As numerous cases have surfaced challenging the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) detainment practices, the Supreme Court has granted certiorari to hear Rhoney v. Barbosa da Cunha. On July 23, 2026, petitioner Philip L. Rhoney (on behalf of the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement) filed for a writ of certiorari and on October 1, was granted cert by the Supreme Court. In the case, the Supreme Court will address the question presented: “Whether 8 U.S.C. 1225(b)(2)(A) mandates the detention pending removal proceedings of aliens who, like respondent, are present in the United States without having been admitted.” The original case was heard on November 25, 2025 in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of New York. Then, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision on April 28, 2026.
Background:
Ricardo Aparecido Barbosa Da Cunha, originally from Brazil but having lived in the United States since 2004 or 2005, was never formally admitted by immigration officials. ICE officers apprehended Barbosa Da Cunha in September 2025 in Norwood, Massachusetts, while he was driving to work. The DHS consequently initiated removal proceedings against him. The DHS charged him as an "inadmissible alien” under the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), specifically § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) and § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I), for his entry and absence of sufficient immigration documents. Barbosa Da Cunha was then detained during removal proceedings under the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA)’s 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) which maintains that “categories of aliens must be detained.” Specifically, this applies to immigrants “seeking admission.” The IIRIRA amended the INA in 1996, and it modified the federal government’s jurisdiction in the removal of noncitizens. Per the INA § 235(a)(1), an “applicant for admission” describes aliens who reside (or have resided) in the U.S. without lawful admission. It has thus been contested as to whether an “applicant for admission” falls under those “seeking admission.”
Initially, respondent Barbosa da Cunha filed a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court of Massachusetts. However, since he was transferred to a detention facility in Buffalo, New York, his case moved to the U.S. District Court for the Western District of New York. The district court granted him the petition, holding that § 1225(b)(2)(A) is not applicable to him. They determined that “seeking admission” definitionally requires “active efforts to obtain admission.” Barbosa Da Cunha did not actively try to do so after being inspected. Instead, § 1226(a), which does apply to him, permits release on bond or conditional parole during removal proceedings. In essence, the court ruled that noncitizens already present in the U.S. have the option to pay a bond or be released on conditional parole during their immigration hearings; the government is not legally required to detain the individual.
Government’s Statutory Argument and Detainment Policy:
Under the Trump Administration, § 1225(b)(2)(A) was taken to include “applicants for admission” like Barbosa Da Cunha, but this was a change from previous implementation of the law. In Rhoney v. Barbosa da Cunha, petitioner Philip L. Rhoney argued that “[u]nder the plain language of § 1225(b)(2), DHS is required to detain all aliens…regardless of how long the alien has been in the United States…” Previously, Section 1225(b)(2)(A) was exercised regarding new migrants who were inspected directly at the border or shortly after they entered. Instead, for immigrants who had already established presence in the U.S. for many years—which usually entailed citizen family members, a long-held job, or something of similar nature—the DHS applied a different section: 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).
The DHS based the government’s statutory argument on the applicability of § 1226(a) to noncitizens who had entered the U.S. unlawfully. According to the petitioner, when Congress amended the INA with the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) in 1996, the term “entry” changed to “admission.” The IIRIRA enacted the amendment in question, § 1225(b)(2)(A). This induced a monumental change to numerous provisions of the INA by redefining the status of immigrants: “Instead of making physical entry into the United States the touchstone of an alien’s status, the ‘pivotal factor’ became ‘whether or not the alien has been lawfully admitted.’” Moreover, the government argued that 1225(b) applies to all noncitizens who have not been admitted, and any person who entered without inspection has not been granted “admission,” regardless of how long they have lived in the United States.
This points to a significant tension in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), specifically between 1225(b)(2)(A), which upholds mandatory detention, and 1226(a), which permits the evasion of detention via bond payments and parole. The district court of Western New York ruled that § 1225(b)(2)(A) was intended to apply exclusively to “new” noncitizens (essentially, noncitizens who had not been residing in the U.S. for a significant time period). Additionally, the court opined that government interpretation of 1225(b)(2)(A) would render 1226(a) “superfluous.” Such interpretation leads executive powers to justify the mandatory detention of noncitizens such as the respondent. In this case, the current administration had broadly applied one section of the INA while ignoring 1226(a) altogether. Yet, the court refused to rule on Barbosa da Cunha’s charge that his Fifth Amendment rights were violated. Barbosa da Cunha did get his bond hearing granted, however, and the court ordered the DHS to conduct the hearing within ten days or grant his release.
Court of Appeals:
The respondent was released on October 29, 2025, after his bond hearing the previous day. Consequently, the government appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Along with ten other federal appeals courts, the Second Circuit ruled against the mandatory detention of noncitizen residents. Nine of these were unanimous in their decision, with the exception of the Ninth Circuit and Seventh Circuit courts. The Fifth Circuit and Eighth Circuit, however, agreed with the government’s interpretation of 1226(a).
To the petitioner’s point that the DHS is required to detain all noncitizens regardless of their previous stay, Circuit Judge Joseph F. Bianco pointed out that bond hearing requests such as Barbosa da Cunha's would have been granted, and further, he would have been released while his hearings took place. Thus, the Court of Appeals concluded that the detention mandate in 1225(b)(2)(A) applies exclusively to “those noncitizens who present themselves at a port of entry for admission, or who cross the physical border into the United States but are apprehended at the ‘threshold of initial entry.’” The definition of “seeking admission” therefore exclusively includes people who “request” lawful entry after being inspected—not noncitizens with prior establishment in the U.S. The Court of Appeals, similarly to the district courts, then found unnecessary expansion of the phrase “seeking admission” with regard to the administration’s detainment practices.
Judge Joseph F. Bianco also opined: “...we join the overwhelming majority of federal judges…[to] conclude that the government’s novel interpretation of the immigration statutes defies their plain text.” So, the government was not just simply broadly applying § 1225(b)(2)(A), but they were intentionally—and unlawfully—disregarding § 1225(b)(2)(A), which allows noncitizens present in the U.S. to bond and parole. This decision by the court of appeals aligns with the Supreme Court’s previous understanding of both sections.
Further, the court was concerned that applying the detention mandate in § 1225(b)(2)(A) to cases such as the respondent’s would violate due process. They reasoned that previous implementation of the INA through the executive branch “strongly counsels against adopting” the current administration’s interpretation of the mandatory detention provision. The current administration’s attempt to impress a certain degree of ambiguity onto that provision, and their utilization of it, poses a “grave” threat of violating the Fifth Amendment. This pertains to the legal doctrine of constitutional avoidance: when there is an ambiguous law with two contradictory interpretations, and one of those interpretations can potentially violate constitutional law, the courts will rule in favor of the other interpretation.
Significance and Implications:
Circuit Judge Joseph F. Bianco wrote that he, amongst other federal judges, must “construe these statutes in a manner that would avoid the serious constitutional questions attendant to what would be the broadest mass-detention-without-bond mandate in our Nation’s history for millions of noncitizens.” In this, Judge Bianco alludes to the high stakes of Rhoney v. Barbosa da Cunha. Beyond Judge Bianco, civil rights organizations and other federal judges have urged the Supreme Court to affirm the lower courts’ rulings. If the court affirms the court of appeals’ and district court’s decisions, it would resolve the legal tension between 1225(b)(2)(A) and 1226(a) for noncitizens present in the U.S. without formal admission. Moreover, the ruling will imply the executive’s jurisdiction in immigration policy is, in legal principle, more confined than it currently claims. However, many predict this decision will be close. In recent immigration cases, namely Mullin v. Doe (2026), the court ruled 6-3 in favor of the administration. Thus, the court concluded that federal courts cannot review non-constitutional disputes regarding DHS’ changes to Temporary Protected Status designation. This reversed the lower courts’ ruling. Although it seems like the lower courts were quite consistent with one another in Rhoney, the Supreme Court’s opinion cannot be presumed to align with them. The court has yet to set an official date to hear the oral argument.