As of late, searches and seizures of personal devices and the digital personal data that they contain at many U.S. international border crossings have produced significant discourse as to what exactly is permitted under the Fourth Amendment. Depending on the court, the level of scrutiny seems to change. One particular instance from January 2025, highlighted by the case of United States v. Tunick, 1:25-cr-00499, (N.D. Ga.) has sparked controversy regarding the current precedent of digital seizures at the U.S border. In the case that it reaches the Supreme Court, the extent to which the Fourth Amendment applies at the border as well as how it pertains to digital devices and personal data will likely forever be changed. In this article, I will make the argument that there is insufficient historical or legal precedent supporting that a citizen must handover their personal, sensitive digital data stored within a digital device at the border without a warrant, and that a citizen may not be legally prosecuted under suspicion of destroying, deleting, or otherwise nullifying personal data in duress when made to surrender said device in custody.
The precedent comes from United States v. Ramsey (1977), a case regarding whether or not the inspection of incoming international mail from Thailand and subsequent discovery of illegal narcotics was constitutionally permitted under the Fourth Amendment, and to which the Supreme Court determined that "[border] searches without probable cause and without a warrant are nonetheless 'reasonable' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment."[1] For around fifty years, this precedent has stood, giving the federal government the authority to check anything they so choose that comes across the border; however, as technology has increased exponentially in both its prevalence and ability, it has inadvertently come with many changes—most notably to the amount of private information the average citizen carries nearly everywhere. This change, to many, suggests a detour from the previous measurements of authority granted, as highlighted by the Supreme Court's decision in Riley v. California (2014).
In Riley, police seized Riley's phone during an arrest on weapons charges, then used the saved data on the phone to, firstly, seek greater punishment in court related to his gang membership and, secondly, determine his address and obtain a warrant, from which they were able to search and seize evidence from his home that allowed them to charge Riley for drug and firearm offenses. The Supreme Court overturned the California ruling on his gang affiliation charges, citing that "police generally may not, without a warrant, search digital information on a cell phone seized from an individual who has been arrested."[2] This establishes the idea that the very personal nature of the data on mobile electronic devices is more comparable to that of one's home than personal property. To clarify, the phone itself was legally removed from Riley's person, as were his other effects; however, it was the act of searching and examining the data stored inside the phone itself that caused a breach in constitutionality.
Interestingly, in the case mentioned in the beginning, this time from a Georgia federal district court, the defendant, Sam Tunick, is an individual who has been charged under 18 U.S.C. § 2232, an old mercantile law regarding imported property, for his alleged "[d]estruction or removal of property to prevent seizure,"[3] a result of his alleged providing of a 'duress password'—a password that wipes a modified cell-phone when used—to border agents, causing his device to "[flash] several times" and "[appear] to restart.”[4] This case now brings up quite important questions about what particular Fourth Amendment rights apply to digital devices seized at the border, placing it at the forefront of U.S. constitutional discussion. Notwithstanding the previous nebulous ideas as to what is protected under the Fourth Amendment, there remains the burden of proving the existence of Tunick's data in the first place, let alone that it was destroyed, as alleged in his charge. While the Court is clear on its verdict allowing for heightened authority at international borders, questions arise from newer interpretations of personal data like the aforementioned in Riley v. California (2014). Among the most glaring of issues in the case against Sam Tunick is the terminology of 18 U.S.C. § 2232, which specifies that it targets the intentional destruction or removal of property to prevent seizure. The question, then, is what the Supreme Court defines data as; and, secondly, to what extent do the Fourth Amendment's protections apply to it? Unsurprisingly, the Court's definitive answer to either of these seems to be left intentionally vague.
The ruling in Riley v. California (2014) suggests similarly. The Court held in Riley that searching the data stored within one's personal digital device is generally not permitted under the Fourth Amendment, with some notable exceptions. These exceptions specifically cite the case of Kentucky v. King (2011) as the criteria for their ability to be presently invoked. In Kentucky, the Court cited that "exigent circumstances," determined in the earlier 9th Circuit Court decision in United States v. McConney (1984) as "those circumstances that would cause a reasonable person to believe that entry (or other relevant prompt action) was necessary to prevent... the destruction of relevant evidence[,]"[5] are only applied when "police do not create the exigency by engaging or threatening to engage in conduct that violates the Fourth Amendment."[6] In the case of Kentucky, police were accused of violating the Fourth Amendment by entering a home after hearing noises inside they believed to be "consistent with the destruction of evidence."[7] The subsequent search and evidence found as a result were determined to have been acceptable under the exigent circumstances exception, as the officers "did not create the exigency by engaging or threatening to engage in conduct violating the Fourth Amendment."[8]
Moreover, in a recent 6-3 ruling in Chatrie v. United States (2026), the Court established that the procurement of Okello Chatrie's location data from Google by police officers was legally considered a Fourth Amendment-protected search because "an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his cellphone location information."[9] This ruling may be inferred to present personal data as being protected under the Fourth Amendment, but not without some hesitations, in part due to the Court's careful specification of 'location information.' Therefore, in examining the case of Sam Tunick, it can be inferred that the behavior of Agent Findley et al., in threatening seizure of his personal device and, thus, the data within, with the intentions of pressuring Tunick into opening his phone for them to search,[10] would, therefore, have excluded Tunick's situation from being considered under exigent circumstances of a lawful Fourth Amendment search because as ruled in Kentucky, the agents created the exigency through threatening Tunick with conduct that would violate the Fourth Amendment, that being a seizure of data on a cell phone under Riley. Had the agents not threatened him with an unconstitutional seizure through giving an ultimatum, then there would be no exigency, as Tunick would not have been pressured to provide a passcode to wipe the phone. Thus, following the precedent in Kentucky, the exigency in the case against Tunick would not fall under the definition of applicable exigent circumstances.
As some might counter, the more recent ruling on the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals case U.S. v. Cardozo (2026) might provide some legal friction, as it held that "manual searches of cell phones at the border are routine border searches and do not require individualized suspicion," thus suggesting that these searches are not protected under the Fourth Amendment as they are routine (as protected under Ramsey). To that end, the Circuit's decision has come along during the process of Tunick's trial, so while this opens room for thought and further debate about the Fourth, the decision in Cardozo will ultimately be legally ineffectual to the Atlanta federal district court's decision. However, in the case that the district rules against Tunick and goes onto the appellate court, wherein the prosecution will likely use the ruling of Cardozo, then my response will come directly from the Fourth Circuit's added stipulation for "distinguishing such [routine searches] from forensic searches, which are nonroutine and require some level of individualized suspicion."[11]
In the case of Tunick, the present officers, Agent Findley et al., were using the threat of seizure to lure Tunick into providing them with his password, so that they would not be required to use a forensic search. Because of this happening while Tunick was already in secondary or prolonged inspection, and seeing as Tunick "asked four times during the interrogation to speak with a lawyer,[12] to which he was denied, there are raised questions of Sixth Amendment violation, as once one is subjected to Secondary Screening by CBP, there are certain requirements that they must give to citizens. For Tunick, the fact he was questioned by federal agents about child sexual abuse images could be considered an attempt to receive an admission of guilt through coercion, something that cannot be done lawfully unless Miranda Rights have been read,[13] which Tunick testifies did not occur.[14] Moreover, in spite of the prosecution's other claims, there remains the objective difficulty in proving beyond a reasonable doubt that there was data destroyed on Tunick's phone. As data has not been determined to be property by the Supreme Court, and no tangible or visual evidence proves any data, evidence or not, was destroyed, there is certainly room for reasonable doubt on whether Tunick's data even existed in the first place, and the grounds on which he can even be tried for something as non-material as data.
As elaborated above, there are plenty of differing legal precedents that might lead the case involving Sam Tunick to be problematic for prosecutors to secure a conviction in. Hence, it is my firm belief that the rights under the Fourth Amendment, as relating to data and seizures at international borders, should be specified in order for such a legal scenario to not occur. No matter the angle of dissection, in this situation there is present a gross negligence in the upholding of the basic constitutional rights of Mr. Tunick. In fact, it is the very circumstances that allow for this violation in the first place that are currently warping the original intent and purpose of the Fourth Amendment. The digital world is upon us, and so with it comes the responsibility to determine what data truly is. There is no question that data should be protected under the Fourth Amendment as the very personal and sensitive collection of information it is. Nevertheless, until a decision is made and laws are written to clarify the extent to which that protection holds, the case of Tunick and undoubtedly many alike will be the only guides to where our rights over our personal data end and begin, leaving the future of the Fourth Amendment in a uniquely precarious position.
[1] United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606 (1977), Justia, 2026.
[2] Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014), Justia, 2026.
[3] 18 U.S.C. § 2232, “Destruction or Removal of Property to Prevent Seizure,” FindLaw.com, 2024.
[4] Patrick Quinn, “Atlanta Activist Faces Federal Charge after Airport Phone Search,” Atlanta News First, 2026, https://www.atlantanewsfirst.com/2026/08/07/atlanta-activist-faces-federal-charge-after-airport-phone-search/.
[5] United States v. McConney, Justia, 2026.
[6] Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452 (2011), Justia, 2026.
[7] Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452 (2011), Justia, 2026.
[8] Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452 (2011), Justia, 2026.
[9] Chatrie v. United States, 609 U.S. ___ (2026), SCOTUSblog, 2026.
[10] Timothy Pratt, “US Government Targets Cop City Protester over Phone Operating System,” The Guardian, 2026, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/jul/23/cop-city-protester-phone.
[11] United States v. Cardozo, No. 25-4239 (4th Cir. 2026), Justia, 2026.
[12] Pratt, “US Government Targets Cop City Protester.”
[13] “Involuntary Confessions by Criminal Suspects & Legal Concerns,” Justia, 2025.
[14] Pratt, “US Government Targets Cop City Protester.”