Introduction
In Allen v. Milligan (2023), the Supreme Court held 5-4 that Alabama’s 2021 congressional map likely violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) by diluting Black voting strength [1]. Despite Alabama having a Black voting-age population of over 27%, the state drew a map where Black voters could realistically elect candidates of their choice in only one of seven congressional districts [2]. Following the decision, the Court ordered Alabama to adopt a plan that included either an “additional majority-Black congressional district, or an additional district in which Black voters otherwise have an opportunity to elect a representative of their choice” [3]. However, the recent ruling in Louisiana v. Callais (2026) has narrowed the scope of Section 2 of the VRA. It stated that proving whether a map is an unconstitutional racial gerrymander depends on the intent rather than the outcome-based precedent previously established in cases like Allen [4]. In this article, I argue that the Court’s shift to an intent-based framework severely undermines the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments’ protections against racial vote dilution, leaving voters vulnerable. Furthermore, the emergency stay conflicts with the original intent of the Purcell Principle, permitting states to disrupt the status quo by leveraging a map already deemed unconstitutional in their elections.
Voting Dilution: Intent vs. Effects Argument
The emphasis on evaluating racially discriminatory intent will make it increasingly difficult to protect voters. To prove a Section 2 violation under the framework established in Thornburg v. Gingles (1986), the plaintiff must establish three preconditions:
“The minority must be large and geographically compact enough to be a majority in a reasonably configured congressional district”;
“The minority must be politically cohesive”; and
“The majority group must vote enough as a bloc to defeat the minority group’s preferred candidate” [5].
However, this framework was updated in 2022, when Louisiana redrew its congressional districts and was challenged by a federal judge in Robinson v. Ardoin (2022), who held that the map violated Section 2 of the VRA because it did not include an additional majority-Black district [6]. When Louisiana drew a new map, SB8, it was disputed as an unconstitutional racial gerrymander because the VRA did not require Louisiana to create an additional majority-minority district—there was “no compelling interest [justifying] the State’s use of race in creating SB8” [7]. Thus, this decision undermined the legal precedent of using outcomes to determine a map’s racially discriminatory character. Instead, Section 2 imposes liability only when there is a "strong inference that the State intentionally drew its districts to afford minority voters less opportunity because of their race” [8]. It is virtually impossible to prove racially discriminatory intent, as it will place additional evidentiary burdens on the plaintiffs to completely separate race and politics, which are often intertwined. It will also likely be difficult to find explicit statements from state governments that admit racially discriminatory intent when redrawing maps. As a result, the Louisiana ruling raises the bar for proving discriminatory intent by going beyond the original Gingles framework, enabling states to argue their case on legally permissible, partisan grounds instead.
Impact on the Voting Rights Act
The Louisiana ruling weakens the protections outlined in the Voting Rights Act. Dissenting Justice Kagan says that the “less opportunity” standard in Section 2 was designed to focus on the “‘results’” of a state practice [9]. Implementing “race-neutral procedures” can conceal race-based intent. Justice Alito, writing the majority opinion, argues that plaintiffs must show “voters [engaging] in racial-bloc voting that cannot be explained by partisan affiliation,” yet this is difficult to prove, as the two are often intertwined [10]. According to the Harvard Kennedy School, Republican state legislators will be more incentivized to eliminate Congressional districts that currently elect Black representatives, justifying their decision based on partisan grounds [11]. This creates tensions set against what Congress established in Section 2 of the VRA, making it easy to argue that any map allows participation regardless of how discriminatory it may be. The Louisiana ruling makes it nearly impossible to argue whether a map prevents members from participating.
Returning to Allen, the Court ruled that Alabama’s 2021 congressional map was unconstitutional gerrymandering under Thornburg's three preconditions. This is because Alabama drew districts based on gerrymandering techniques called “packing” and “cracking.” Despite Alabama voters typically voting largely on racial lines, the state drew districts where Black voters had an opportunity to select their preferred candidate in only one district—“packing”—whereas other Black voters were divided among multiple districts, also known as “cracking” [12]. The Court initially ruled that this map violated Section 2; however, as this case is now under review in light of the Louisiana ruling, new standards for evaluating the effective grounds of racial vote dilution may determine whether voting rights and political opportunity can be protected in future elections.
Counterargument
Proponents of the Louisiana ruling argued that any form of race-based redistricting or sorting is illegal. Justice Alito stated that “the State’s use of race in creating SB8… [was] an unconstitutional racial gerrymander” [13]. However, it can also be argued that SB8, in this case, was a remedy for previous discriminatory maps; thus, it does not violate the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, as the additional majority-minority district was intended to ensure that minority voting power was no longer “systemically dilute[d]” [14]. Additionally, some argue for race-neutral procedures instead. Even so, filing lawsuits in redistricting cases will be complicated because plaintiffs can now claim that they are creating congressional maps based on partisan advantage rather than racial grounds. This complicates matters because, as seen in Rucho v. Common Cause (2019), the Court ruled that although partisan gerrymandering is “incompatible with democratic principles,” it is a “nonjusticiable political question” outside the Court’s jurisdiction [15]. This supplements Justice Kagan’s criticism that this ruling essentially dismantles Section 2 by creating “untenable readings of statutory text, made-up and impossible-to-meet evidentiary requirements, disregard for precedent, and disdain for congressional judgment” [16]. There are no legal standards dictating how plaintiffs must control for party affiliation and demonstrate racial discrimination under these changed Gingles standards.
The Purcell Principle
The Court’s order granting an emergency stay illustrates how the Purcell principle can cause legal tension in upcoming 2026 midterm elections, as the stay disrupts the status quo rather than preserving it. In Purcell v. Gonzalez (2006), the Purcell Principle holds that courts should not change election rules too close to an election [17]. After the Louisiana ruling, the Court issued an emergency stay, permitting Alabama to use its 2023 congressional map despite an earlier district court ruling that the state intentionally diluted Black voters and violated the Fourteenth Amendment [18]. Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson dissented to the emergency stay, claiming that it will lead to a “chaotic election,” especially as hundreds of thousands of voter registrations would need to be changed under a “never-before-used congressional map that intentionally discriminates against Black Alabamians” [19]. Because the official court ruling will not be finalized until after the November election, Alabama is permitted to use the contested map in the 2026 election. This highlights the contradiction between plaintiffs’ use of the Callais framework to prove intentional race discrimination and the temporary allowance of this contested map. It is essential to note that this is not an isolated case. According to the National Redistricting Foundation, over 2.49 million people were “denied equal representation for two years and forced to vote under illegal maps because of Purcell” [20]. While some critics may argue that the emergency stay in Allen is only temporary—and not precedent—the stakes are raised as these midterm election results cannot be reversed.
Conclusion
As legal tensions arise over the new Louisiana ruling, it will affect not only voter protection rights but also the outcomes of previously established Supreme Court cases on racial vote dilution, creating potential administrative chaos amid the current midterm elections. The ruling significantly weakens the power of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments by allowing the defendants—the state governments drawing the congressional map—to conceal racial intent under the guise of partisan advantage, blurring whether plaintiffs can legally prove a Section 2 violation. In her dissenting opinion in Louisiana v. Callais, Justice Kagan even stated that the Court’s decision “renders Section 2 all but a dead letter” [21]. This decision has the potential to significantly dilute the voting power of Black and minority voters, especially in states where they tend to vote along racial lines.
Footnotes
[1] Allen v. Milligan, 599 U.S. 1 (2023)
[2] “Allen v. Milligan | American Civil Liberties Union.” n.d. ACLU. Accessed October 25, 2026. https://www.aclu.org/cases/thomas-v-allen-and-milligan-v-merrill.
[3] Allen v. Milligan, 608 U.S. 2 (2026)
[4] Allen v. Milligan, 608 U.S. 2 (2026)
[5] Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986)
[6] Robinson v. Ardoin, 86 F.4th 575 (5th Cir. 2023)
[7] Louisiana v. Callais, 608 U.S. __ (2026) (Alito, J. opinion for the Court; Thomas, J., concurring; Kagan, J., dissenting)
[8] Louisiana v. Callais, 608 U.S. __ (2026)
[9] Louisiana v. Callais, 608 U.S. __ (2026) (Alito, J. opinion for the Court; Thomas, J., concurring; Kagan, J., dissenting)
[10] Louisiana v. Callais, 608 U.S. __ (2026) (Alito, J. opinion for the Court; Thomas, J., concurring; Kagan, J., dissenting)
[11] Harvard Kennedy School. 2026. “What Louisiana v. Callais Means for the Voting Rights Act.” https://www.hks.harvard.edu/faculty-research/policy-topics/fairness-justice/what-louisiana-v-callais-means-voting-rights-act.
[12] “Cracking and packing Black voters: Alabama v. Milligan.” n.d. Emory University School of Law. Accessed October 29, 2026. https://law.emory.edu/news-and-events/releases/2023/07/smith-scotus-cracking-and-packing-black-voters-alabama-v-milligan.html.
[13] Louisiana v. Callais, 608 U.S. __ (2026)
[14] Louisiana v. Callais, 608 U.S. __ (2026) (Alito, J. opinion for the Court; Thomas, J., concurring; Kagan, J., dissenting)
[15] Rucho v. Common Cause, 588 U.S. 684 (2019)
[16] Louisiana v. Callais, 608 U.S. __ (2026) (Alito, J. opinion for the Court; Thomas, J., concurring; Kagan, J., dissenting)
[17] Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1 (2006)
[18] Allen v. Milligan, 608 U.S. __ (2026) (on application for stay)
[19] Ibid.
[20] National Redistricting Foundation. n.d. “Purcell Report: How Courts And Defenders of Gerrymandering Misused an Obscure Rule to Disenfranchise 2.5 Million People.” https://redistrictingfoundation.org/policies/purcell-report-how-courts-and-defenders-of-gerrymandering-misused-an-obscure-rule-to-disenfranchise-2-5-million-people/.
[21] Louisiana v. Callais, 608 U.S. __ (2026) (Alito, J. opinion for the Court; Thomas, J., concurring; Kagan, J., dissenting)