On November 12, 2016, Winston Hencely spotted someone approaching the Veterans Day 5K race at Bagram Airfield in Afghanistan who seemed out of place. As Hencely reached out to question him, he felt a bulky explosive vest. Seconds later, Ahmad Nayeb, a former Taliban member hired as a laborer by a Fluor Corporation subcontractor, then detonated the bomb. Six people died, and seventeen were injured. According to an Army investigation, Fluor’s “complacency and lack of reasonable supervision” were “the primary contributing factor[s]” to the attack. Yet when Hencely sued Fluor under South Carolina tort law for negligent supervision, both the district court and the Fourth Circuit dismissed Hencely’s claims on the grounds of federal preemption before he could present them to a jury. This dismissal raises a fundamental question about the scope of preemption in military contexts. Preemption, under the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause, occurs when federal law overrides conflicting state law, preventing states from regulating in areas where federal authority is supreme or where state law would interfere with federal objectives.

On December 5, 2025, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Trump v. Barbara. The case questions whether Executive Order No. 14160, issued by President Donald Trump on January 20, 2025, complies with the Citizenship Clause of the 14th Amendment and 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a), which codifies that clause.

When it comes to international disputes handled by U.S courts, perhaps nothing gets more complicated than Duran v. United States. The controversy traces back to 1972, when former Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos hid $40 million worth of funds in a New York bank account. Today, two parties are seeking to claim these stolen assets: the Philippine Government and 9,539 victims of Marcos’ authoritarian regime, jointly represented by lead plaintiff Jose Duran. The victims endured political imprisonment, torture, military suppression, and other inhumane government measures.

In October 2025, the United States confronted the longest federal government shutdown in its history. When the fiscal year began on October 1, Congress had not enacted regular appropriations. President Donald Trump insisted on major federal workforce cuts and refused to sign spending bills, while Senate Democrats conditioned their votes on extending health-insurance subsidies. With no compromise by the October 1 deadline, a lapse in appropriations triggered the Antideficiency Act, which prohibits federal officers from “obligating or expending federal funds in excess of the amount available in an appropriation.” Most federal agencies furloughed employees and suspended services; the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) exhausted its $4.6 billion contingency reserve for the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) but announced on October 20 that it lacked enough funds to pay November benefits for roughly 42 million recipients.

On October 20, 2025, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in United States v. Hemani. The case questions the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3), the federal statute that makes it a felony for anyone who “is an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance” to possess, ship, or transport a firearm. Interestingly, this is the very same law that Hunter Biden was convicted under in June of 2024 in Delaware. Biden was found guilty of three counts arising from his 2018 purchase of a revolver, during which he allegedly lied on the ATF Form 4473 by denying unlawful drug use. The prosecution argued that, at the time, he was using and addicted to crack cocaine, violating §922(g)(3). While Biden raised a Second Amendment defense, the district court rejected his facial challenge to the statute, citing an existing Eighth Circuit precedent upholding the statute to be a relevant historical analogue to firearms restrictions.

On November 2nd, 2025, President Donald Trump expressed on NBC’s 60 Minutes that “tariffs are incredible because they really give us great national security and great wealth.” The national security part is perhaps arguable, but the family-owned Learning Resources Ltd., as well as countless other American businesses, did not experience great wealth—quite the contrary. After Trump imposed his “Liberation Day” tariffs in April 2025, which involved a “baseline” tariff of 10% on almost all imports into the U.S, over half (57%) of U.S. companies surveyed by KPMG reported declining gross margins as a direct result of these tariffs. Small and mid-sized businesses were hit especially hard because, unlike large firms with abundant inventories, they are more vulnerable to cost shocks and supply chain disruptions. With such daunting economic consequences, how did Trump justify his policies? He imposed his tariffs through the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) of 1977, which grants President authority during times of emergency. In this specific instance, the two emergencies are the U.S. trade deficit and the inflow of fentanyl and opioids, which he called “country-killing emergencies.” However, it is uncertain whether Trump’s tariffs fit the conditions of IEEPA as the recent Supreme Court oral arguments demonstrate. 

In August 2021, Thomas Keathley was seriously injured in a car collision in Mississippi. He sued the driver’s employer, Buddy Ayers Construction (BAC) for negligence. But Keathley never saw his day in court—not because he lacked evidence, but because he had failed to disclose the pending lawsuit in his Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceedings, a process in which individual debtors propose a three-to-five-year plan to repay creditors while retaining their property under court supervision. The Fifth Circuit dismissed his case entirely under the doctrine of judicial estoppel, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Fall 2025 upon Keathley’s appeal. The question now before the Court could reshape how strictly federal courts police the intersection of bankruptcy disclosure duties and substantive litigation rights.

In 2008, Michael Bowe was charged, and convicted, with conspiracy to commit a Hobbs Act (18 U.S.C. § 1951) robbery, attempted Hobbs Act robbery, and use of a firearm in a violent crime. In 2009, Bowe pleaded guilty to all charges and received a 288-month sentence, 120 of which are associated with the conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), a federal mandate law for a minimum time served for carrying a firearm during a violent crime. In 2015, the Supreme Court ruled in Johnson v. United States that the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA)—mandating a minimum of 15 years for convictions of those committing a violent crime with 3 or more prior convictions for violent felonies—had an unconstitutionally vague residual clause. The residual clause, defined in 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), defined a “violent felony” as one involving “conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another” which was determined to be too vague to give notice to what constitutes a violent felony and thus 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) was struck down. Spurred by the growing question of what qualifies as a violent crime or felony, Bowe began his appeal process in 2016, arguing that Johnson v. United States serves as precedent to which his crimes are no longer classified as “crimes of violence” necessary for his firearm conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). 

In yet another consequential and contentious use of the emergency docket, the Supreme Court granted President Donald Trump’s application to stay a lower court order that blocked him from immediately removing Rebecca Kelly Slaughter, the Democratically-appointed Federal Trade Commissioner, without cause, despite explicit statutory protection under 15 U.S.C Section 41. The 1914 act established the F.T.C. and made clear that the president could only fire an F.T.C. chair due to “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.” In other words, the president can only remove an F.T.C. chair for cause, something Trump did not do. 

The Supreme Court’s 2025 oral arguments in Louisiana v. Callais have ignited a national debate over the future of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA), the cornerstone of federal protections against racial vote dilution. The case stems from Louisiana’s creation of a second majority-Black congressional district following a lower court’s ruling that the prior map violated Section 2—a move later challenged as unconstitutional racial gerrymandering under the Equal Protection Clause. During oral arguments, the justices wrestled with whether Section 2’s “results test,” rooted in the 1982 VRA amendments and Thornburg v. Gingles (1986), impermissibly compels race-based redistricting or simply permits it as a remedy for proven vote dilution. Discussion centered on the Gingles framework itself, as several justices considered whether its application inadvertently forces states to prioritize race over traditional districting criteria. The Court’s questions suggested less interest in overturning Section 2 outright than in recalibrating its implementation to ensure compliance with constitutional limits on racial classifications. Ultimately, Callais may mark a pivotal moment in defining how states balance race-neutral districting principles with the VRA’s mandate to protect minority voting strength—potentially signaling the emergence of a refined “Gingles 2.0” standard that preserves Section 2’s protections while constraining the use of race in redistricting.

This paper explores how Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Corporación Cimex, S.A. could redefine the boundaries of sovereign immunity and turn U.S. courts into arenas for foreign policy battles. Born from Cuba’s 1960 nationalization of American oil refineries and revived by President Trump’s 2019 activation of the Helms–Burton Act, the case asks whether that Act overrides the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA)—or whether Exxon must still satisfy one of FSIA’s narrow exceptions. Beneath the legal question lies a geopolitical one: should private corporations act as proxy enforcers of U.S. sanctions against foreign governments? Drawing on precedents like Republic of Austria v. Altmann (2004) and Rubin v. Iran (2018), this paper argues that Congress never clearly authorized such an abrogation of immunity. If the Court sides with Exxon, it risks weaponizing U.S. courts as instruments of diplomacy, blurring the line between justice and geopolitics in an increasingly volatile world.

In what will either clarify or redefine the boundaries of presidential power, the Supreme Court has granted certiorari and scheduled oral arguments in Trump v. Cook, a case which asks whether President Donald Trump has the authority to fire Lisa Cook, a sitting member of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors (Fed).

On the first day of his second term, President Trump issued Executive Order 14168, ordering every federal agency to strip self-attested gender identity from official records and to align markers with birth-assigned sex. Within 48 hours, the State Department froze adjudication of passport applications from transgender, intersex, and nonbinary Americans; some passports were returned with sex markers reset, displacing the prior self-designation regime (including the “X” option).

In what could have been the Supreme Court’s first meaningful engagement with a Trump-related appeal, Bessent v. Dellinger instead offered little judicial clarity, as the justices sidestepped substantive questions by holding the government’s application in abeyance, leaving broader legal issues unresolved. Hampton Dellinger was confirmed by the Senate to serve as the Special Counsel for the Office of Special Counsel on February 27, 2024, following a nomination from then-President Joe Biden. The Office of Special Counsel’s primary function is to protect governmental whistleblowers and safeguard against political corruption. On February 7, 2025, President Trump announced that he had fired Dellinger. Trump’s removal of Dellinger follows a familiar pattern of politically charged firings of government watchdogs, often without clear cause, undermining the independence of officials tasked with oversight. Dellinger sued the administration arguing that his firing violated 5 U.S.C § 1211(b), which states that the Special Counsel shall serve a 5 year term, and can be removed by the President “only for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.” District Judge Amy Berman Jackson issued a temporary restraining order (TRO), which restrained President Trump from firing Dellinger, effectively reinstating Dellinger as Special Counsel for the duration of the TRO (14 days). The Department of Justice immediately appealed on the Supreme Court’s emergency docket.

On June 12, 2023, the Texas legislature passed H.B. 1181, a law that would require any website whose content contains more than one-third sexual material harmful to minors to incorporate age verification methods. Before taking effect, plaintiffs sued, claiming that H.B. 1181 violated their First Amendment right to free speech. The district court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, ruling that the age-verification requirement failed strict scrutiny, and launched an injunction. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Texas, ruling that the age verification requirement only called for a rational basis review, and they vacated the district court’s injunction. The case was then appealed to the Supreme Court, which granted certiorari on July 2, 2024. The question before the court is whether H.B. 1181’s age verification requirement is subject to a rational basis review or strict scrutiny.

On July 1, 2024, the Court issued a highly controversial opinion on one of its most anticipated cases in the docket: Trump v. United States. The ruling, which significantly broadened the scope of presidential immunity, has sparked widespread public backlash, with many arguing that it undermines the principle of executive accountability. While these concerns are well-founded, they overlook the decision’s most flagrant flaw: its lack of constitutional grounding.

On November 20, 2001, Rob Andrew was shot and murdered. His estranged wife, Brenda Andrew, and her new partner, James Pavatt, were quickly framed as suspects in the shooting. Though Pavatt ultimately confessed to the shooting, he denied that Brenda Andrew was involved. However, the State still charged Andrew with capital murder; at the trial, the prosecution drew from extensive evidence that depicted Andrew as sexually provocative and morally depraved. Andrew’s sex life became a central issue in the trial, with prosecutors arguing that her sexual history made her a “bad wife, bad mother, and a bad woman.” Andrew was convicted of murdering her husband and sentenced to death.

In December 2015, The Guardian revealed that Cambridge Analytica had harvested data from 30 million Facebook users through a personality quiz created by employee Aleksandr Kogan. This data was used to create "psychographic profiles" of Facebook users initially sold to Ted Cruz's presidential campaign and later used by Donald Trump's presidential campaign. Though Cambridge Analytica agreed to delete this data in January 2016, reporters discovered in October that the firm continued using it despite its commitments. The breach remained largely contained until March 2018, when public revelations about Cambridge Analytica's continued data misuse caused Facebook's stock to plummet, harming investors alongside the users whose data was compromised.

The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) was enacted in 1938 under President Franklin D. Roosevelt as part of the New Deal to protect workers from exploitative labor practices. It established a federal minimum wage, required overtime pay for employees working more than 40 hours per week, and imposed child labor restrictions. Over time, the law has been amended to expand protections and adjust wage standards. However, the FLSA also includes several exemptions, meaning certain workers are not entitled to overtime pay. Among them are bona fide executives, agricultural workers, and outside salesmen—employees who primarily work away from their employer’s place of business. The recent Supreme Court ruling in EMD Sales, Inc. v. Carrera (2025) reaffirms this important exemption and ensures that the legal standard for classification remains consistent and reasonable.