The International Legitimacy of Palestine: A Legal Case for Statehood

In the past few months, there has been a sudden surge in international recognition of Palestinian statehood, and amid continued hostilities without international intervention, the question of the legitimacy of the Palestinian state is as relevant as ever. This article seeks to answer the question: Does Palestine meet the international criteria for statehood, and if so, what rights follow?

Palestine is among only two states that lack full UN membership, having been restricted to the status of “observer entity” since 2012 [1]. To answer the question of statehood, the most widely cited and internationally recognized objective framework for determining statehood is the Montevideo Criterion. Established in 1933 at the Montevideo Convention, its express goal was to offer an objective criterion for statehood to be used by the international community (specifically in the Americas), and was signed by 19 states [2]. It has since become the international standard for defining statehood. These criteria fall under the classification of customary international law, a classification derived from 1) the extensive, widespread, consistent use throughout the international community, and 2) the international belief that the practice is legally required (opinio juris) [3]. The criterion states: “The state as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: a) a permanent population; b) a defined territory; c) a government; and d) capacity to enter into relations with other states” [2]. Palestine satisfies these internationally recognized criteria for statehood and should therefore be treated as a state with the associated rights, including the right to participate in treaties, exercise territorial sovereignty, and receive protection under international humanitarian law.

Firstly, Palestine has a permanent population. The current populations of the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem total around five million people [4]; despite forceful expulsion during the Nakba in 1948 and scattering of refugees across the world, the current Palestinian population has demonstrated continuous residence and social organization in the territory since the Ottoman and Mandate periods [5]. While descriptions of the origins of a Palestinian identity vary, for this argument, even a conservative understanding would suffice: Descendants of the city dwellers and farmers who inhabited Palestine in 1919 still live in the region, and have formed defined communities and homes throughout the Palestinian territories [6]. Palestine currently has seven cities with populations over 100,000, 49 others with over 10,000, and many villages and sub-regions surrounding these urban areas [7]. This population is largely unmoved and dedicated to protecting their claim to the parts of the land they still retain, definitively satisfying the first condition of the Montevideo Convention.

Second, Palestine has a defined territory. While the borders have shifted and have been constantly violated by the creation of illegal Israeli settlements inside the West Bank, Palestine’s core territorial claim—the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem—has been consistently recognized by the United Nations as the “Occupied Palestinian Territory” [8]. Key resolutions, including UNSC Res. 242 (1967) and UNGA Res. 67/19 (2012), reaffirm these boundaries as forming the basis for Palestinian self-determination and future sovereignty [9, 10]. Moreover, the International Court of Justice (2004 Wall Advisory Opinion) accepted these same areas as the relevant Palestinian territory for legal purposes, confirming their international recognition [11]. Importantly, the requirement of a “defined territory” under international law does not necessitate fixed or uncontested borders. As the International Court of Justice clarified in the Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo (2010), the existence of unsettled boundaries does not preclude statehood [12]. Therefore, Palestine satisfies the second condition.

Montevideo’s criteria for a state’s government are unclear, and leave the government’s strength, scope, and regime up to interpretation. There are two relevant governing bodies in the case of Palestine: the Palestinian Authority and Hamas. The Palestinian Authority (PA) was created under the Oslo Accords in 1995 and serves as the current governing body of the West Bank [13]. The PA had control of Gaza until the elections and conflict of 2006, which relinquished control to the Hamas party [14]. It is important to recognize the flaws of these governments. The PA has lost public respect and functional efficacy, as its efforts have done little to curb settlement expansion or ease the military occupation. Hamas’ extremism and violence have likewise alienated it from its people, less than 10 percent of whom even participated in the 2006 election. Despite the PA’s and Hamas’s currently low capacity and dwindling public support, it is important to separate the failure of a government under occupation and immense conflict from a government lacking the capacity for effective control. Palestine’s governments still stand as evidence that there exist governing bodies whose institutions can be used as a platform for effective governance and statehood, if allowed sovereignty. The Montevideo criteria do not specify the necessity for a presently strong, united government, and therefore, Palestine remains eligible for statehood.

Critics of Palestine’s statehood often target its divided governance system, arguing that it renders Palestine both ineligible for statehood and unsustainable as an entity. However, the UN has historically accepted or upheld the statehood of divided states, and the international community has taken on the challenge of supporting a fractured state. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Germany, Cambodia, Vietnam, and Liberia all experienced extreme division or civil war, eclipsing the party-based division of the occupied Palestinian territories, and achieved or retained statehood [15]. UN-led support even helped stabilize and legitimize divided governments in states like Liberia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Cambodia [16]. Neither Montevideo’s language nor UN precedent supports the claim that Palestine’s internal division justifies denying statehood.

Finally, Palestine has demonstrated its capacity to enter into relations with other states. The primary diplomatic body of the Palestinian peoples has been the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), established in 1964. The UN recognizes the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people for international purposes, as clarified by UNGA Res. 3210 (1974) [17]. This organization represents Palestine in agreements like the Oslo Accords and occupies Palestine’s observer entity seat in the UN, mediating diplomatic activity. To this day, the PLO remains the primary representative of the Palestinian people and is evidence of Palestine’s legitimate claim to international diplomacy, satisfying the final condition of the Montevideo Criteria.

Despite Montevideo’s classification as customary international law, dissenters have criticized Montevideo’s declaratory approach, claiming that the political recognition by existing nations is a crucial variable. However, even with this “constitutive” approach to statehood, Palestine still meets the conditions for recognition as a sovereign state. Palestine has achieved an unprecedented level of international political recognition in recent developments. As of October 2025, about 81 percent, or 157 of 193 UN members, recognize a Palestinian state, including all of the Permanent Security Council members except the United States [18]. In the interest of promoting diplomacy, a large coordinated wave of international effort included new recognitions from France, the UK, Canada, and many other European and Caribbean countries [19]. Political acceptance of Palestine’s statehood is at an all-time high, from nations all across the political, economic, and social spectrum, reinforcing its constitutive qualifications for statehood.

Palestine’s claim to statehood is extremely robust, so why does statehood continually elude it? Why does earning statehood matter? In the 77 years since the creation of the Israeli state and European-backed recognition under the promises of the Balfour Declaration, there have been two formal applications for UN membership, one in 2011 and one in 2024 [20]. Both attempts were vetoed by the United States in council hearings before reaching the assembly [21]. The United States has held the belief, in line with Israeli constituents, that peace agreements should come first between Palestine and Israel, and international intervention by recognizing the Palestinian state impedes diplomacy [22]. This is not true. Even in the interest of not rewarding violence, Hamas’s conduct, however reprehensible, cannot legally vitiate the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination. The continued delay of Palestinian statehood has exacerbated the immense power imbalance between Israel and Palestine, making fair peace deals less feasible. Palestine is not entitled to treaty-making, and its lack of standing has structurally disadvantaged it in peace negotiations, creating asymmetry rather than enabling compromise [23]. In the West Bank, Israel often collects taxes on Palestine’s behalf, controls resources, and heavily restricts travel within and out of the territory [24]. Without statehood, Palestine lacks the grounds to resist these assertions legitimately and cannot even sue on its own behalf in the International Court. In the International Court, Palestine depends on other nations to bring forward these injustices, like how South Africa did in the case of genocide in Gaza [25]. Many of these very injustices, in fact, actively hurt Palestine’s case for statehood. The creation of illegal Israeli settlements in the West Bank directly confuses borders and encroaches on Palestine’s defined territory, and the blockade on Gaza heavily suffocates movement and attempts at governance [26]. In denying Palestinian statehood, the UN withholds the means—both rights and legal avenues—with which Palestine could facilitate peace-seeking with Israel, and legitimizes Israel’s continual attempt at suffocating Palestine’s case for statehood. While statehood would not immediately right injustices and balance power discrepancies, it remains an important international step in upholding equality, freedom, and self-determination in the long-term quest for peace.

Palestinian statehood is a legal right, affirmed by decades of international consensus, customary law, and international practice. Delaying this recognition has served to prolong conflict and allow violence to define what diplomacy should resolve. Recognizing this legal and diplomatic reality is not a reward for violence, but a step towards upholding international law and peace, and delegitimizing violence as a means of progress.

[1] United Nations General Assembly, “Status of Palestine in the United Nations.” Resolution 67/19, November 29, 2012.

[2] Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, 165 L.N.T.S. 19.

[3] International Court of Justice, Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations Advisory Opinion ICJ Rep. 174, 179–80, 1949.

[4] World Bank, “Population, Total – West Bank and Gaza,” World Bank Data (2024), https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=PS.

[5] Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, Palestine in Figures 2024, March 2025, https://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Downloads/book2715.pdf.

[6] Nathan Citino, Ana Martin Gil, and Kelsey P. Norman, “Generations of Palestinian Refugees Face Inertia,” Migration Policy Institute, February 2023, https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/palestinian-refugees-dispossession.

[7] World Population Review, “Palestine Cities by Population 2025,” World Population Review, https://worldpopulationreview.com/cities/palestine.

[8] United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), “Occupied Palestinian Territory,” 2025, https://www.unocha.org/occupied-palestinian-territory.

[9] United Nations General Assembly, Status of Palestine in the United Nations, UNGA Res. 67/19, November 29, 2012.

[10] United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, S/RES/242, November 22, 1967.

[11] International Court of Justice, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, July 9, 2004.

[12] International Court of Justice, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion (July 22, 2010).

[13] Oslo II Accord, Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Sept. 28, 1995.

[14] Reuters, “Israeli-Hamas violence since Gaza takeover,” Reuters, Dec. 29, 2008, https://www.reuters.com/article/economy/israeli-hamas-violence-since-gaza-takeover-idUSLT459032/.

[15] Matthias Schoiswohl, Status and (Human Rights) Obligations of Non-Recognized De Facto Regimes in International Law (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2004), 152–160.

[16] See, e.g., United Nations Security Council Res. 1509 (2003) (Liberia); UNSC Res. 1031 (1995) (Bosnia and Herzegovina); and UNSC Res. 745 (1992) (Cambodia).

[17] United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3210, A/RES/3210, October 14, 1974.

[18] Marium Ali, “Which are the 150+ countries that have recognised Palestine as of 2025?,” Al Jazeera, September 23, 2025, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/9/23/which-are-the-150-countries-that-have-recognised-palestine-as-of-2025.

[19] Ibid.

[20] Edith M. Lederer, “U.S. vetoes Palestinian request for full UN membership,” Associated Press, Apr. 19, 2024, https://apnews.com/article/un-vote-palestinian-membership-us-veto-8d8ad60d8576b5ab9e70d2f8bf7e2881.

[21] United Nations Security Council, Meetings Coverage and Press Releases, “Security Council Fails to Adopt Resolution on Palestinian UN Membership after Veto by United States,” April 18, 2024.

[22] Ibid.

[23] Yossi Mekelberg, “Recognition of the Palestinian State: Reducing the Power Gap.” Qantara, Jul 16, 2024, https://qantara.de/en/article/recognition-palestinian-state-reducing-power-gap.

[24] United Nations, The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Israel’s financial stranglehold on the occupied Palestinian territory must end: UN experts,” September 15, 2025, https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/09/israels-financial-stranglehold-occupied-palestinian-territory-must-end-un.

[25] Stephanie van den Berg and Anthony Deutsch, “South Africa brings case accusing Israel of genocide at the International Court of Justice,” Reuters, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/what-is-south-africas-genocide-case-against-israel-icj-2024-05-16/.

[26] International Court of Justice, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, July 9, 2004.