On the Precipice of a Slippery Slope: Jones v. Mississippi (2021) and Juvenile Life Without Parole

In the past two decades, the Supreme Court has reevaluated and lessened the severity with which juvenile offenders are punished for their crimes. In a landmark decision, in Miller v. Alabama (2012), the Court barred mandatory life without parole sentence requirements for juveniles, which previously obligated judges to sentence juveniles accused of certain crimes to life imprisonment without the possibility of a supervised early release [1]. While the Court banned the mandatory sentence requirement, it still permits life without parole for juveniles if judges have accounted for the characteristics of youth that impair judgment [2]. A motivating factor for this shift in juvenile sentencing has been the notion that children lack the maturity level of adults and are thus more susceptible to the influence of their environment [3]. It was argued in Jones v. Mississippi (2021) that acknowledging the malleability of youth is akin to the perspective that sentencing juveniles to life without parole signals the juvenile’s incapability of reform [4]. This incapacity for reform is known as permanent incorrigibility [5]. However, the Court decided that sentencing a juvenile to life without parole did not necessitate proof of permanent incorrigibility [6]. Through this ruling, which restricts the influence of Miller, the Supreme Court can usher in a holistically narrower interpretation of permanent incorrigibility. Consequently, Jones may be the harbinger of stricter punishments for juvenile offenders. To qualify this classification of Jones, this article will contextualize the ruling in the broader landscape of juvenile incarceration decisions. Next, it will examine how the case constitutes a slippery slope regarding juvenile sentencing and investigate how permitting sentences absent a finding of permanent incorrigibility will allow reliance on unclear characteristics of youth. The article will also compare the facts of Miller and Jones to examine factors that may have contributed to their divergent rulings.

A Broader Landscape

Prior to Jones, the Supreme Court had delivered opinions in favor of decreasing the severity of punishments that could be issued to juvenile offenders. In Roper v. Simmons (2005), the Court ruled that the death penalty for juveniles, or offenders under the age of 18 years, violated the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment [7]. Half a decade later, the Court ruled in Graham v. Florida (2010) that justifying life without parole by assuming that a juvenile will perpetually be a danger to society necessitates deeming the juvenile beyond reform [8]. Such a judgment created a domain in which permanent incorrigibility was a requisite to life without parole. The Miller opinion offered further protection for juveniles by removing an element of mandatory sentencing [9]. This ruling was expanded in Montgomery v. Louisiana (2016), in which the Court decided to retroactively apply Miller to earlier juvenile life without parole sentences [10]. However, in Jones, the Court made a consequential distinction between accounting for youth and determining permanent incorrigibility. It rejected the petitioner’s claim that sentencing a juvenile to life without parole required establishing the juvenile as permanently incorrigible [11]. Through this ruling, the Court reduced the findings necessary to satisfy taking a juvenile’s youth into account and thereby curtailed the influence of the Miller decision. This poses a threat to the Court’s decision in Weems v. United States (1910) to interpret the Eighth Amendment as a requirement that punishments be proportional to the crime, as progress toward treating juveniles with leniency deemed proportional to their crimes could be impeded [12]. The steps taken by the Supreme Court to ensure that juveniles are treated by the justice system in a manner proportional to their youth are essential for upholding the decision in Weems. Due to Jones, the progress made in ensuring that juvenile punishments are proportional to the offense may be slowed or halted because the evidence required to sentence a juvenile to life without parole has been lessened.

A Warning for the Future

Since Jones rejects the importance of finding permanent incorrigibility prior to delivering life without parole sentences to juveniles, it can be viewed as a warning for the future of juvenile justice. The decision in Jones asserted that a judge only has to consider the characteristics of youth that may impede a juvenile’s decision-making process [13]. In Jones, the court’s decision was narrower than in Miller, which declared permanent incorrigibility to be a notable factor for juvenile sentencing for life without parole [14]. In Jones, the Miller ruling was subjected to restrictive scrutiny that does not permit its expression of incorrigibility to play a role in judicial factfinding. Such an expression of incorrigibility traced back to Graham, which established permanent incorrigibility as a justification for juvenile life without parole [15]. While Graham does not overtly declare proving permanent incorrigibility a prerequisite for juvenile life without parole sentences, it places such determinations in high regard within the scope of juvenile sentencing. The Jones decision, attempting to refute the value of establishing permanent incorrigibility, cited the portion of the Montgomery opinion that proclaimed that “a finding of fact regarding a child’s incorrigibility . . . is not required” prior to issuing a life without parole sentence to a juvenile offender convicted of homicide [16]. Only a part of the Montgomery decision’s discussion of permanent incorrigibility was integrated into the Jones ruling. Notably, the same section of Montgomery from which Jones derived its precedence for lessening the significance of permanent incorrigibility continued and stated that Miller’s failure to explicitly declare permanent incorrigibility as a burden of proof is attributable to the Court’s careful limiting of its scope of procedural requirements to avoid intruding upon States’ administration of their criminal justice systems. It is not, however, due to a perceived lack of importance of ensuring a juvenile is forever a harm to society prior to delivering a life without parole sentence [17]. The Jones decision used the language from Montgomery that supports its argument and excluded all other details. This cherry-picking allowed for the meaning to be twisted and the content to be taken out of context. In another reference to Montgomery, Jones also opined that “Miller did not impose a formal factfinding requirement” [18]. Here, the qualifying language of “formal” asserts that Miller did mention a factfinding guideline, but Jones opted to neglect any significance that this requirement might hold. The Jones decision’s selective interpretation of the text from Montgomery is alarming, as it reveals the Court’s manipulation of Montgomery’s verbiage to defend its rejection of the significance of permanent incorrigibility for juvenile life without parole.

A Lack of Clarity

Miller simply requires judges to consider how youth may inhibit juveniles’ decision-making capacity. However, due to its arbitrary nature, it is difficult to verify or disprove whether a judge has sufficiently done so. As such, a narrower interpretation could lower the standard for what qualifies as accounting for youth factors. In the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals, Evan Miller’s perceived “mental maturity” and his prior juvenile offenses of truancy and “criminal mischief” were cited to affirm a life without parole sentence in lower court. [19]. This exemplifies how an oversimplified consideration of maturity among juveniles can result in punishments that are subsequently deemed harsh by the Court. Furthermore, Miller referenced Graham to establish an offender’s age as relevant to the Eighth Amendment and to determining the severity of sentences [20]. However, this reference to Graham still failed to provide clarification as to what characterizes taking into account youth. While the open-ended nature of this consideration allows for more state control, it also means that the principles and intents set forth in Miller can be circumvented if the Court does not consciously protect the expressed intent of the Miller decision when drawing upon it for precedent.

A Comparison of Miller and Jones

Comparing the case facts in Miller v. Alabama and Jones v. Mississippi demonstrates the existence and repercussions of a slippery slope. This slippery slope could culminate in the Court defending an opinion by relying on favorable precedents while ignoring those in opposition. In identifying the potential sources of deviation between the two rulings, including age, victims, and the severity of the crime, it becomes evident that these factors share similar magnitudes and characteristics. First, an analysis of the offenders’ ages reveals that they were both legally allowed to be tried as adults within their states. In Miller, Evan Miller was 14 years old when he, along with an accomplice, attacked their neighbor Cole Cannon [21]. In Jones, Brett Jones was 15 years old when he stabbed and killed his grandfather, Bertis Jones [22]. While some may argue that Jones was older than Miller when he committed homicide and thereby at an age where he could face stricter punishments, an investigation of juvenile age cutoffs for punishments reveals that this is not the case. In Alabama, where Miller had been tried, a 14-year-old juvenile can be treated as an adult by the justice system after a hearing [23]. In Mississippi, where Jones’ trial occurred, juveniles as young as 13 years old can be tried as adults [24]. In both Alabama and Mississippi, state laws permitted the transfer of the cases to adult courts, and the offenders were tried as such. Being tried as an adult can result in receiving harsher punishments compared to those typically given to youths [25]. However, since Miller and Jones were both transferred to adult courts, any impact of the marginal age difference between the two juveniles would be negligible. In both cases, they were exposed to the more severe punishments that can be delivered in adult courts.

The relationship between the juveniles and the victims, as well as the severity of the crime, can be examined together to determine if either factor influenced the other and thus contributed to the cases’ different rulings. Miller had been smoking marijuana and playing drinking games with the victim, Cole Cannon, before he killed him in an attack prompted by attempted robbery. When Cannon fell asleep, Miller took his wallet and split the money with his friend. However, upon trying to replace the wallet, Miller woke up Cannon. Cannon fought to get his wallet back, but was overtaken by Miller’s friend with a baseball bat. After his friend knocked Cannon unconscious, Miller grabbed the bat and kept hitting Cannon. The boys left, but then returned to cover the evidence of their crime by lighting a fire. Cannon died from his injuries and smoke inhalation [26]. Similar to Miller, Jones knew the person he killed. Jones lived with his grandparents, Bertis and Madge. After Bertis discovered Jones’ girlfriend, Michelle Austin, in Jones’ bedroom, Bertis and Jones argued. The argument continued later that night, escalating to shoving and punching. Then, Jones grabbed a kitchen knife and stabbed his grandfather a total of 8 times. Jones tried to hide the evidence of the murder, but was seen by neighbors who called the police [27]. First, diving deeper into the interpersonal relations involved in the cases, Jones had a closer, familial relationship with his victim than Miller had with his. Perhaps Jones' killing his grandfather seemed like a more unforgivable act to the Court than Miller killing a neighbor. However, this is a moral argument that should be evaluated separately from the legal matter. Otherwise, moral judgments could generate conviction discrepancies that diverge from the law. Within the scope of the legal argument, the Jones decision never cites the act of killing a family member, as opposed to someone who is not a family member, as a driving force for the verdict. Therefore, the connections between the juveniles and the victims are likely not the cause of the different findings. Next, the severity of the crimes will be considered. In Miller, Cannon had attacked Miller and his accomplice in an attempt to prevent a robbery. After Cannon was knocked unconscious, Miller proceeded to continue attacking Cannon. In Jones’ case, a heated argument had escalated quickly, culminating in Jones stabbing his grandfather repeatedly. While Miller had actively prompted a fight with Cannon by trying to rob him, Jones had been part of an intense dispute. Additionally, the causes of death in the two situations were comparably severe, wherein both offenders attacked their victims on multiple accounts within a short timeframe. Furthermore, both Miller and Jones attempted to cover up the evidence of their wrongdoing. Clearly, the facts of Miller and Jones are similar: the ages of the offenders, the relationships with the victims, and the intensity of the crimes. As such, it is difficult to reconcile the drastically different results of Miller v. Alabama and Jones v. Mississippi.

A Loophole in Miller

In Jones, the Court argued that due to the fact that Miller does not explicitly declare permanent incorrigibility as a factfinding prerequisite for juvenile life without parole sentencing, judges can deliver such a punishment without having to find a youth offender as incorrigible. Although Miller does not formally establish permanent incorrigibility as a factfinding burden, it expresses this standard clearly. This standard of importance placed upon permanent incorrigibility can be found in Miller’s reference to Graham regarding the notion that justifying life without parole based on the possibility of the juvenile permanently posing a risk to society requires the judge to classify the juvenile as irreparable [28]. This reference to incorrigibility equates a juvenile life without parole sentence to deeming a juvenile offender a danger to society forever. Furthermore, the Montgomery decision attributes the slight ambiguity regarding incorrigibility to the Court’s caution with placing too many sentencing limitations on the states for fear of overstepping rights granted through [29]. While this caution grants states the freedom to sentence juveniles to life without parole absent a finding of permanent incorrigibility, the Miller decision’s proposal of accounting for permanent incorrigibility establishes it as an important factor that was sacrificed in order to realize the rest of the decision.

Conclusion

The landmark Supreme Court decision in Miller v. Alabama granted greater leniency to youth offenders in an effort to ensure that punishments are proportionate to the crime. However, the Court’s shift toward reducing the severity of juvenile sentences is threatened by the decision in Jones v. Mississippi, which declared a finding of permanent incorrigibility unnecessary for sentencing a juvenile to life without parole. This assertion threatens previous Court rulings to view juveniles with clemency by lessening the significance of finding a juvenile incapable of reform. As such, there is a less concrete fact-finding necessity for sentencing juveniles to life without parole that simply requires judges to account for the characteristics of youth. The Jones decision is founded on carefully selected verbiage from Montgomery to disregard portions that deem permanent incorrigibility as a crucial fact-finding burden. This cherrypicking generates a slippery slope where the Court can choose precedence that supports a specific ruling and neglect other precedents. A disregard for permanent incorrigibility leaves judges to rule on juvenile homicide cases by interpreting the impact of the characteristics of youth. As demonstrated by the analysis of Miller and Jones, judges’ discretion relies on an arbitrary framework that can lead to vastly different decisions on cases with similar circumstances. With legal precedence declaring youths to be susceptible to external factors, it is essential that this malleability be taken into consideration when issuing sentences. However, the Jones decision is a threat to more than juvenile sentencing guidelines. The Court’s process of selectively referencing prior cases to support Jones endangers the purpose of legal precedence as a whole.

Footnotes

[1] Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012).

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

[4] “Supreme Court Rules Trial Courts Not Required to Make a Finding of Permanent Incorrigibility Before Sentencing Underaged Youth to Life Without Parole,” Press Release, NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., April 22, 2021, https://www.naacpldf.org/press-release/supreme-court-rules-trial-courts-not-required-to-make-a-finding-of-permanent-incorrigibility-before-sentencing-underaged-youth-to-life-without-parole/.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S. Ct. 1307 (2021).

[7] Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).

[8] Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010).

[9] Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012).

[10] Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016).

[11] Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S. Ct. 1307 (2021).

[12] Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910).

[13] Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S. Ct. 1307 (2021).

[14] Ibid.

[15] Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010).

[16] Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016).

[17] Ibid.

[18] Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S. Ct. 1307 (2021).

[19] Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012).

[20] Ibid.

[21] Ibid.

[22] Ibid.

[23] Interstate Commission for Juveniles, “Age Matrix,” August 13, 2025, https://www.juvenilecompact.org/age-matrix.

[24] Ibid.

[25] “Juveniles in Adult Criminal Court & the Legal Process,” Justia, https://www.justia.com/criminal/offenses/other-crimes/juvenile-crimes/juveniles-in-adult-court/.

[26] Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012).

[27] Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S. Ct. 1307 (2021).

[28] Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010).

[29] Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016).