Department of Homeland Security v. D.V.D.: A Final Step Back into Danger

1 Introduction

Protection from removal to one country does not necessarily prevent removal to another. For noncitizens who face this possibility, a new destination may also bring a risk of persecution or torture. Under these circumstances, what procedures and protections are required? Do district courts have jurisdiction over challenges to these procedures? Do they have the authority to grant relief?

In 2025, the government first sought emergency relief from the Supreme Court in Department of Homeland Security v. D.V.D. (2026) The Court granted a stay without resolving the legality of DHS’s policy. On September 29, 2026, the Court again granted emergency relief, stayed the district court’s final judgment, and agreed to hear the case on the merits. 

2 Facts

2.1 Policy Backgrounds

"Third-country removals" describe the government's practice of deporting noncitizens to countries that are not designated in their removal orders. The government may apply third-country removals when withholding of removal or the Convention Against Torture (CAT) bars removal to a designated country. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(2)(E)(vii), when removal to each country listed in the preceding clauses is impracticable, inadvisable, or impossible, the government may remove a noncitizen to another country willing to accept them. However, this statute did not provide a clear procedure for determining third-country removal.

On March 30, 2025, DHS issued a Guidance Regarding Third Country Removals, which adopted a two-track process to determine if a noncitizen selected for removal to a third country is likely to face torture or persecution there. Aliens may be removed to a third country without notice if the U.S. has received diplomatic assurances that aliens removed will not be persecuted or tortured. Otherwise, the aliens will receive actual notice and an opportunity for a prompt screening conducted by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). USCIS screens them to determine whether they are more likely than not to face persecution on a statutorily protected ground or torture in that country.

2.2 The Case Facts

The named plaintiffs, D.V.D., M.M., E.F.D., and O.C.G., filed this lawsuit on March 23, 2025. They alleged the potential risk of being persecuted or facing other kinds of violence if removed to a third country.

Plaintiff D.V.D., a Cuban citizen whose removal order designated Cuba as the only country of removal, feared that if deported to a third country, he could be persecuted because of his mental health condition or imprisoned. Plaintiff M.M., a Honduran citizen who had fled domestic violence, had received withholding of removal to Honduras but feared that a third country might return her to Honduras, where her husband could harm or kill her, or that her husband could locate her in a third country and attack her. Plaintiff E.F.D., an Ecuadorian citizen granted CAT protection in 2018, was re-detained and alleged that he had not been told when or where he would be removed.

Plaintiff O.C.G.'s experience illustrated the consequences of third-country removal without notice and an opportunity to be heard. After receiving withholding of removal to Guatemala, he was deported to Mexico without it being designated as a country of removal. According to his account, Mexican authorities offered him a choice between remaining detained for an unknown period while the asylum application was pending and returning to Guatemala. He finally chose to return to Guatemala.

The plaintiffs alleged that DHS failed to provide notice and an opportunity to be heard. They argue that this violated the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), § 2242 of the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 (FARRA), relevant implementing regulations, including 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16 and § 1208.18, and the Due Process Clause.

3 Procedural History

3.1 Initial District Court Proceedings

After the named plaintiffs filed a lawsuit in the District of Massachusetts on March 23, 2025, Judge Brian Murphy granted a temporary restraining order on March 28. The government appealed and sought a stay. While that appeal was pending, DHS issued the March 30 Guidance. The government then requested an indicative ruling, which asked the district court to indicate that it would dissolve the temporary restraining order in light of the Guidance. On April 7, the First Circuit Court of Appeals denied the stay request.

On April 18, the district court granted the motion for class certification and a preliminary injunction, requiring written notice and a meaningful opportunity to raise a fear of return to claim for CAT protection. The government then filed another appeal for a stay on April 22, which was denied on May 16.

3.2 The Supreme Court's First Intervention

The government applied to the Supreme Court on May 27 after the First Circuit denied the request for a stay. On June 23, the Supreme Court stayed the April 18 preliminary injunction, with Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson dissenting. The Court then clarified on July 3 that a remedial order which addressed earlier violations could not enforce the stayed injunction. DHS issued further guidance in July, and litigation over the underlying claims continued in the district court. On July 15, plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment and requested an indicative ruling that the district court would dissolve its preliminary injunction if the First Circuit remanded.

3.3 Final Judgment and Supreme Court Review

Following the remand, the district court dissolved the injunction and entered final judgment on February 25. In the final judgment, it declared the rights to notice and an opportunity to raise protection claims, but set aside DHS’s third-country removal policy. The government then appealed and obtained a stay pending appeal. On September 18, the First Circuit largely affirmed the judgment. On September 23, it confirmed that its stay pending appeal was dissolved.

The government returned to the Supreme Court on September 24, applying for a stay of the district court's order and an immediate administrative stay. On September 29, the Supreme Court stayed the district court’s February judgment and granted review. The final judgment brings remedies including classwide declaratory relief and Administrative Procedure Act (APA) vacatur to the court. Whether 8 U. S. C. § 1252(f)(1) permits those forms of remedies is now a central question on review. The oral argument is scheduled for December 9, 2026.

4 The Question Presented

The main questions the parties need to argue include: (1) Whether the district court had jurisdiction over Respondents’ claims. (2) Whether the district court had authority to enter classwide declaratory relief and APA vacatur under §1252(f)(1). (3) Whether the Government’s Guidance on third-country removals is unlawful under § 1231(b), the Due Process Clause, or FARRA/CAT and its implementing regulations. (4) Such other questions that the Government determines are appropriate for the proper disposition of the case.

Before the Supreme Court are the petitioners: DHS, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Attorney General, and the superintendent of the Plymouth County Correctional Facility. The respondents are D.V.D., M.M., E.F.D., and O.C.G., proceeding under pseudonyms on their own behalf and on behalf of absent class members.

5 The Parties' Arguments

This section focuses on the petitioners' and respondents' arguments in their briefs. The petitioners argue that (1) the district court lacked jurisdiction over respondents' claims; (2) the district court lacked authority to enter classwide relief under 8 U.S.C. 1252(f )(1); (3) in all events, the Guidance is lawful. The respondents', in response, argue that (1) Congress did not bar judicial review; (2) §1252(f)(1) precludes injunctions, not other classwide remedies; (3) DHS's third-country removal policy is unlawful;

5.1 Question 1: District Court's Jurisdiction

On the district court's jurisdiction, the petitioners argue that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the respondents' claims for three reasons. First, they argue that § 1252(g) provides that the district court does not have jurisdiction over "any cause or claim" "arising from the decision or action" to "execute removal orders against any alien." They then invoke the definition of "execute" as "To complete;...... to perform;...... to carry out according to its terms; …" from Black's Law Dictionary, and argue that the third country's decision is included in the execution of a removal order. Additionally, they draw support from Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (AADC, 1999), in which the Supreme Court held that § 1252(g) covers executing removal orders, to argue the district court lacks jurisdiction.

Second, the petitioners argue that § 1252(b)(9) and § 1252(a)(5) also provide that no court shall have jurisdiction to review questions of law and facts about removal except through a petition for review. Challenges to third-country removal procedures are thus restricted because the decision of destination is "the essential last step" in removal. Meanwhile, the petitioners reject the district court’s concern that such claims cannot be raised during the original proceedings because the destination has not been selected. They argue that practical difficulties cannot override the statutory text, even if some questions consequently become unreviewable, because Congress can entrust their final resolution to the Executive.

Third, the petitioners invoke § 2242(d) of FARRA and § 1252(a)(4), arguing that these provisions further preclude the district court's jurisdiction over claims under CAT, including regulatory and related due process claims grounded in FARRA. They then argue that bringing these claims under the APA does not change their basis in CAT. Otherwise, the restrictions would be ineffective because CAT is not self-executing and FARRA creates no cause of action.

In response, the respondents argue that Congress did not bar judicial review because respondents' lawsuit challenges DHS’s denial of mandatory protections, instead of the removal orders or the government’s authority to remove them to third countries.

First, drawing on AADC and Jennings v. Rodriguez (2018), they argue that § 1252(g) protects discretionary enforcement decisions from judicial review, not every action related to removal. They then explain that their challenge concerns a policy that bypasses statutory safeguards before removal, which DHS has no discretion. They also invoke DHS v. Regents of the University of California (), where § 1252(g) did not bar review of DACA’s rescission.

Second, they argue that §§ 1252(b)(9) and 1252(a)(5) do not channel these claims into petitions for review of existing removal orders. The policy applies after removal proceedings have ended, and then DHS selects a country not previously designated. Respondents therefore could not have raised country-specific protection claims in those proceedings before the proceedings end. Moreover, petitions for review are limited to the administrative record, which cannot address claims arising from later events.

Third, they argue that § 1252(a)(4) and FARRA § 2242(d) do not bar their claims. They do not challenge CAT regulations or the denial of an individual CAT claim. Instead, they bring an APA challenge to a policy that prevents them from presenting protection claims and creating an administrative record for review. Finally, they present a due process claim which challenges the absence of procedures protecting a liberty interest.

5.2 Question 2: District Court's Authority to Grant Declaratory Relief and APA Vacatur

On the district court's authority to grant declaratory relief and APA vacatur, the petitioners argue that § 1252(f)(1) precludes both the classwide declaratory relief and APA vacatur because both restrain the operation of the INA's removal provisions. First, they argue that the district court lacked authority to grant classwide relief under § 1252(f)(1), which prohibits lower federal courts from enjoining or restraining the operation of the INA's removal provisions on a classwide basis. They also invoke California v. Grace Brethren Church (1982), in which the Supreme Court interpreted similar statutory language to include declaratory relief. That interpretation defeats the lower courts’ reliance on the statute’s failure to refer to declaratory relief. Second, they argue that the same reasoning bars the universal vacatur here. Referring to the Court’s interpretation of "restrain" in Garland v. Aleman Gonzalez (2022), they argue that the vacatur "check[s], hold[s] back, or prevent[s]" agency officials from conducting third-country removals under the Guidance.

The respondents argue that § 1252(f)(1) limits classwide injunctions, but does not bar declaratory relief or APA vacatur. First, on declaratory relief, they refer to the title of § 1252(f), "Limit on injunctive relief," and the text, which bars courts from "enjoin[ing] or restrain[ing] the operation" of specified INA provisions without mentioning declaratory relief. In response to petitioners' argument about California, the respondents distinguish this case as involving broader statutory language and federalism concerns surrounding state taxation; therefore, the decision does not establish a bar to declaratory relief under § 1252(f)(1). Second, on APA vacatur, they invoke Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms (2010) to distinguish vacatur from an injunction. They explain that while vacatur operates on the unlawful agency policy, an injunction directs officials' conduct. Therefore, vacatur leaves DHS free to conduct third-country removals under lawful procedures. They also clarify that they seek vacatur only as to the class in response to petitioners' objections to "universal" vacatur.

5.3 Question 3: The Lawfulness of the Government's Guidance

On the lawfulness of the government's guidance, the petitioner argues that the guidance is lawful. First, they argue that neither § 1231 nor the FARRA, nor their implementing regulations, set out specific procedures for third-country removals. In their view, Congress left the Executive discretion in procedures for assessing protection claims in third-country removals, and DHS exercised that discretion through the Guidance. Thus, they explain that the Guidance was adopted to fill the procedural gap and that it satisfies the Due Process Clause, because it guarantees that each noncitizen will either be removed to a country from which the United States has obtained credible diplomatic assurances, or receive actual notice and an opportunity to express fear of removal, which they affirmatively express. Finally, stressing that the Executive is entitled to the greatest deference in matters involving immigration and foreign affairs, they conclude that whatever the due process may require in this setting, these protections are sufficient.

The respondents focus heavily on this part, arguing that DHS's policy violates statutory, regulatory, and constitutional protections. First, they argue that § 1231(b)(3) and its regulations require individualized adjudication of withholding claims. DHS therefore cannot treat the absence of separate third-country procedures before the Guidance as permission to design a new regulation to bypass existing requirements. Second, they argue that FARRA and the CAT regulations require the opportunity to present protection claims. Although there's a diplomatic-assurances exception in CAT, it also requires individualized assurances and an Attorney General determination of reliability. Categorical assurances assessed only by the State Department do not satisfy that process. Third, they argue that both tracks in the Guidance violate due process: diplomatic assurance provides no notice or hearing, while the other gives only six to twenty-four hours' notice. Referring to A.A.R.P. v. Trump (2025), they argue that the abbreviated screening does not leave sufficient time to consult and gather evidence to establish full eligibility for protection, and provides no review of negative decisions.

The fourth question is omitted because the petitioners and the respondents have determined that no additional questions warrant briefing.

6 Conclusion

In sum, Department of Homeland Security v. D.V.D. (2026) interprets the difficulty of translating humanitarian commitments into effective and workable removal procedures. Diplomatic assurances and the screening DHS offers may help solve the dilemma, but their adequacy depends on whether they can identify individual risks before removal.

My tentative prediction is that the Court will narrow district courts' authority to hear challenges related to third-country removal procedures or grant classwide relief, without fully resolving whether the Guidance is lawful. However, no matter what the judgment will be, an actual notice and a practical opportunity to raise a fear before removal to a third country should be preserved. Also, noncitizens should have access to judicial review of DHS’s compliance with these safeguards to make sure the notice and screening are effective. As O.C.G.'s experience illustrates, without protection, third-country removal will be the final step back into danger for noncitizens.

Next
Next

Certiorari Granted for Rhoney v. Barbosa da Cunha: a Case on Mandatory Detention