Democracy after Tuesday: Watson v. RNC and Postmark Rules.

After the 2024 federal election, the Republican National Convention (RNC), the Mississippi Republican Party, the Libertarian Party of Mississippi, and individual voters filed lawsuits against Mississippi’s Secretary of State, Michael Watson, and county election officials. The issue? Mississippi’s “postmark rule,” which permits mail-in ballots to be counted even if those ballots were received by election officials after election day, so long as they were postmarked before election day. The plaintiffs challenged the postmark rule, arguing that it violates federal statutes governing election timing and thus, Mississippi’s postmark rule is pre-empted by federal law. This rule is currently enacted in 30 states for military absentee ballots and in 14 states for the general population. The Court’s decision in Watson v. RNC, issued on June 29, 2026, had the potential to overturn them all and reduce many Americans’ access to the polls this November.

In Watson, the question before the Court was, “whether counting ballots postmarked by election day, but received up to five days later, violates the federal election-day statutes.” The 5-4 majority opinion by Justice Barrett sought the ordinary definition of an election at the time of writing three pertinent federal election statutes: 3 U.S.C. § 1, 2 U.S.C. § 7, and 2 U.S.C. § 1. The statutes define the dates of elections for appointing presidential electors, congressional representatives, and senators. Accordingly, the plaintiffs attempted to argue that because these statutes establish a date of elections, all ballots must be received by that federally defined election day.

However, in her opinion, citing several editions of Webster’s dictionary and the principle that statutes should be generally interpreted by their ordinary meaning at the time Congress enacted the statute, Justice Barrett concludes that the defining element of an election is the act of “choosing a person to fill an elected office.” The majority further finds that choosing is constituted by the casting of the ballot rather than the receipt, referencing the controversial RNC v. DNC (2020), which notes that “[e]xtending the date by which ballots may be cast by voters—not just received by the municipal clerks but cast by voters—for an additional six days after the scheduled election day fundamentally alters the nature of the election.” Thus, by distinguishing the extension of the date on which votes may be cast rather than the date of receipt as the fundamentally altering circumstance, RNC v. DNC (2020) reinforces the interpretation of “election” as the act of casting votes.

In particular, the Court focuses on the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA), which establishes procedures for absentee voting for military members. UOCAVA, Barrett argues, confirms that while Congress may set deadlines for casting ballots, states hold the power to determine when ballots must be received. For example, UOCAVA contains language explicitly mentioning state law: “not later than the deadline for receipt of the State absentee ballot under State law.” Likewise, 52 U.S.C. § 20303(b)(3), where UOCAVA is codified, presupposes that ballot receipt is a matter of state law; any other interpretation would not make sense. Thus, by presupposing that this power rests with the states, UOCAVA reinforces that Congressional intent when defining election deadlines is to regulate the casting of ballots, rather than their receipt.

Together, the Court determined that the three federal election statutes require only that ballots must be cast before “the Tuesday next after the first Monday in November” in accordance with 3 U.S.C. § 21(1). Thus, post-election receipt in isolation does not violate federal election-day statutes. And further, because under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, federal law only pre-empts conflicting state law, states have full authority to regulate the receipt of ballots, including the enactment of “postmark” rules.

However, the Court’s arguments remain contentious, with Justice Alito, joined by Justices Thomas, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh, writing in dissent. The dissent appeals to historical precedent in interpreting the definition of an election, looking to early voter practices and the practices of Civil War soldiers when casting the first absentee ballots. Alito argues that an election is “the expression of the electorate’s choice,” and that the electorate’s choice consists of the collection of individual ballots. Thus, the federal election-day statutes require that this collection be assembled on election day, such that the electorate’s choice is authoritative. And because postmark rules delay this assemblage of the ballots beyond election day, they conflict with federal election statutes.

Additionally, while the dissent concedes the majority’s ordinary definition of an election, Alito maintains that the ordinary definition is not sufficient to interpret the election-day statutes. He argues in favor of the definition of an election, established in Foster v. Love (1997), as the “combined actions of voters and officials meant to make a final selection of an officeholder,” where “combined actions” refers not to the combined actions of voters and the officials making the final selection of an officeholder, but rather the combined acts of ballot casting and receipt.

Watson will profoundly impact Americans throughout the country as they vote in the upcoming elections. As more Americans choose to vote by mail, it’s likely that similar issues will be raised in Congress and brought before the Court to clarify the boundaries of mail-in ballots within the Constitution and existing case law. By affirming that election officials are not bound by historic election practices, the Watson ruling clarifies absentee ballots legislation and, echoing United States v. Rahimi (2024), asserts that law is not “trapped in amber.”