Learning Resources v. Trump - Kagan Opinion

Shortly after taking office in January 2025, President Donald J. Trump declared two national emergencies: (1) a drug trafficking emergency and (2) a trade deficit emergency. Invoking the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), he imposed sweeping tariffs on imports from multiple nations. IEEPA, enacted in 1977, authorizes the President to deploy certain economic measures in response to “unusual and extraordinary” foreign threats after declaring a national emergency. Once triggered, the statute permits the President to “investigate, block during the pendency of an investigation, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit” specified foreign-related transactions.
Relying on this authority, President Trump imposed both “drug trafficking” tariffs and broad “reciprocal” tariffs. The rates were repeatedly adjusted, expanded, suspended, and modified. Two sets of plaintiffs challenged the legality of these measures. In Learning Resources v. Trump, two small businesses sought injunctive relief in federal district court, arguing that IEEPA does not authorize tariffs. The district court granted a preliminary injunction. In a parallel case, V.O.S Selections, five businesses and twelve states filed suit in the Court of International Trade. The Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed the judgment in favor of the challengers, holding that IEEPA’s power to “regulate importation” does not authorize tariffs that are “unbounded in scope, amount, and duration.” The Supreme Court granted certiorari (before judgment of the D.C. Circuit) and consolidated the cases.

The legal question presented was whether the IEEPA authorizes the President to impose tariffs. The Court did not consider the wisdom of the tariffs, the validity of the emergency declarations, or the broader constitutionality of tariff policy. The sole issue was whether Congress, through IEEPA, delegated tariff authority to the President.

In a 6-3 decision, the Court held that IEEPA does not authorise the imposition of tariffs. The majority emphasized that Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution vests in Congress the power to “lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and Excises,” and that tariffs are a species of taxation. Because the President lacks inherent peacetime authority to impose tariffs, any such power must be clearly granted by statute. Although six justices agreed on that conclusion, they did not share a single rationale. Writing for a three-Justice plurality, Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Gorsuch and Barrett, invoked the Major Questions Doctrine, concluding that the phrase “regulate…importation” was too indeterminate to constitute clear congressional authorization for a power of such economic and political magnitude.

Justice Kagan, joined by Justices Sotomayor and Jackson, concurred in the judgment but declined to join the portion of the opinion relying on the Major Questions Doctrine. Justice Kagan’s concurrence is significant because it rejects the need for structural or quasi-constitutional doctrines to resolve the dispute. Instead, she grounded her reasoning in ordinary principles of statutory interpretation.

Justice Kagan agreed that IEEPA does not authorize the tariffs. However, she argued that the plurality’s reliance on the Major Questions Doctrine was unnecessary. In her view, the case could be resolved through conventional interpretive tools.

First, she focused on the statutory text and structure. IEEPA authorizes the President to undertake several actions: to investigate, block, regulate, direct, compel, nullify, void, prevent, or prohibit foreign-related transactions. These powers primarily regulate or restrict economic transactions. They do not resemble revenue-raising measures. Tariffs, by contrast, are fiscal instruments that generate revenue and operate as taxes on importers.

Second, she explicitly emphasized that Congress knows how to delegate tariff authority. In other trade statutes, Congress uses the term “duty”, imposes rate caps, limits duration, and conditions authority on procedural findings. IEEPA contains none of these features. The absence of such language is not an ambiguity but a meaningful omission. If Congress intended to delegate tariff power, it would have said so explicitly.

Third, Justice Kagan rejected the argument that because taxation can regulate behavior, the power to regulate necessarily includes the power to tax. Regulatory authority and taxing authority are historically and legally distinct. That taxes may influence conduct does not collapse the constitutional difference between regulating and taxing.

Justice Kagan’s concurrence in Learning Resources invites comparison with her dissent in West Virginia v. EPA (2022), where she sharply criticized the Court’s use of the Major Questions Doctrine to invalidate EPA climate regulations. In West Virginia, the EPA relied on the Clean Air Act’s (1970) authorization to determine the “best system of emission reduction.” The agency interpreted this language to permit “generation shifting,” effectively encouraging the transition from coal-fired power to renewable energy sources. The majority held that this interpretation implicated a “major question” requiring clear congressional authorization, which it found to be lacking in the Act.

Justice Kagan strongly rejected the majority’s reasoning in West Virginia. She argued that the statutory language was deliberately broad and that Congress intended to grant EPA flexibility to address large-scale environmental challenges. In her view, the Court improperly substituted its judgment for that of Congress and the expert agency, writing that “The Court appoints itself — instead of Congress or the expert agency — the decisionmaker on climate policy.” For her, the Major Questions Doctrine represented an unwarranted judicial constraint on Congress’s ability to delegate policymaking authority to agencies.

The contrast between these two cases is instructive. In West Virginia, Justice Kagan believed that the statute clearly authorized the EPA’s actions and that the majority artificially narrowed the Act’s expansive language. In Learning Resources, by contrast, she believed that the President was stretching statutory language beyond its meaning. Importantly, Justice Kagan did not attack the use of the Major Questions Doctrine in Learning Resources; rather, she believes it was not necessary. Her position in this case reflects that she believes that courts should rely on ordinary statutory analysis before invoking structural doctrines rooted in separation-of-power concerns.

Justice Kagan’s concurrence reflects several broader jurisprudential themes. First, it reflects minimalism. She resolves the dispute on narrow statutory grounds and avoids expanding the doctrine beyond necessity. Her approach limits the precedential reach of the decision. Second, it reflects a reluctance to constitutionalize statutory interpretation. The Major Questions Doctrine, in her view, risks transforming routine interpretive disputes into structural constitutional questions. Finally, her opinion demonstrates institutional caution. Justice Kagan has consistently warned against interpretive doctrines that constrain Congress’s ability to delegate authority to the executive branch. In Learning Resources, she strikes down executive action without enforcing a doctrinal framework that could later be used to invalidate agency regulations she believes Congress clearly authorized.

Justice Kagan’s concurrence in Learning Resources thus illustrates a careful distinction between executive overreach unsupported by statutory text and broad delegations that Congress has intentionally granted. Her approach is neither categorically deferential to agency action nor presumptively hostile to executive authority. Instead, it reflects a consistent methodological commitment that courts should apply ordinary tools of statutory interpretation, respect congressional design, and avoid invoking structural constitutional doctrines unless necessary.

Cover photo of Kagan by Sean Hurt licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 2.0 Generic license.