Rollins v. Rhode Island State Council of Churches Re: November 11, 2025
In October 2025, the United States confronted the longest federal government shutdown in its history. When the fiscal year began on October 1, Congress had not enacted regular appropriations. President Donald Trump insisted on major federal workforce cuts and refused to sign spending bills, while Senate Democrats conditioned their votes on extending health-insurance subsidies. With no compromise by the October 1 deadline, a lapse in appropriations triggered the Antideficiency Act, which prohibits federal officers from “obligating or expending federal funds in excess of the amount available in an appropriation.” Most federal agencies furloughed employees and suspended services; the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) exhausted its $4.6 billion contingency reserve for the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) but announced on October 20 that it lacked enough funds to pay November benefits for roughly 42 million recipients.
Section 4 of the Food and Nutrition Act authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to administer SNAP “subject to the availability of funds appropriated under section 18 of this Act.” At the same time, the Act states that “assistance under this program shall be furnished to all eligible households who make application for such participation.” Seeing a mandatory promise in the statutory word “shall,” a coalition of cities, nonprofits, churches, and small businesses led by the Rhode Island State Council of Churches sued Secretary Brooke Rollins in the U.S. District Court for the District of Rhode Island. The plaintiffs argued that the USDA’s suspension of November benefits violated the Food and Nutrition Act, constituted arbitrary and capricious agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and caused irreparable harm to households and social‐service providers. They also challenged the agency’s early termination of time-limit waivers for able-bodied adults without dependents (ABAWDs), contending that Congress did not authorize retroactive cancellation of waivers and that sudden termination deprived states of time to adjust.
Judges John J. McConnell Jr. and Indira Talwani granted a temporary restraining order on October 31. They found that the plaintiffs showed a likelihood of success on the merits and that withholding aid would cause imminent harm to millions. The order compelled the USDA to continue paying full November benefits using its contingency reserve and to transfer funds from other nutrition programs as necessary. The government appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit and sought an administrative stay from the Supreme Court.
The plaintiffs [contend][13] that the Food and Nutrition Act’s guarantee that assistance “shall be furnished to all eligible households” imposes a nondiscretionary duty. Although the statute qualifies benefit payments as “subject to the availability of funds appropriated,” the plaintiffs argue that Congress also gave the Secretary emergency tools. Section 18 of the Act authorizes a contingency reserve and cross-program transfers; historically, the USDA used these authorities to cover funding gaps, such as during the 2013 and 2019 shutdowns. By refusing to use available reserves and transfer authority to pay full benefits, the agency departed from prior practice without explanation and thus acted arbitrarily under the APA.
The plaintiffs also assert that the decision to suspend benefits is subject to judicial review and not “committed to agency discretion by law.” They characterize the suspension as a termination of an entitlement that required notice and comment and say the agency failed to consider the reliance interests of states and beneficiaries. On the ABAWD waivers, they argue that the USDA’s early termination contradicts Congress’s decision to postpone new time-limit rules until FY2026 and therefore violates the APA’s prohibition on retroactive rulemaking.
Churches and cities further emphasise that SNAP is the difference between subsistence and starvation for millions of households. They stress that the statutory scheme aims to “safeguard the health and well-being of the Nation’s population by raising levels of nutrition among low-income households.” Suspending benefits during a budget standoff, they argue, would invert the program’s purpose and impose catastrophic burdens on food pantries and local governments.
Relying on the Antideficiency Act, the USDA contends that it cannot pay SNAP benefits once the appropriation for the program lapses. The Act forbids federal employees from “making or authorizing an expenditure from, or creating or authorizing an obligation under, any appropriation or fund in excess of the amount available.” The government argues that the phrase “subject to the availability of funds” is not a flexible guideline but a strict fiscal limit: when appropriated funds are exhausted, the Secretary must reduce or suspend benefits rather than raid other programs. It further argues that the district court’s order requiring transfers from the child-nutrition accounts “makes a mockery of the separation of powers” by forcing the Executive to violate the Antideficiency Act and by effectively appropriating funds without congressional authorization.
The government maintains that funding decisions are committed to agency discretion and thus exempt from APA review. Even if reviewable, it contends that its actions were reasonable: it used all $4.6 billion of the contingency reserve and issued partial benefits to cover November. Forcing the agency to exhaust other nutrition accounts would, in the government’s words, “starve Peter to feed Paul.” It also asserts that early termination of ABAWD waivers aligns with Congress’s broader welfare-to-work policies and that states were on notice of the impending change.
On appeal, the government sought emergency relief from the First Circuit. Judges on that court declined to enter an immediate stay but set expedited briefing. That same evening, Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson, in her capacity as the circuit justice, issued a temporary administrative stay of the district court’s order pending the First Circuit’s ruling. Unlike a merits stay that reflects a full Court vote, an administrative stay preserves the status quo while appellate courts consider the issues. By acting alone and issuing only a brief reprieve, Justice Jackson prevented SNAP funding from becoming another unsigned emergency ruling and signalled that the Supreme Court should not use its shadow docket to decide complex budget disputes. Her order pressures the First Circuit to address the statutory and constitutional questions on a developed record rather than allowing the Supreme Court, on first impression, to dictate whether millions will receive food assistance.
The shutdown’s context shapes this case. On November 10, the U.S. Senate approved a compromise spending bill that would restore funding through January 30 and stall President Trump’s workforce cuts. On November 12, the House returned to Washington and passed the bill, and President Trump signed it into law. With enactment now complete, the 42-day shutdown has formally ended, allowing federal workers to return to their jobs. Because USDA lawyers told the Supreme Court that an end to the shutdown would eliminate the need to pause the district court’s order, the Supreme Court’s stay may be short-lived. The legal dispute could become moot, at least for November benefits. Nonetheless, the underlying statutory interpretation remains important because future budget stalemates could trigger similar suspensions.
The case turns on the meaning of the statutory clause “subject to the availability of funds.” The USDA reads this clause as a hard ceiling: without a valid appropriation, the Secretary cannot issue benefits. The plaintiffs view it as a recognition of Congress’s obligation to appropriate funds, not a license to suspend aid when transfer authority and contingency reserves exist. The tension between these readings illustrates a broader debate over how strictly courts should enforce appropriation constraints when vital social programs are at stake.
The Antideficiency Act provides the Executive no leeway to obligate funds beyond what Congress appropriates. Yet the Food and Nutrition Act directs that assistance “shall be furnished” and authorizes the Secretary to run the program using appropriated funds and reserves. When courts construe these statutes together, they must reconcile Congress’s fiscal control with Congress’s welfare commitments. One possible interpretation is that the Secretary must exhaust all funds lawfully available before suspending benefits. The district court adopted this reading; the government contends that it complied by spending the reserve but had no authority to shift billions from child nutrition accounts.
Another issue is justiciability. The government’s claim that its funding decisions are committed to agency discretion by law raises questions about the proper scope of APA review. Courts traditionally defer to agencies on matters of resource allocation, but that deference is not absolute when Congress imposes mandatory duties. The plaintiffs’ challenge to the early termination of ABAWD waivers similarly implicates whether agencies may retroactively withdraw entitlements without clear statutory authorization.
Beyond statutory construction, the case highlights the moral dimension of budget standoffs. SNAP is the nation’s largest nutrition assistance program, serving more than 42 million people. The Food and Nutrition Act declares that the program aims to “safeguard the health and well-being” of low-income households. Using hunger as leverage in fiscal negotiations risks eroding public trust and undermining the premise that basic needs are not bargaining chips. Justice Jackson’s administrative stay and insistence on a transparent appellate process underscore the judiciary’s role in ensuring that emergency orders do not quietly reshape substantive rights.
Because Congress has now enacted the funding bill, the immediate crisis has passed; SNAP benefits will resume, and the case may be dismissed as moot. However, a ruling on the merits (i.e., whether from the First Circuit or the Supreme Court) could set a precedent for future shutdowns. A decision in the government’s favor would normalize benefit suspensions whenever appropriations lapse, effectively transforming the Act’s “shall” into “may” and leaving millions vulnerable during budget impasses. A ruling upholding the injunction would affirm that agencies must exhaust all lawful options to preserve statutory entitlements and that administrative convenience cannot trump human welfare. In a country where one in eight struggles to afford food, how courts interpret the phrase “subject to the availability of funds” will reveal whether statutory form can still protect human subsistence.