can freely determine, without external interference, their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development” [16]. Article I of the COFA agreement pertains to this, and the language directly challenges the UNGA resolution’s stress on economic autonomy: “Regulations and policies normally applicable to United States financial assistance to its state and local governments, as reflected in the Fiscal Procedures Agreement, shall apply to each sector grant described in section 211…” [17]. Essentially, this treats grants provided by the US and given to the FAS, identical grants the US gives its own domestic territories (or states). As such, in the compact FAS nations are supported as an extension of the US, albeit less absorbed than a formal state. To monitor the implementation and efficiency of these grants, section 213 sets the foundation for the Joint Economic Management Committee. Despite being “joint,” this committee is unevenly split; it comprises three US officials, while only holding two positions for FSM officials [18]. These officials are tasked with executing the economic objectives identified in section 211 (public infrastructure, humanitarian assistance, private sector development, education, etc.). Thus, while the FAS does structurally maintain a certain degree of sovereignty, their economies are substantially guided by the United States’ hands.
Numerous counterarguments arise concerning how this article defines national sovereignty and the extent to which monetary sovereignty is involved. Additionally, one may point out that the United States’ jurisdiction in FAS’ foreign affairs is quite limited and does not infringe on the states’ sovereignty. Granted, the United States concedes a lot of its foreign-policy powers over the Federated States of Micronesia in the form of mutual agreement. Still, the inclusion of a necessary approval by the United States government means that FAS countries have limitations in exercising their own interests without an overseeing power (the United States), as other independent states are able to. Certain foreign policy decisions may be constrained where they conflict with U.S. defense authority under the Compact. The latter claim that monetary sovereignty is not a core component of national sovereignty, I purport that monetary sovereignty is inherently intertwined with national sovereignty. This is especially the case because credit-based financial systems are increasingly prominent; so, to a certain extent, national sovereignty is a strong indicator of a state’s financial independence [19].
Conclusion:
Classifying the Freely Associated States as “sovereign” in their own right creates a significant tension between the United States and their legal authority to regulate different sectors of non-domestic states through mutual contracts. Yet this argument is not constricted to the FAS alone. As the United States and other global superpowers aim for hegemony across vast economic zones and regions, one may recognize a broader pattern more akin to the legal principles of imperial sovereignty rather than strict state sovereignty. Though COFA was a byproduct of collective decision-making between the states involved, it does not bind with characteristics that have traditionally defined national sovereignty. Rather, a nuanced or flexible definition of national sovereignty would be more accurate. In conclusion, edging the line between complete agency and full dependence on the United States, the Compacts of Free Association create dependency on the United States thereby reducing the Freely Associated States’ claim to national sovereignty.
Footnotes
Reuters. “Marshall Islands Calls for US to Pay More Compensation over Nuclear Tests.” World News. The Guardian, July 13, 2023. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jul/13/marshall-islands-pacific-us-nuclear-bomb-test-payment.
“Compact of Free Association Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Micronesia,” art. I, § 311.
“COFA,” art. V, § 30; art. VII, § 2.
Andreas Osiander, “Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth,” International Organization 55, no. 2 (2001): 251–87.
“COFA,” art. V, § 30.
“COFA,” art. VII, § 2.
“COFA,” art. I § 311.
“COFA,” art. I § 313.
“COFA,” art. IV, § 141.
“COFA,” Preamble.
“COFA,” art. II, § 123.
UNCLOS Part V, Article 58.
UNCLOS Part VII, Article 87
“Code of Federated States of Micronesia concerning Territorial Boundaries and Economic Zones,” Public Law No. 5-112, § 7.
“COFA,” art. I, § 331.
UN General Assembly, Resolution 52/119, “Respect for the principles of national sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of States in their electoral processes,” A/RES/52/119, December 12, 1997, https://docs.un.org/A/RES/52/119.
“COFA,” art. I, § 212.
“COFA,” art. I, § 213.
Katharina Pistor, “From Territorial to Monetary Sovereignty,” 18 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 491 2017, https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/2279