The Price of Victory: Balancing Constitutionality and Military Success with Andrew Morrissey

Andrew Morrissey served in the United States Marine Corps from 1989 to 1992, with duties as a soldier and Judge Advocate, eventually attaining the rank of Captain. Morrissey now practices as a private workers’ compensation lawyer in Connecticut, in addition to considerable involvement in local veterans’ organizations such as the American Legion. Given such competing commitments to the Constitution as a soldier, Judge Advocate, private lawyer, and veteran, Morrissey provides a unique perspective on balancing constitutionality and military success.

This interview was conducted in April 2026 and has been edited for brevity and clarity.

Professional Background and Legal Foundations in Military and Civilian Service

HULR: Thank you, Attorney Morrissey, for being here today. We are honored to have you speak with us. Please take a moment to introduce yourself.

Andrew Morrissey (AM): Thank you, good afternoon. My name is Andrew Morrissey. I am a 1985 graduate of the University of Connecticut, where I earned a degree in economics. After my undergraduate experience, I was accepted to the University of Connecticut School of Law. During my journey through law school, I made the decision to join the United States Marine Corps in the capacity of a judge advocate. I chose the Marine Corps, as opposed to the three other services, because the Marine Corps is the only service branch in which judge advocates are full-duty line officers first, and judge advocates second. In the other branches of service, there is a judge advocate corps, which would be similar to a medical corps, where officers are limited to serving in one role only.

I attended Officer Candidate School in the summer of 1987 between my second and third year of law school. Officer Candidate School is most comparable to what people, unfamiliar with the military, would deem as the boot camp experience. The screaming, the yelling, the hollering, the exhaustion. You are not referred to as a Marine; you are not referred to as a person; you are referred to only as a candidate. Upon successful completion of Officer Candidate School, I then returned to law school. As a requirement to be a judge advocate, you must pass the bar of your state. I graduated in May of 1988, took the Connecticut bar, and thankfully, passed it. I then went on active duty with the Marine Corps starting in January of 1989, for approximately three and a half years of active duty. I was first commissioned as a Second Lieutenant, later being promoted to First Lieutenant. My final rank was Captain, which was the rank I held at the time that I left the military in the latter half of 1992.

Since leaving the Marine Corps, I have returned to the state of Connecticut and worked in the private practice for about 35 years. Our small firm practice is focused on workers’ compensation within the state of Connecticut. I have also remained active with veterans organizations, particularly the American Legion in Naugatuck, Connecticut, where I have held the position of commander for two terms and currently serve as judge advocate. The American Legion is a group of military veterans that seeks to improve veterans’ welfare and understanding of our freedoms and Constitution.

HULR: You are uniquely positioned in that you have copious experience in the military, both as a soldier and as a Judge Advocate, and in the private sector, as a workers’ compensation lawyer. In both the Marine Corps and as a lawyer, you made a commitment to uphold the Constitution of the United States. Do you think there is a difference between the commitment you make to the Constitution as a soldier and the commitment you make to the Constitution as a lawyer?

AM: I do not think there are great differences. Certainly not with the oath or the commitment that is taken as an officer, because as a military officer, you are taking an oath to uphold and defend the Constitution of the United States of America. Not to the current sitting president, not to Congress, not to your governor, but to the Constitution. Likewise, as a private attorney, I am sworn to uphold the laws and Constitution of our state. And, as a further measure, every month when we meet at American Legion, the first thing we do is recite our preamble, in which we continue to pledge — as veterans and members of the American Legion — to uphold and honor the Constitution of the United States. So, no, I do not think the oath taken or the commitment to preserve and defend the Constitution changes all that much in those scenarios.

The Purpose and Structure of Military Law Within the American Legal System

HULR: Military law is a compelling facet of America’s legal system; “codified in the Uniform Code of Military Justice,” military law applies only to “members of the armed forces” [1]. Can you explain the purpose of military law and how the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) differs from the civilian legal system?

AM: In order to answer the first half of the question, we must understand the purpose of the military. And from that, you can deduce why we have a Uniform Code of Military Justice. When you boil it down to its ultimate purpose, the military exists to fight an enemy or defend our country and property from attack. It exists for a very life-and-death purpose. Thus, the Uniform Code of Military Justice exists to help streamline that purpose and allow those charged with command over the various military units, from Commander in Chief all the way down to a lieutenant platoon commander, to be consistent with that ultimate mission. The system of the military is very vertical and linear. If you read the Oath of Office for an enlisted service member, they promise to “support and defend the Constitution of the United States” and to “obey the orders of the President of the United States and the orders of the officers appointed over” them [2]. It is not just an oath to defend the Constitution, but also an oath to obey orders. The military requires instant obedience to orders. You do not have a law at Harvard that says you can be punished or expelled for disagreeing with a professor. If a professor tells you to do something, and you choose not to, you might get a lower grade, or you might annoy them, but you are not facing a conviction in a criminal court. So again, the UCMJ is designed to back up those in command to ensure the instant and unquestioning obeying of orders.

Distinctions Between Peacetime and Wartime Enforcement of Military Law

HULR: Military law, unlike civilian law, changes dramatically based on the current domestic or international context our country faces. Can you speak to how military law changes between peacetime and wartime?

AM: The UCMJ, in large part, mirrors civilian law, including crimes that are just as applicable in civilian law as they are under the UCMJ. If during peacetime, a Marine on Camp Pendleton base in California kills someone, that is just as much a murder charge under the UCMJ as it would be if a civilian were to kill someone. They have both committed murder. That is still a felony. It is still a crime.

However, there are certain crimes unique to the military, both in peacetime and wartime. For instance, if you, as a student, oversleep and miss class, you overslept and missed class. If a soldier, airman, or marine oversleeps and does not show up, it is a crime. You need to be where you are supposed to be when you are supposed to be there. Other crimes unique to the military include desertion — there is no civilian equivalent to that —, disrespect toward a superior officer — a high school student swearing at their principal might result in student discipline, but it is not a crime—, and conduct unbecoming an officer — conduct unbecoming a person or unbecoming a student do not exist.

Then there are certain combat-oriented crimes, which are more likely to be enforced during wartime. These include “misbehavior before the enemy”, “aiding the enemy”, “improper hazarding of vessel or aircraft” [3, 4, 5]. There are crimes that can carry a death penalty only when committed during a time of war, including “desertion”, “willfully disobeying {a} superior commissioned officer”, “offenses by {a} sentinel or outlook”, and “lurking as a spy or acting as a spy” [6, 7, 8, 9].

Discipline, Obedience, and Cohesion in High-Stakes Military Contexts

HULR: As you have mentioned, military law is stricter and harsher during wartime, with crimes like desertion and disobeying orders punishable by death. What role do these measures play to ensure unity and loyalty during wartime?

AM: Be it at Parris Island or San Diego, which are the two recruit depots, or at Officer Candidate School, one of the biggest sins that one can commit is to use the first-person adjective. If anyone is unfortunate enough to refer to themselves as ‘I’, they will immediately be swarmed by drill sergeants, laying into that person for using the word. The word ‘I’ is met with such a visceral response because the mentality for a combat unit must be a hivemind. If an officer in command says “Go left.”, everyone must go left instantaneously, because you are a unit. You are not individuals. You are one unit performing a task. Again, the military operates, if we are talking about wartime, in life-or-death situations.

Take, for example, the trenches of World War I. Imagine sitting in a muddy trench, for days on end, with maybe a thousand other enlisted soldiers, waiting for the captain or the lieutenant to signal what is known as ‘over the top’. A thousand men would run out of a trench and try to get to the next trench; of the thousand, maybe a couple hundred would survive that run. In that type of hellish, life-and-death situation, it would be disastrous if every third soldier decided to defect, because the soldier next to them also becomes incentivized to defect. Again, I am using a very extreme example to illustrate a point, but it is all or nothing. If one soldier starts mouthing off to the lieutenant or the captain, you cannot have everyone else questioning orders and causing delay. The military is designed to ensure adherence to the oath all soldiers make to obey orders.

With an all-volunteer armed services, there is likely more self-selection into the military that reduces the need to protect against wartime offenses. Not that it is a blanket prophylactic measure, but I think non-compulsory service — as opposed to the compulsory draft that has previously existed — decreases the chances of a soldier committing a crime in violation of the UCMJ. The other impetus for such strict, heavy-handed potential punishments derives from the difficulty of physically removing problematic soldiers in past wars. Using my World War II trenches example, if a soldier violates the UCMJ, it is not possible to pause trench warfare to extract that soldier from combat. Commanding officers needed to be able to charge and deal with soldiers that threatened a mission in the moment. In this day and age, there is a much greater capability to extract a problematic soldier from the situation almost instantly, if not instantly. That would decrease the need for such strict wartime measures because it is possible to remove the poison petal from the rose.

Constitutional Protections and the Limits of Punishment in Military Justice

HULR: You have spoken about how extreme measures are necessary to ensure cohesion and prevent defection in a military unit during wartime. However, there are protections in the Constitution against cruel and unusual punishment. Taken out of context, certainly some of these extreme measures in place would be flagged as cruel and unusual punishment. Can you speak to the tension between the extreme measures put in place by the UCMJ and the cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment?

AM: It is important to remember that even if someone is charged with a crime punishable by death during wartime, the commanding officer does not have the option to be judge, jury, and executioner. The Constitution still applies to that service member charged with a potential death penalty offense. Once they are segregated out of the unit and eventually processed and charged with the crime, the soldier’s full constitutional rights apply. The crime charged might be unique to the military, but the blanket protection provided to alleged criminals under the Constitution is still present.

In terms of the push and pull between cruel and unusual punishment and these particular crimes, I think there is a great amount of debate that can happen there. One consideration that I believe would be on the minds of the Commander in Chief, or any officer who can charge these crimes, is that while the death penalty can be sought and charged, it does not necessarily have to be. In an all-volunteer armed forces, does the United States really want to be charging and carrying out such a punishment? Again, crimes cannot go unpunished, but for publicity’s sake, do officers want to employ the death penalty, which might affect recruiting efforts?

On the other hand, I rationalize the tension by considering the context. If one service member disobeys an order that could get a thousand of their fellow service members killed or horribly wounded, I believe there are still times when it is necessary to keep command and control in place and to act as a deterrent for future potential disobeyers of lawful orders. If it is a time of war and a superior commissioned officer tells someone to do a better job of cleaning up their mess kit because there is some food still on it, and the person disobeys, that is a slap on the wrist.

Reconciling Military Necessity with Constitutional Principles

HULR: We have talked about the specific tensions between the cruel and unusual punishment and extreme measures put in place by the military, but more broadly, can you speak to how much leeway you believe military law should have to diverge from the Constitution during wartime? In other words, where would you draw the line between military success and constitutionality?

AM: I do not think a line has to be drawn. Take a scenario where there is a combat unit on the front lines, and a service member commits one of these crimes that is punishable by death. The UCMJ was put in place under our Constitution because Congress passed a law that said the UCMJ shall be the law, as amended from time to time, of our armed forces. And if that service member is charged with breaking or violating one of those laws, they can then be constitutionally charged with the crime that Congress has declared is a crime. But again, you still have the right to be constitutionally presumed innocent until your case travels through the military criminal justice system just as in the civilian system. I do not think that there is a contradiction in having offenses on the books as potential capital punishment crimes, and saying that the Constitution still applies. Both are true.

HULR: Thank you very much for your thoughtful responses. We deeply appreciate you taking the time to speak with us today!

Works Cited

[1] LII / Legal Information Institute. n.d. “Military Law.” Accessed April 12, 2026. https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/military_law.
[2] U.S. Army. n.d. “Oath of Enlistment - Army Values.” Accessed April 12, 2026. https://www.army.mil/values/oath.html.
[3] LII / Legal Information Institute. n.d. “10 U.S. Code § 899 - Art. 99. Misbehavior before the Enemy.” Accessed April 12, 2026. https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10/899.
[4] LII / Legal Information Institute. n.d. “10 U.S. Code § 903b - Art. 103b. Aiding the Enemy.” Accessed April 12, 2026. https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10/903b.
[5] LII / Legal Information Institute. n.d. “10 U.S. Code § 910 - Art. 110. Improper Hazarding of Vessel or Aircraft.” Accessed April 12, 2026. https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10/910.
[6] LII / Legal Information Institute. n.d. “10 U.S. Code § 885 - Art. 85. Desertion.” Accessed April 12, 2026. https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10/885.
[7] LII / Legal Information Institute. n.d. “10 U.S. Code § 890 - Art. 90. Willfully Disobeying Superior Commissioned Officer.” Accessed April 12, 2026. https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10/890.
[8] LII / Legal Information Institute. n.d. “10 U.S. Code § 895 - Art. 95. Offenses by Sentinel or Lookout.” Accessed April 12, 2026. https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10/895.
[9] “10 USC 903: Art. 103. Spies.” n.d. Accessed April 12, 2026. https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title10-section903&num=0&edition=prelim.