How Far Does Executive Authority Stretch?

The agency responsible for managing the United States’ entire copyright system is now at the center of a battle for control with the president. In October 2020, the Librarian of Congress, Carla Hayden, appointed Shira Perlmutter as Register of Copyrights. As the Librarian of Congress, Hayden served as the primary executive officer for the Library of Congress, the nation’s largest library and the foundation of research for Congress [1]. Perlmutter, as the Register of Copyrights, serves as the head of the U.S. Copyright Office and helps lead the federal copyright registration system [2]. In May 2025, President Donald Trump fired Carla Hayden over a controversy driven by the American Accountability Foundation, a conservative group, which claimed Hayden promoted “inappropriate” content in children’s literature. Former White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt said the removal came because Hayden “did not fit the needs of the American people,” having done “quite concerning things… at the Library of Congress” [3]. Under the library’s LCR 1-120 regulation, Hayden was originally to be replaced by Principal Deputy Librarian Robert Newlen, but President Trump overrode the appointment and made his own, appointing Deputy Attorney General Todd Blanche [4]. Trump justified this action by claiming that the Librarian of Congress acts as an “Officer” of the United States and exercises executive powers through the Copyright Office, placing the role under the President’s authority under Article II of the U.S. Constitution because executive endeavors answer to the President [5]. The Supreme Court ought to uphold standing LCR 1-120 of the Library of Congress Regulations on the succession of Librarians of Congress, rejecting executive efforts to manipulate role selections in ways that deviate from standard policy. In light of this tension over executive authority, presidential purview should not extend to the Register of Copyrights, a position exclusively presided over by the Librarian of Congress.

The Library of Congress functions as a federal government agency under the legislative branch, and this status protects it from laws and restrictions that other executive agencies must follow [6]. Executive involvement in the Library of Congress continued with Blanche, who—days later—fired Shira Perlmutter after her report on artificial intelligence, which examined whether AI systems should be allowed to use copyrighted material to train algorithms [7]. Subsequently, Perlmutter filed a lawsuit against the Trump administration, claiming that only the Librarian of Congress had the authority to remove her from her position. Perlmutter v. Blanche (2025) refers to Library of Congress Regulation 1-120, which describes the role of Acting Librarian of Congress and its succession order: “(1) the Principal Deputy Librarian; (2) the Deputy Librarian for Library Collections and Services; (3) the Chief of Staff; and, if necessary, (4) a designated service unit head” [8]. According to the suit, the circumvention of succession, with Blanche taking Hayden’s role, was unconstitutional and breached the separation of powers, invalidating Perlmutter’s removal [9]. With the first three articles of the U.S. Constitution establishing the principle of the separation of powers by outlining the respective powers and responsibilities of the three main branches of government [10], Perlmutter argued that because the Library of Congress fell under the legislative branch, it was not within the executive’s control to override existing regulatory procedure within the Library of Congress. 

The dispute raises questions about the scope of presidential control over Library of Congress officials. While the removal of Carla Hayden has some established precedent that may validate the president’s authority over her role [11], Perlmutter's case is unique because it operates outside the immediate domain of presidential oversight, calling into question the extent of the executive’s power. A legal justification may exist for President Trump’s authority to replace Hayden with Blanche, but no apparent legal basis supports extending that authority to Perlmutter’s position, a role exclusively overseen by the Librarian with an internal succession protocol. On succession to the Librarian of Congress title, the Supreme Court ought to uphold standing LCR 1-120 of the Library of Congress Regulations, rejecting executive efforts to manipulate role selections in ways that deviate from standard policy. In light of this tension over executive authority, presidential purview at the very least ought not to extend to the Register of Copyrights, a position exclusively presided over by the Librarian of Congress.


The Ambiguity of Acting Positions

While legal precedent for the succession of offices like the Librarian of Congress can be ambiguous, the Library maintains a clear procedure for selecting an Acting Librarian. A significant question for both longstanding and acting appointments is whether the president's appointments to such positions require Senate confirmation. While the Librarian of Congress requires Senate confirmation and serves a 10-year term [12], selecting an Acting Librarian does not require Senate confirmation. In these circumstances, legal procedure defers to the Federal Vacancies Reform Act (FVRA) of 1998, which provides protocol for searching for “an acting official to temporarily perform the duties of the vacant office” [13]. The first step in succession is for the role to go to the office's “first assistant,” which lacks a clear legal definition. Interpretations of what constitutes a “first assistant” often depend on a case-by-case analysis [14]. When considering succession to the Librarian of Congress, the library’s established regulations clearly indicate that the Principal Deputy Librarian is the first person considered for appointment as Acting Librarian. This case leaves little ambiguity, making it clear who a “first assistant” would be under the FVRA. An alternate option is for the president to choose any other “Senate-confirmed official” [13] or any high-ranking employee in the same department to fill the vacancy [14]. President Trump’s appointment of Blanche as Acting Librarian was not Senate-confirmed because it was only a temporary placement, and it fell under the FVRA's alternate vacancy choice since Blanche had recently been appointed Deputy Attorney General with Senate confirmation [15]. Although the executive department made this appointment, the Library of Congress does not recognize it; instead, Robert Newlen, the Principal Deputy Librarian, is considered internally the true Acting Librarian [16]. Because the alternate option of choosing a Senate-confirmed official comes after the FVRA’s recommended protocol of going with the “first assistant,” the Court ought to hold that the true path of succession goes to the Principal Deputy Librarian based on the Library of Congress’s established organizational procedure, which clearly defines that “first assistant.” There is no valid reason to pursue the secondary reason because the authors of the FVRA intentionally listed the “first assistant” pathway first, which naturally tends to be the first step in the order of succession. Ultimately, the administration’s use of the FVRA ignores the clarity provided by LCR 1-120, which gives a clear path for the Principal Deputy Librarian to fill Hayden’s shoes and no longer requires the president to choose another officer.


The Constitutionality of Hayden’s and Perlmutter’s Removals

When considering the executive department’s removals of Hayden as Librarian of Congress and Perlmutter as Register of Copyrights, several past cases on presidential appointments and removals come into play. The Court's ruling in Humphrey’s Executor v. United States gave Congress the authority to protect a non-executive agency—the Federal Trade Commission in Humphrey’s and the Library of Congress in Perlmutter—with provisions only addressing “for-cause” removals by the executive. In 1933, President Franklin D. Roosevelt asked William Humphrey, the commissioner of the Federal Trade Commission reappointed by President Hoover, to resign due to his conservative beliefs and oversight of many New Deal Programs. Humphrey refused and was later fired for policy reasons [17], with Section 1 of the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914 allowing presidents to remove commissioners for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office” [18]. Humphrey’s estate administrator, since Humphrey passed away before the case [19], filed a lawsuit. Humphrey’s Executor v. United States ultimately led the Supreme Court to find that “the intent of the act is to limit the executive power of removal to the causes enumerated, the existence of none of which is claimed.” This set the precedent that the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914 was not unconstitutional for interfering with the president’s executive authority and thus invalidated Humphrey's firing on policy grounds. Under this lens, the Library shares qualities the Court emphasized in the FTC: a fixed term length and a quasi-legislative role in setting guidelines for research and copyright [20]. The organizational commonalities between the FTC and the library stand as a basis for why the Court ought to rule similarly in Perlmutter. 

The Court’s reasoning hinged on the fact that the United States—the respondent—relied on Myers v. United States (1926), which validated the president's right to remove individuals in office who were part of the executive department. Because the Federal Trade Commission functioned with both judicial and legislative functions, it did not fall under the executive's purview. The same analysis translates to Hayden’s removal from the Librarian of Congress position; the Library of Congress does not fall under the executive and functions as a subsidiary of the legislative branch. Treating Humphrey’s as precedent invites the Supreme Court to rule for Perlmutter. Trump v. Slaughter (2026) complicates that evaluation.

Though Slaughter overrules the precedent set in Humphrey’s, the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Slaughter coupled with the context of the case encourages Perlmutter to be handled differently because of the absence of executive or investigatory power in the Register of Copyrights office. Rebecca Slaughter, like Humphrey, was serving on the Federal Trade Commission as a commissioner when she was fired by President Trump because her “continued service on the FTC [was] inconsistent with [his] Administration’s priorities”, using his authority under Article II as the legal basis [21]. In Trump v. Slaughter, however, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of Trump, establishing the highly executive nature of the Federal Trade Commission in its ability to investigate private parties and set standards that carry the form of law. Article II of the Constitution gives the President unfettered discretion to make appointments and removals at will in agencies with this executive nature [21]. With Perlmutter, the nature of the Library of Congress separates her firing from Slaughter’s. Because the library is primarily a research body, it has no executive power like the FTC, whose investigations can carry the force of law. This distinction is crucial because otherwise, broadly applying Trump v. Slaughter could dangerously extend presidential authority to a wide range of governmental positions, beyond just those that deal with executive responsibilities. Distinguishing bodies like the Library of Congress from the FTC in terms of executive oversight is essential to determining how far executive authority extends. 

Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (2020) establishes a constitutional standard for office leadership, and its findings protect the Library of Congress from prospective executive oversight. During a Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) investigation into Seila Law LLC, the law firm challenged the CFPB's structure as a violation of the Constitution’s separation-of-powers principle. It argued that the organization’s ability to issue subpoenas and request evidence and materials, and its leadership under a single director with only for-cause removal, interfered with the executive department’s authority. The Court found the CFPB’s structure unconstitutional because Article II vests executive power solely in the President [22]. The only exceptions to potentially allow this structure were a multi-member leadership body or “inferior officers,” neither of which applied in Seila Law LLC. This ruling ultimately strengthened the President's authority, yet it applies weakly to Hayden’s removal and Perlmutter. The Librarian of Congress is not considered an “inferior officer,” and the librarian holds no significant executive powers that would impede the constitutional duties of the executive department. The Copyright Office has the same status because it sits under the Library of Congress [23]; its power is limited to the Library of Congress, and it faces the same authoritative limits. The Register is primarily responsible for advising Congress on the copyright system and providing information to federal agencies [24], roles without an executive quality. 

Perlmutter v. Blanche’s Timeline and its Essence to Executive Authority

After Shira Perlmutter filed her suit against the Trump administration, the case was brought to the D.C. District Court with district judge Timothy R. Kelly. Initially, Perlmutter sought a temporary restraining order to stop her removal as Register of Copyrights, a non-permanent, immediate solution that would allow the case to proceed to a hearing. After that effort failed, Perlmutter sought a preliminary injunction, a longer-term decision that gives both parties time to prepare their arguments. Judge Kelly also denied the injunction, prompting Perlmutter to appeal to the D.C. Circuit. There, she received an injunction that allowed her to remain as the Register of Copyrights [25]. Subsequently, the Trump administration attempted to take back Perlmutter’s position while litigation continued, using the Supreme Court’s shadow docket. But, in June 2026, the Supreme Court shut down the administration’s efforts and allowed Perlmutter to keep her role a Register [26]. Analysis of each higher court's precedent shows that, upon closer review, the courts deferred to Perlmutter, as the case was brought to higher courts. The D.C. Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, the latter through an indirect judicial response, both ruled in favor of Perlmutter's remaining Register. Because much of the judicial difficulty Perlmutter faced stemmed from Judge Kelly’s treatment of the case in the district court, Perlmutter’s removal rests on concentrated opinions rather than broad judicial agreement. The case is now expected to proceed through deliberation, with a briefing deadline of October 30, 2026, for the D.C. Circuit [27]. 

The tension between the Library of Congress and the Trump administration reflects a growing gap in understanding where executive authority ends. Even with precedent such as Trump v. Slaughter, the extent of the President's discretion over any federal office remains undefined. Because the criteria established in prior cases, many of which contrast with Perlmutter v. Blanche, are inconsistent, the Supreme Court should use these circumstances to set the bar for where executive control ends in appointments and removals. Following precedent similar to Seila Law LLC, which limits executive authority in appointments and removals to offices that exhibit unitary demonstrations of executive power, the Court ought to maintain Shira Perlmutter as the Register of Copyrights. Otherwise, the extent to which a given executive administration can remove individuals in office at will remains boundless.

References

[1] Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 20540 USA. n.d. “About the Librarian | About the Library | Library of Congress.” Accessed September 28, 2026. https://www.loc.gov/about/about-the-librarian/.

[2] “ Overview of the Copyright Office | U.S. Copyright Office,” accessed October 4, 2026, https://www.copyright.gov/about/.

[3]  Andrew Feinberg, “White House Reveals Why Trump Fired Librarian of Congress,” The Independent, May 9, 2025, https://www.the-independent.com/news/world/americas/us-politics/trump-carla-hayden-fired-librarian-congress-b2748232.html.

[4] Kim, Seung Min, Zeke Miller, and Lisa Mascaro. 2025. “President Trump Fires Librarian of Congress Carla Hayden.” AP News, May 9. https://apnews.com/article/donald-trump-library-of-congress-carla-hayden-20a1862ce6d2e0d51a84a37b264ce2ef. 

[5] Dave Hansen, “Carla Hayden Removed as Librarian of Congress and What This Could Mean for Authors,” Authors Alliance, May 9, 2025, https://www.authorsalliance.org/2025/05/09/carla-hayden-removed-as-librarian-of-congress-and-what-this-could-mean-for-authors/.

[6]  “How We Buy | Doing Business with the Library | About the Library of Congress | Library of Congress,” web page, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 20540 USA, accessed October 4, 2026, https://www.loc.gov/about/doing-business-with-the-library/how-we-buy/.

[7]  O’Brien, Matt. 2025. “Trump Administration Fires Top Copyright Official Days After Firing Librarian of Congress.” AP News, May 11. https://apnews.com/article/copyright-director-firing-government-trump-7ab99992a96131bce7de853b66feec68. 

[8]  LCR 1-120 – Acting Librarian of Congress | LC Rules and Regulations.

[9]  Svirnovskiy, Gregory. 2025. “Ousted Head of Copyright Office Challenges Trump Administration in Court.” Politico, Politico, May 23. https://www.politico.com/news/2025/05/22/copyright-office-challenges-trump-administration-00367020. 

[10]  “Separation of Powers and Checks and Balances | Constitution Annotated | Congress.Gov | Library of Congress,” accessed October 4, 2026, https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/essay/artI-S1-3-1/ALDE_00013290/. 

[11]  “The Politicization of Federal Leadership: Record Non-Senate Confirmed Presidential Appointments and the Hollowing Out of Career Leadership,” Partnership for Public Service, March 23, 2026, https://ourpublicservice.org/know-the-facts/resource-library/reports/the-politicization-of-federal-leadership-record-non-senate-confirmed-presidential-appointments-and-the-hollowing-out-of-career-leadership/.

[12] “About the Librarian | About the Library of Congress | Library of Congress,” web page, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 20540 USA, accessed October 4, 2026, https://www.loc.gov/about/about-the-librarian/.

[13] Congress.gov. "The Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998." October 10, 2026. https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IG10088. 

[14] “Understanding the Federal Vacancies Reform Act,” September 20, 2020, https://www.rpc.senate.gov/policy-papers/understanding-the-federal-vacancies-reform-act.

[15]  “U.S. Senate: U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 119th Congress - 1st Session,” accessed October 4, 2026, https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_votes/vote1191/vote_119_1_00105.htm.

[16]  Kathleen McCook, “Robert Newlen, Acting Librarian of Congress -Standoff at LC | LHRT (Library History Round Table),” May 13, 2025, https://connect.ala.org/lhrt/discussion/robert-newlen-acting-librarian-of-congress-standoff-at-lc-1.

[17]  Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935)

[18]  “Federal Trade Commission Act,” Federal Trade Commission, July 19, 2013, https://www.ftc.gov/legal-library/browse/statutes/federal-trade-commission-act.

[19]  “Humphrey’s Executor v. United States,” Oyez, accessed October 4, 2026, https://www.oyez.org/cases/1900-1940/295us602.

[20] Sutherland, George, and Supreme Court Of The United States. U.S. Reports: Humphrey's Executor v. U.S., 295 U.S. 602. 1934. Periodical. https://www.loc.gov/item/usrep295602/. 

[21] 25-332 Trump v. Slaughter (06/29/2026), n.d.

[22] Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 591 U.S. ___ (2020)

[23] “Perlmutter v. Blanche,” Constitutional Accountability Center, n.d., accessed October 20, 2026, https://www.theusconstitution.org/litigation/perlmutter-v-blanche/.

[24] “17 U.S. Code § 701 - The Copyright Office: General Responsibilities and Organization,” LII / Legal Information Institute, accessed October 20, 2026, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/17/701.

[25]  “Perlmutter v. Blanche et Al.,” Levin Center for Oversight and Democracy, n.d., accessed October 4, 2026, https://levin-center.org/congressional-lawmakers/congressional-oversight-resources/oversight-case-law/case-list/perlmutter-blanche/.

[26]  “U.S. Supreme Court Declines Trump-Vance Administration’s Shadow-Docket Request, Leaving Protections for Copyright Office Leadership in Place,” Democracy Forward, June 30, 2026, https://democracyforward.org/news/press-releases/u-s-supreme-court-declines-trump-vance-administrations-shadow-docket-request-leaving-protections-for-copyright-office-leadership-in-place/.

[27]  “Perlmutter v. Blanche 1:25-Cv-01659 (D.D.C.) | Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse,” accessed October 4, 2026, https://clearinghouse.net/case/46635/.

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