Competition Commission of India and Sporting Authorities - The Need for CCI’s Intervention to Prevent Abuse of Dominance by National Sporting Federations and their State Affiliates
Introduction:
The commercialization of sports has ignited a critical discourse on whether the actions of sporting authorities align with competition law principles. At the heart of this discussion lies the scrutiny of national sporting federations and their state affiliates, which have risen to dominant positions in the market. These bodies wield considerable influence, making pivotal decisions that can restrict players from engaging in tournaments or leagues not endorsed by them. In doing so, they could potentially curtail the marketplace and impact a multitude of stakeholders, ranging from players and coaches to referees, sponsors, and broadcasters. The role of the CCI becomes sacrosanct in order to prevent the abuse of dominant positions by these sporting authorities, ensuring that players and other key stakeholders are not unfairly disadvantaged.
Applicability of Competition Law Principles to Sports Governing Bodies:
The CCI strives to establish a competitive environment and ensure fairness in the marketplace. The provisions of the Competition Act, 2002 (‘Act’) [1] in India apply to entities that engage in economic undertakings in regard to those activities. In addition to their sport-related activities, sports-governing organizations are involved in hosting and managing events and tournaments that are commercially viable in the business context. In general, a rule imposed by a sporting federation that limits competition is justified only if it seeks a legitimate objective and if it is proportionate and essential to accomplish that goal. However, this will not hold true if a less restrictive regulation can be imposed in order to achieve the objective envisaged by the regulating authority. In an instance where the benefits of enforcing a legitimate regulatory imposition outweigh the consequences of restriction on competition, it will not be deemed as violative of competition law principles. This norm of forbidding authorities from undertaking decisions that are not inherently in pursuit of their legitimate objectives was analyzed in the landmark Wouters case [2] wherein measures taken in the public interest were not deemed as restrictive as per competition law. The Wouters doctrine [3] was also applied in the Meca-Medina case [4] wherein it was laid down that a rule with the legitimate goal of ensuring fair competition will prevail over a law deeming it as restrictive.
CCI’s Jurisdiction over Sporting Federations - The Need for CCI’s Regulatory Intervention through Investigations:
While sports bodies can argue that a particular sporting federation cannot be construed as an ‘enterprise’ within the ambit of Section 2(h) of the Act [5] since it is a not-for-profit entity, the argument is not valid because the CCI also takes into account the economic aspect of the sporting sector such as the involvement of sporting federations in various revenue-generating activities. This aspect was analyzed in Surinder Singh Barmi v. the Board of Control for Cricket in India (‘BCCI case’) [6] upon referral to the case of Motosykletistiki Omospondia Ellados NPID v. Elliniko Dimosio [7], which stated that the act of “organizing events” (involving the grant of various commercial rights) should be considered an economic activity [8]. The CCI, therefore, has the authority to investigate whether sporting federations have complied with competition law norms, similar to how the German National Competition Authority, the Bundeskartellamt, had opened a probe into an alleged anti-competitive agreement regarding Rule 40(3) of the Olympic Charter [9] between the International Olympic Committee and the German Olympic Sports Confederation to determine whether the ban on athletes using their unofficial Olympic sponsors can be considered anti-competitive [10].
As per Section 26(1) of the Competition Act [11], the CCI is required to direct its investigative arm, the Director General (‘DG’), to investigate an anti-competitive practice if there exists a prima facie case for the same. However, the DG does not have the authority to conduct a suo motu probe into the matter, as was observed in various cases, including Competition Commission of India vs M/S. Grasim Industries Ltd. [12], Fx Enterprise Solutions India Pvt. Ltd. v. Hyundai Motor India Ltd [13]. etc. which are in line with the S.V.S Raghavan Committee Report [14]. While the investigative wing of the CCI may not have the suo motu power to initiate investigations, the CCI can do so upon receipt of a complaint or a reference from a Central or State Government or statutory body or upon its own knowledge or information.
Abuse of Dominance and Sporting Federations:
In the context of sports, abuse of dominance takes place when a sporting federation that wields significant power in the sporting industry makes use of its uniquely suited position to restrict players and other interested parties from participating in or conducting events that are not recognised by their respective sporting federations. In this context, the role of the CCI becomes significant in enabling a conducive sporting environment for sportspersons as well as other interested parties by prohibiting anti-competitive agreements as defined in Section 3 [15] in addition to preventing abuse of dominance as per Section 4 of the Act [16].
When an organization is recognized as a national sporting federation for a particular sport, it becomes a dominant player in regulating and organizing sporting events as it can operate independently of the market forces (i.e., in this context, a national sporting federation can operate irrespective of whether there are competitors organizing sporting events not recognized by it). A federation’s dominant position is attributed to its affiliation with the MYAS and the exclusive rights it holds in conducting national championships as well as other prominent tournaments every year, determining the All India Rankings of registered players and selecting coaches, players, physiotherapists and other staff for the national team.
As per Section 4(2) of the Act [17], national sporting federations in India have a dominant position in the market, as the organization of sporting events which are done by the respective sporting federations in accordance with the National Sports Development Code of India, 2011 (‘Sports Code’), constitutes an economic activity. It is the responsibility of sporting federations to ensure that players, coaches, referees, sponsors, broadcasters, tournament organizers and other interested parties are not outright prevented from exercising their right to practice their profession or carrying on their occupation, trade or business since the same would be a violation of Article 19(1)(g) [18], which is a fundamental right guaranteed under the Constitution of India.
Examining the CCI’s Verdicts in Instances pertaining to Abuse of Dominance by Sporting Federations:
The proliferation of professional sports leagues in cricket, hockey, football, badminton, and kabaddi over the past ten years has led to numerous controversies regarding media rights assignments, player and rival league restrictions and possible violations of Sections 3 and 4 of the Competition Act, which forbid anti-competitive agreements [19, 20, 21].As such, the CCI has adjudicated some high-profile cases involving the economic aspect of sports. In the BCCI case, upon various allegations of abuse of dominance and denial of market access to other players by the BCCI (including alleged favoritism towards certain parties in awarding T-20 Contracts, management rights, sponsorship rights, broadcasting rights, etc.), the CCI directed the DG to investigate the matter upon observing that there was a prima facie case of violation of the provisions of the Act. The probe was not just restricted to the particulars stated in Mr. Barmi’s complaint but also emphasized on the applicable competition law principles. In Dhanraj Pillay & Ors. v. M/S Hockey India (‘HI’) [22], the informants alleged that HI, the national federation for hockey in India, had abused its powers by restricting unsanctioned hockey leagues from being conducted and also for entering into Code of Conduct Agreements with its players to impose disciplinary actions against them if found participating in these events. Despite noting the potential conflict of interest between HI’s “regulatory” and “organizing” roles and observing the need for a robust internal control system to differentiate between HI's two roles, the CCI cleared HI of the charges of abuse. In Confederation of Professional Baseball Softball Clubs v. Amateur Baseball Federation of India (‘ABFI’) [23], the informant complained against ABFI for prohibiting State Associations from dealing with unrecognized bodies and leagues in addition to stating that disciplinary action would be taken against players for participating in such tournaments and leagues. The CCI had observed that ABFI’s conduct had resulted in the foreclosure of the market and directed it to cease and desist from violating the provisions of the Act. On the whole, there are certain contradictory orders passed by the CCI, and there seems to be a lack of consistency in adjudicating disputes pertaining to abuse of dominance in sports.
The Ongoing Scuffles with the Grand Prix Badminton League and the Badminton Association of India - A Case for the Competition Commission of India
On April 10th, July 5th, and August 22nd of 2023, the Badminton Association of India (‘BAI’) issued circulars discouraging players, staff and coaches from participating in ‘unregistered tournaments’ and thereby prohibiting players and other interested parties from getting involved in Season 2 of the Grand Prix Badminton League (‘GPBL’), which was set to commence from 27th August, 2023 in Bengaluru. The matter was taken up by the promoters of GPBL, Bitsport Private Ltd., in the Karnataka High Court, which passed an ex-parte order to permit players to play in the league, noting that the BAI cannot prohibit players and other stakeholders from participating in the GPBL. Upon appeal by the BAI, the Supreme Court in Badminton Association of India v. Bitsport Pvt. Ltd. [24], quashed the order and sent the matter back to the Karnataka High Court, wherein a single-judge bench granted an interim order in favor of the GPBL. The same was upheld by a division bench. Despite the relief given by the High Court, the BAI had pressured players into not taking part in the league, causing the GPBL to become indefinitely postponed [25]
While badminton players competing at the highest international level have generally benefited from sponsorships, this is not always the case for many other renowned players. Players who have fallen off the top rankings due to injuries as well as up-and-coming players, frequently miss out on desirable sponsorships, making it difficult for them to pay for coaching fees and international travel costs. In circumstances like this, the most feasible policy decision would be to permit leagues such as the GPBL to be conducted to ensure that promising players are not deprived of their hard-earned incomes. In light of the BAI’s recent controversial restriction of players, it is questionable whether the advantages of the BAI’s regulatory powers outweigh the disadvantages. This prompts one to wonder whether the restrictions imposed by the BAI are in pursuit of their legitimate objectives of promoting and regulating the sport of badminton in India for the public interest.
As a legal recourse, the promoters of GPBL could approach the CCI seeking an order under Section 27 [26] by providing details of the alleged contravention, including details pertaining to the relevant product market, the documents related to the same, along with affidavits and evidence gathered, and by paying the applicable fee as per Regulation 49 of the CCI (General) Regulation, 2009 [27] and other subsequent Amendments.
Construing the BAI as an enterprise:
The CCI has jurisdiction over the present matter since BAI is a ‘society’ registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. As per Section 2(l)(v) of the Competition Act [28], a society is construed to be a ‘person’. In accordance with competition law principles, the BAI is required to be considered as an ‘enterprise’ within the ambit of Section 2(h) of the Competition Act in order to analyze whether Section 4 [29] would be applicable.
One of the objectives of the BAI, as stated in its Memorandum of Association, is to “encourage, standardize, control, promote and develop the game of badminton in India” [30]. While the primary functions of the BAI revolve around the regulation of the sport, it is also involved in the supervision and overseeing of organizational activities such as conducting various national-level badminton tournaments, including the annual national badminton championships in addition to international badminton tournaments as well. The BAI has also generated revenue from such activities through various means such as sponsorships, grant of media and broadcasting rights, sale of tickets etc., which can be deemed as economic activities. In the case of the Department of Sports v. Athletics Federation of India (‘AFI’) [31], AFI was deemed as an ‘enterprise’ owing to the economic activities undertaken by it, which are in line with the activities undertaken by the BAI. Notably, in the BCCI case, the Court laid down that sporting federations are to be construed as “enterprises” within the ambit of the Act and are required to be treated “at par with other business establishments.” Due to these reasons, the BAI can be considered as an ‘enterprise’ within the ambit of Section 2(h).
Determining the ‘Relevant Market’:
In Air Works India (Engineering) Private Limited v. GMR Hyderabad International Airport Limited [32], the Court observed that in order to determine the relevant product market as per Section 2(t) [33], the demand side substitutability of the product should be analyzed. As per Section 19(5) [34], the relevant market can be construed by giving due regard to the ‘relevant geographical market’ and the ‘relevant product market’. In this context, since the BAI is involved in providing services related to the organization of badminton events, the relevant market is the ‘market for the provision of services for the organization of badminton activities in India’ with ‘India’ being the relevant geographical market as per Section 2(s) [35] since the BAI organizes various events across India.
Establishing Dominance in the Relevant Market:
BAI is the apex authority for managing the sport of badminton in India. It has 33 State Associations and 4 other organizations as its members. By virtue of its association with the MYAS, the Sports Authority of India (‘SAI’), the Badminton World Federation (‘BWF’), Badminton Asia, and the Indian Olympic Association (‘IOA’), it has controlled badminton activities in India since 1934. The BAI also selects the Indian badminton team for various international tournaments. Its regulatory powers, including control over players, the ability to approve the entry of other private leagues etc., is critical for the success of other leagues. BAI can thus be considered as an authority that enjoys a position of dominance in the relevant product market of “provision of services relating to the organization of badminton activities in India.”
Establishing Abuse of Dominance as per Section 4 of the Competition Act:
The BAI has abused its position by restricting its registered players, coaches and technical staff from participating in “Unrecognised or Unauthorised Tournaments or Leagues” [36]. These discriminatory conditions have also restricted the entry of new leagues into the relevant product market. This foreclosure of market access was possible because the BAI used both its commercial and regulatory powers, while this abuse of dominance did not arise from a purely sporting decision. As per Section 4(2)(c) [37], abuse of dominance is established if any enterprise indulges in a practice that would lead to denial of market access. This has been reiterated in M/S Kansan News Pvt. Ltd vs M/S Fastway Transmission Pvt. Ltd, [38] Xyz vs Rec Power Distribution Company Ltd [39]. and other cases as well. By refusing to approve GPBL, BAI has inevitably misused its monopoly status. It can, therefore, be concluded that there exists a prima facie case of contravention of the provisions of Section 4 [40], which warrants a fit case for an investigation by the DG under Section 26 [41].
Juxtaposing the GPBL vs. BAI issue with the Athletics Federation of India case - Analysis of the Foreclosure of Market Access:
While the issue with the BAI’s restrictions can be compared to the AFI case since both these instances involve national-level federations restricting players from participating in their respective sporting events not recognised by their federations, it is essential to note the distinctions between these two cases.
Firstly, the effects of the limitation of the market for the organization of these sporting events are not the same. In the AFI case, the CCI had observed that the AFI’s decision to take action against athletes and other stakeholders who would encourage unauthorized marathons was not considered abusive. The rationale behind the conclusion seems to be that the AFI usually recognises only 11 marathons out of more than 300 every year in India. As such, it could not be argued that there was a contravention of Section 4 of the Act. Nevertheless, in the Indian badminton scenario, the Indian Badminton League, which was last organized in 2013, resulted in organizers suffering 25 Crores worth of losses [42]. The Premier Badminton League (‘PBL’), which was last organized by the BAI in 2020, has not resumed its activities post-pandemic due to losses incurred over the years [43]. This differentiates the GPBL from other regularly conducted tournaments. As a result, the BAI’s restrictions on organizing this league have more consequences than the AFI’s restrictions on the conduct of a marathon.
Secondly, the GPBL is a significant financial incentive for players as opposed to a regular national badminton tournament. With a prize pool of around 3 Crores, the GPBL benefits around 65 Indian players and 15 foreign players who could have earned somewhere between 2 lakhs to 15 lakhs by playing badminton for around two week [44]s. The prospects of the GPBL’s successful execution without financial constraints are much higher since it is run on a reasonable budget, which does not seem to be the case with PBL. From a monetary perspective, the BAI’s foreclosure of the market will have a much more debilitating effect compared to the AIF’s decision to prevent athletes from participating in marathons. Therefore, it should be noted that the CCI’s mandate in the AIF case may not be applicable in the present instance.
Competition law concerns with the Pyramid Structure in Sporting Governance:
The pyramid structure or chain of command is what governs the laws and practices in sports; the organizations at the top decide how most other sporting bodies operate, while those at the bottom follow orders [45]. This implies that the authorities in charge of governing and developing a particular sport are also involved in organizational activities which are commercial in nature. Primarily, the pyramid structure emphasizes on a chain of command by delineating the regulatory roles of different authorities, right from an apex international authority to national federations, state affiliates, district-level associations/clubs etc [46]. The Indian sports governance framework is also in line with the pyramid system, with the MYAS as the nodal authority under which other sporting bodies, such as the national sports federations for different sports, their respective state affiliates and district federations operate. While this hierarchy of having a single organization with overarching powers to regulate the sporting sector in a country can provide an adequate structure for organizing competitions from the grassroots to the elite level, this structure also seems to place a great deal of power in the hands of sporting authorities vis-à-vis registered players and private clubs. There are legitimate concerns that the pyramid structure can be a heavy cross to bear since it could result in various issues such as the foreclosure of market access to different stakeholders who are relatively new to the industry, restriction of the players’ freedom of movement by federations, denial of entry of private or rival leagues, discrimination, lack of checks and balances, increase in discretionary powers, lack of transparency in the decision-making process etc. which might potentially infringe upon the provisions of the existing competition law principles and statute of a particular country. The paradox of the pyramid structure for the organization of sports is that while it was allegedly established to make the sporting governance framework more efficient, it also has the potential to lead to anti-competitive behavior and abuse of dominance.
While national federations and their respective state affiliates play an important role in regulating, controlling, promoting and developing a particular sport in the country, this does not per se make it justifiable for a federation like the BAI to actively restrict players from taking part in tournaments organized by private entities especially since these are not taken into consideration while determining the All India Rankings of players and are, moreover, a lucrative means for players to win considerable prize money as winnings. There have also been instances where sporting associations have been de-affiliated by the MYAS due to procedural infirmities or non-compliance with the Sports Code, which can be detrimental to players. Moreover, the renewal of this status given to sporting federations has to take place annually, which ensures that no sporting federation can have an infinitely fixed tenure in India as per the Sports Code. Consequently, it can be deduced that the Sports Code had incorporated these provisions to enable fair competition and ensure that any competitor that has complied with all the prerequisites for the grant of the status of a sporting federation can become one if the existing sporting federation is de-affiliated. When all these are possible, it does not seem well-founded for a sporting federation to actively restrict players from engaging in tournaments or leagues not recognised by it.
The Viability of Sports Dispute Resolution to Ensure Compliance with Competition Law Principles:
Various international bodies, including the World Anti-Doping Agency and the International Olympic Committee (‘IOC’), have opted for dispute resolution mechanisms adopted by the Court of Arbitration for Sport (‘CAS’) [47]. While a dispute can be brought before the CAS only if the parties have an arbitration agreement that specifies the recourse to be granted by the CAS, an exception to this is stated in Rule 61(2) of the Olympic Charter, 2020 [48], which mandates that all disputes concerning the Olympic Games need to be referred to the CAS. One noteworthy instance of the CAS adjudicating a competition law matter is the case of Professional Football Agents Association (PROFAA) v. FIFA [49], where the CAS issued an award that examined various claims regarding the legality of the new FIFA Football Agents Regulations (FFAR) under the EU competition law and whether the restrictions imposed by FIFA were proportionate to the pursuit of its legitimate objectives.
While India is a signatory to the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1958, which ensures that CAS arbitral awards are recognised and enforceable in India [50], most of the Indian sports law disputes adjudicated by the CAS including International Association of Athletics Federations v. Athletics Federation of India & Ors., World Anti-Doping Agency v. Indian National Anti-Doping Agency & Mhaskar Meghali, World Anti-Doping Agency v. Indian National Anti-Doping Agency & Dane Pereira etc. are regarding anti-doping matters [51, 52, 53]. This shows that the relevance of the CAS for adjudicating abuse of dominance issues of Indian sporting federations is yet to be explored. Additionally, not all antitrust issues may be dealt with by the CAS since some national sporting federations in India and their state affiliates are yet to recognise its jurisdiction for settling disputes.
Concluding Remarks:
Sports federations are required to act as custodians of their respective sport for the public good. Due to the recent exclusionary practices deployed by sports federations, particularly the BAI, towards certain tournaments, it is essential for the CCI to examine the rules set by these governing authorities and their implications on different stakeholders. In furtherance of this, an in-depth competition law analysis in the Indian sports sector is required. The CCI could also consider providing a more empirical analysis for defining the relevant market of a sporting federation by utilizing substantial data, a precedent which it had set forth in abuse of dominance cases, including Prints India v. Springer India Pvt. Ltd. and MCX Stock Exchange Ltd. v. National Stock Exchange of India Ltd [54, 55].
Due to the increasingly commercialized activities taking place in the sporting industry, it is important for the CCI to intervene and investigate allegations of anti-competitive agreements being entered into as per Section 3(4) or instances of abuse of dominance as per Section 4(2)(c) to provide a conducive environment for the growth of sports in India. Moreover, the CCI should also examine the applicability of the Small but Significant and Non-transitory Increase in Price Test (‘SSNIP’) in addition to the demand/supply side substitutability for defining the relevant market in the sporting sector. The CCI could also consider referring to survey data of the television rating points of a particular sporting program compared to other sporting or entertainment programs to analyze whether a particular sporting program can be substituted with other sports or entertainment programs.
The CCI could also rely on the EU White Paper on Sports (2007) [56] to consider the concept of ‘specificity of sport’ and analyze whether or not sporting federations’ restrictive measures are essential for the effective regulation of a particular sport. The conflicting verdicts given by the CCI in abuse of dominance cases by sporting regulators result in questions being raised about the precedential value of these decisions. The “specificity of sport,” as stated in Article 165 of the Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community [57], recognises the need for a case-by-case analysis of whether a particular rule of a sport is in compliance with the existing competition law principles and statute.
There is also an increasing need for more clarity and consistency in the applicability of competition law principles in the Indian sporting industry. It is crucial to gain more clarity on the objectives of sporting federations that can be construed as anti-competitive. The CCI could consider launching a market study on the sporting sector in India by deploying qualitative and quantitative techniques using substantial data collected, interactions with stakeholders, survey responses, etc.
India is in dire need of a comprehensive sports legislation with adequate standards of transparency and accountability to regulate the sporting sector. This is significant as it would likely facilitate better participation from private entities as well. Due to the commercialised nature of the sporting sector, it becomes imperative for a competent legal environment and other mechanisms pertaining to private investments in Indian sports to safeguard the return on investments by investors, along with enabling players to get better funding. The CCI’s intervention in the sporting industry will become a monumental factor in precluding different stakeholders from being unfairly disadvantaged or discriminated against by sport regulating authorities.
References
[1] The Competition Act, 2002.
[2] Wouters v Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten (C-309/99) [2002] E.C.R. I-1577.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Meca-Medina v Commission of the European Communities (C-519/04 P) [2006] 5 C.M.L.R. 18.
[5] The Competition Act, 2002, §2(h).
[6] Surinder Singh Barmi v. the Board of Control for Cricket in India, Case No. 61 of 2010 (Competition Commission of India, 08/02/2013).
[7] C-49/07 Motosykletistiki Omospondia Ellados NPID (MOTOE) v. Elliniko Dimosio, 1 July 2008.
[8] Ibid.
[9] International Olympic Committee, The Olympic Charter, 8 August 2021.
[10] Bundeskartellamt, 'Sports, German Athletes and their sponsors obtain further advertising opportunities during the Olympic Games following Bundeskartellamt action - IOC and DOSB undertake to change the advertising guidelines' (2019) <https: data-preserve-html-node="true"//www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Publikation/EN/Pressemitteilungen/2019/27_02_2019_DOSB_IOC.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2> accessed 2 August 2023.
[11] The Competition Act, 2002, §2(h).
[12] Competition Commission of India v. M/S. Grasim Industries Ltd., LPA 137 of 2014.
[13] Fx Enterprise Solutions India Pvt. Ltd. v. Hyundai Motor India Ltd., Case No. 36 and 82 of 2014 (Competition Commission of India, 14/06/2017).
[14] S. V. S. Raghavan Committee Report, High Level Committee on Competition Policy, (August 2000).
[15] The Competition Act, 2002, §3.
[16] The Competition Act, 2002, §4.
[17] The Competition Act, 2002, §4(2).
[18] The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 19(1)(g).
[19] The Competition Act, 2002, §3.
[20] The Competition Act, 2002, §4.
[21] Cyril Shroff and Nisha Kaur Uberoi, ‘Sports and Competition Law in India: The Need for a Third?’ [2014] CPI Antitrust Chronicle <https: data-preserve-html-node="true"//www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/assets/Uploads/ShroffUberoiJAN-141.pdf>.
[22] Dhanraj Pillay & Ors. v. M/S Hockey India, Case No. 73 of 2011 (Competition Commission of India, 31/05/2013).
[23] Confederation of Professional Baseball Softball Clubs v. Amateur Baseball Federation of India, Case No. 03 of 2021 (Competition Commission of India, 03/06/2022).
[24] Supreme Court in Badminton Association of India v. Bitsport Pvt. Ltd., SLP(C) No. 17855/2023.
[25] Sudarshan N., ‘Grand Prix Badminton League Put off Indefinitely’ The Hindu (26 August 2023) <https: data-preserve-html-node="true"//www.thehindu.com/sport/other-sports/grand-prix-badminton-league-put-off-indefinitely/article67237810.ece>.
[26] The Competition Act, 2002, §27.
[27] The Competition Commission of India (General) Regulation, 2009, Regulation 49.
[28] The Competition Act, 2002, §2(l)(v).
[29] The Competition Act, 2002, §4.
[30] Badminton Association of India, Memorandum of Association, Clause 4(i) (September 11, 2017).
[31] Department of Sports, Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports v. Athletics Federation of India (‘AFI’), Case No. 01 of 2015 (Competition Commission of India, 16/03/2016).
[32] Air Works India (Engineering) Private Limited v. GMR Hyderabad International Airport Limited, Case No. 30 of 2019 (Competition Commission of India, 03/10/2019).
[33] The Competition Act, 2002, §2(t).
[34] The Competition Act, 2002, §19(5).
[35] The Competition Act, 2002, §2(s).
[36] Badminton Association of India, Notice, BAI/NOTICE/2023-232, available at https://www.badmintonindia.org/download/news/BAI-%20GENERAL%20NOTICE.pdf.
[37] The Competition Act, 2002, §4(2)(c).
[38] M/S Kansan News Pvt. Ltd vs M/S Fastway Transmission Pvt. Ltd, Case No. 26 of 2011 (Competition Commission of India, 03/7/2012).
[39] Xyz vs Rec Power Distribution Company Ltd., Case No. 33 of 2014 (Competition Commission of India, 05/5/2016).
[40] The Competition Act, 2002, §4.
[41] The Competition Act, 2002, §26.
[42] Vijaya Rathore, ‘Indian Badminton League: Organisers Suffer 25 Crore Loss’ The Economic Times (6 September 2013) <https: data-preserve-html-node="true"//economictimes.indiatimes.com/indian-badminton-league-organisers-suffer-25-crore-loss/articleshow/22352450.cms?from=mdr>.
[43] Shivani Naik, ‘A Two-Week League Gave India’s Badminton Players Chance to Earn in Lakhs. But a Federation Diktat Sees Them Counting Losses’ The Indian Express (31 August 2023) <https: data-preserve-html-node="true"//indianexpress.com/article/sports/badminton/a-two-week-league-gave-indias-badminton-players-chance-to-earn-in-lakhs-but-a-federation-diktat-sees-them-counting-losses-8911367/>.
[44] Ibid.
[45] André Oliveira, The “Pyramid System” Lex Sportiva, available at https://lexsportiva.blog/2019/03/22/the-pyramid-system/.
[46] Istrate, Ingrid, Macovei, Sabina and Bucur, Monica, ‘The Role of Performance Pyramid in Sports Management Case Study - The Athletics Section in CSM Onesti’ (2015) XXIV.
[47] Matthew J. Mitten and others, Sports Law and Regulation: Cases, Materials, and Problems (3rd edn., 2013).
[48] International Olympic Committee, The Olympic Charter, 8 August 2021.
[49] Professional Football Agents Association (PROFAA) v. Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), Arbitration CAS 2023/O/9370 (award of 24 July 2023).
[50] Arnav Bishnoi and Shikhar Agarwal, ‘Enforcement Of CAS (Court Of Arbitration For Sports) Awards In India’ (Mondaq, 2 August 2022) <https: data-preserve-html-node="true"//www.mondaq.com/india/arbitration--dispute-resolution/1216670/enforcement-of-cas-court-of-arbitration-for-sports-awards-in-india>.
[51] International Association of Athletics Federations v. Athletics Federation of India & Akkunji Ashwini, Priyanka Panwar, Tiana Mary Thomas & Sini Jose, Arbitration CAS 2012/A/2763 (award of 30 November 2012).
[52] World Anti-Doping Agency v. Indian National Anti-Doping Agency & Mhaskar Meghali, Arbitration CAS 2016/A/4626 (award of 20 September 2016).
[53] World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v. Indian National Anti-Doping Agency & Dane Pereira, Arbitration CAS 2016/A/4609 (award of 19 January 2017).
[54] Prints India v. Springer India Pvt. Ltd., Case No. 16 of 2010 (Competition Commission of India, 03/07/2012).
[55] MCX Stock Exchange Ltd. v. National Stock Exchange of India Ltd., Case No. 13 of 2009 (Competition Commission of India, 03/06/2001).
[56] Commission of the European Communities, White Paper on Sport, 11 July 2007, COM (2007) 391.
[57] European Union, Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community, 13 December 2007, 2007/C 306/01, available at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/238419/7901.pdf [accessed 22 August 2023].