McFall v. Shimp and the Case for Bodily Autonomy

Six years after Roe v. Wade (1973), the landmark Supreme Court case that upheld a woman’s right to abortion based on her inherent right to privacy, the Common Pleas Court of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, ruled in favor of the “sanctity of the individual” to uphold women’s right to choice. The case, McFall v. Shimp (1978), ruled that a person could not be legally compelled to participate in medical treatment to save another person's life. The holding of McFall v. Shimp extends beyond this narrow circumstance; Judge John P. Flaherty applied the ruling to the moral obligations of people and other living things, citing the duty of the court to protect the individual from being invaded and hurt by others. [1] McFall v. Shimp employs the physical body's rights and duties, consistent with the discussion of reproductive rights during pregnancy—given the ongoing discourse on the legality of abortion, a critical examination of bodily integrity is necessary to distinguish moral conflicts from legal obligations. McFall v. Shimp set a legal precedent that an individual is not under compulsion to aid another person at their mental or physical expense, upholding the right to bodily autonomy found at the center of the debate on the legality of abortion.

Plaintiff Robert McFall, a thirty-nine-year-old asbestos worker, suffered from a rare bone marrow disease called aplastic anemia, causing his bone marrow to produce inadequate blood components. Without a compatible bone marrow donor, McFall had a slim likelihood of surviving, so McFall began searching for potential bone marrow donors among his relatives, including siblings and extended family members. [2] Defendant David Shimp, McFall’s forty-three-year-old first cousin, had high bone marrow compatibility with Robert McFall, but he refused to finalize the compatibility testing process since his wife discouraged it. McFall sought a preliminary injunction that would order Shimp to submit to the bone marrow transplant, but Presiding Judge John P. Flaherty Jr denied the request for a preliminary injunction, stating that while the defendant’s refusal was “morally indefensible,” the court would not force him to subject himself to the transplant. [3]

In McFall’s petition for the preliminary injunction, he asked whether “in order to save the life of one of its members by the only means available, [...] society may infringe upon one’s absolute right to his “bodily security.” [4] Judge Flaherty responded that the United States and its court must respect the individual’s bodily autonomy, writing: 

“For our law to compel defendant to submit to an intrusion of his body would change every concept and principle upon which our society is founded. To do so would defeat the sanctity of the individual and would impose a rule which would know no limits, and one could not imagine where the line would be drawn…For a society which respects the rights of one individual, to sink its teeth into the jugular vein or neck of one of its members and suck from it sustenance for another member, is revolting to our hard-wrought concepts of jurisprudence.” [5]

Thus, Judge Flaherty concludes that the court could not legally compel the defendant to medical treatment, despite his moral view of Shimp’s decision. 

In distinguishing the legal obligations from moral conflicts, McFall v. Shimp assessed a critical element of the right to privacy that permeates discussions of abortion and due process under federal and state court systems: bodily autonomy. [6] Bodily autonomy, defined as the right to govern one's body, protects an individual's security and integrity. [7] According to the court's decision, McFall’s right to life could not force Shimp to subject himself to the bodily intrusion of participation in a non-consensual medical procedure. This concept features prominently in the debate over the morality of abortion, as the sanctity of bodily autonomy supports protections for pregnant people to seek out safe and properly administered abortions. Debate persists over whether the government should restrict abortion based on the moral context of terminating a pregnancy, driven by a religious ideology that elevates human life's value, but, on the legal issue, the principles of bodily autonomy seem to clearly hold that the value of a human life does not negate the state’s legal inability to mandate the action of another. 

Countering McFall v. Shimp’s legal analysis upholding the right to bodily security, moral arguments against access to abortion emerged, asserting that pregnant people have a moral responsibility for their pregnancy and, thus, should assist the fetus’s survival. [8] Despite these arguments, McFall v. Shimp is clear that, on a legal level, courts may not intervene against the perceived moral fallibility of an individual's choice. On conserving respect for the individual, McFall v. Shimp's precedent clarifies the nuances of obligation between a pregnant person and the fetus, prioritizing the pregnant person’s health and choice. [9] As Judge Flaherty professes explains, the individual does not exist to serve the society as a whole. The critical language in McFall v. Shimp’s decision describing an individual sinking its teeth into another to gain sustenance illustrates a violent transgression into an individual’s right to privacy and choice; as applied to abortion, Judge Flaherty’s understanding of human obligation indicates that the right to life cannot legally impede the right to choose or refuse. 

[1] Jones, Gary E.., DeMarco, Joseph P.. Bioethics: Legal and Clinical Case Studies. N.p.: Broadview Press, 2017.

[2] Leagle. “McFALL v. SHIMP | 10 Pa. D. & C. 3d 90 (1978) | Ampc3d90189 | Leagle.Com.” Accessed March 2, 2021. https://www.leagle.com/decision/197810010padampc3d90189.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid. 

[6] LII / Legal Information Institute. “Privacy after Roe: Informational Privacy, Privacy of the Home or Personal Autonomy?.” Accessed March 3, 2021. https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-14/section-1/privacy-after-roe-informational-privacy-privacy-of-the-home-or-personal-autonomy.

[7] “Bodily Integrity and Security of Person.” Accessed March 3, 2021. https://whr1998.tripod.com/documents/icclbodily.htm.

[8] C’Zar Bernstein, Paul Manata, Moral Responsibility and the Wrongness of Abortion, The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy: A Forum for Bioethics and Philosophy of Medicine, Volume 44, Issue 2, April 2019, Pages 243–262, https://doi.org/10.1093/jmp/jhy039

[9] Scott, Rosamund. Rights, Duties and the Body: Law and Ethics of the Maternal-Fetal Conflict. United Kingdom: Bloomsbury Academic, 2002.