An Analysis of the Infamous Dred Scott Decision

The case of Dred Scott v. Sandford (1856)¹ is regarded as one of the most incorrectly decided cases in Supreme Court history. Dred Scott is an example of the Supreme Court manipulating the law in order to push a political agenda. The decision came at a time of heightened national tension surrounding the slavery debate. In this case, the Court thought they would be able to resolve the ongoing slavery debate by making it illegal for Congress to outlaw slavery in a new territory. Dred Scott was a slave who lived in Missouri that had moved with his master to the free states of Illinois and Wisconsin. When his master moved back to Missouri, Scott sued for his freedom claiming he became free when they moved to the free states. In Dred Scott, the Court was presented with several issues to resolve to determine whether Scott had a right to freedom or was to remain enslaved. The first issue presented was whether Scott was a citizen of the United States and, consequently, whether he had a right to bring his suit in front of the Court. The Court had originally ruled, in an extremely controversial manner, that Scott was not a citizen of the United States and therefore had no right to sue in federal court. Although it subsequently decided that this case should not be heard, the Court went on to make judgements on other issues surrounding the case regardless. The second issue presented was whether Congress had the power to ban slavery in the territories. The Court originally ruled that Congress did not have the authority to ban slavery in states that are not a part of the 13 original colonies. The third issue presented was whether Congress outlawing slavery was a deprivation of property without due process under the Fifth Amendment. The Court ruled that Congress could not outlaw slavery at all because they would be depriving slave owners of their property without due process. Although these decisions may seem absurd in modern context, this was the actual ruling by Chief Justice Taney, who used very little legal evidence to back up his position. The Dred Scott case was thus incorrectly decided not only morally but in its application of the law.

When addressing the issue of whether or not Scott was a citizen of the United States, we must first begin by clarifying the laws surrounding citizenship in the U.S. at the time. There is no explicit language in the Constitution that outlines any sort of explanation or requirement for what it means to be a state or national citizen. In the case of Scott, he was found under Missouri law not to be a state citizen, therefore he could not be considered a citizen of the United States. It is important to distinguish that his lack of citizenship status was due to state law barring Africans from becoming citizens, not a national level barrier preventing his citizenship on the basis of race. Each state had its own laws concerning citizenship; thus Scott was still eligible to become a citizen in a state in which the law deemed it permissible. It may be argued that the framer’s original intent was to never include African Americans or those of African American descent as citizens within the Constitution. However, when we look at the composition of the nation at the time of the ratification of the Constitution it is evident that five of the original 13 states included African Americans as citizens who themselves voted for the ratification of the Constitution. Had the framers intended to exclude this population, would they have allowed them to enter the new nation as citizens with the right to vote? Would these African Americans have voted to ratify a constitution that disenfranchised them and stripped away their rights?

The issue of citizenship then arises from the use of the word citizen in Art. 3 Sec. 2 Cl. 1 to describe how “citizens of different states…” can sue in federal court. This description of citizenship cannot be limited to those who are explicitly citizens of states as it would deny the right to trial for citizens such as Scott who are incapable of becoming citizens in the state in which they reside.² The fifth Amendment denies any person be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. The inclusive language used by the framers in this amendment guarantees any person regardless of state citizenship status the due process of law. Scott, being deprived of his liberty, had the right to be legally considered a citizen of the state in which he resided, with the term citizen here being crucially limited to one being able to bring suit in federal court. It may be refuted that the language in the Constitution is meant to only allow explicit “State citizens'' to bring cases to Federal court, but in doing so this would deny the right to due process for people who are not citizens of a certain state, and this exclusion could not have been the framers intent when writing “Any Person” in the Constitution. At the time, women and minors were able to bring cases to federal court even though they did not have the right to vote, outlining a distinction between citizens that enjoy the full rights of citizenship and those who have a right to sue. Denying Scott the right to trial here would incorrectly subject an entire class of people who would be found eligible for citizenship to punishment with no means of justice. The argument that Scott's rights could not be guaranteed because the Constitution explicitly limited the rights of his entire race does not hold, as no such exclusion exists. Given this analysis, it is apparent that the framers intended Art. 3 Sec. 2 Cl. 1 to guarantee justice to anyone in the United States, especially those present during the country’s founding, and it would not allow a state law denying citizenship to a certain group.

When addressing the issue of Congress’ ability to regulate slavery in the territories we must look into the clause in the Constitution that grants Congress this power. Art. 4 Sec. 3 Cl.2 states that “The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States.”³ On the surface the language of this clause seems to very clearly give Congress the right to create laws, which govern the territories belonging to the United States, which includes regulating slavery. The Supreme Court at the time argued that this clause only gave Congress the power to govern territories that were territories in 1789, and that Congress could only control new territory for the purpose of turning it into new states but could not interfere with the rights of citizens living within the territory. However, Congress’s actions before the Dred Scott case showcase that it had been using this clause to govern and create laws in territories acquired from foreign nations since the Constitution was ratified. For example, the Northwest Ordinance⁴ which created the plan for creating new states acquired in the Louisiana Purchase and outlawed slavery in those territories was created before the Constitution's ratification and was continuously followed thereafter. Surely if the framers had intended for this clause to mean that Congress could not govern territories after 1789, they would have repealed the Northwest Ordinance, but instead they allowed it to continue and for slavery to remain outlawed there. The use of this clause in conjunction with the Northwest Ordinance also meant that the Missouri Compromise was Constitutional and lay within Congress’ ability of regulating its territories. The Court had no basis to declare the Missouri Compromise unconstitutional in the Dred Scott decision.

When addressing the final issue of whether banning slavery is a deprivation of property without due process, we must look at the origin of due process and the constitutionality of considering enslaved people as property under due process. While it may be argued that these slaves are owned, bought, sold, and possess no free will, just like any other piece of property, this contradicts the historical context. The framers of the Constitution originally drew inspiration from the Magna Carta for due process. Many of the framers had also written the Northwest Ordinance around this same time. The ordinance outlawed slavery and remained after the Constitution was ratified but was not seen by the framers as violating the Magna Carta or the due process clause. Therefore, banning slavery cannot be interpreted as a violation of due process because if it was, then the framers would have acknowledged this contradiction and repealed the Northwest Ordinance. Had the framers intended for slaves to be considered property under due process, they surely wouldn’t have contradicted this claim by passing the Northwest Ordinance and undermining the very meaning of the Constitution’s text.

Thus, according to the argument outlined above, the Supreme Court should have deemed Scott able to bring his case to federal court; should have found that Congress had the constitutional ability to outlaw slavery in the free states where Scott resided; and should have made the overall decision that because Dred Scott had been taken to reside in a free state for an indefinite amount of time, he should have been considered a free man even though he had voluntarily returned to Missouri. A decision of this magnitude would have had quite the political effect in this period in U.S. history, but the Supreme Court should be focused on applying the law, not controlling the political atmosphere. This case serves as a valuable lesson for modern-day jurisprudence. Politically motivated decisions destroy the legitimacy of the court. It is no doubt a thin border, but with contemporary issues surrounding political court appointments and overturning precedent, the lesson of Dred Scott is as relevant as ever.

References

¹ Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856)

² U. S. Const. art. III, § 2, Cl. 1

³ U. S. Const. art. IV, § 3, Cl. 2

⁴ Northwest Ordinance, July 13, 1787; (National Archives Microfilm Publication M332, roll 9).