The Bihar Caste Census: Demystifying Its Role in the Constitutional Landscape

I. Introduction

In the year 2024, the Divisional Bench of the Patna High Court struck down two amendments [1], on the basis of a breach of the fifty percent threshold mandated in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India (1992) [2]. The amendments emerged from the controversial Bihar Caste Census (also known as the Bihar Caste Survey) which sought to achieve affirmative action proportionate to a community's numeric size [3]. While similar laws have been promulgated in various states [4], and subsequently struck down [5], the case in Gaurav Kumar [6], offers the Indian Supreme Court an opportunity to revisit its Equality Jurisprudence—particularly to reconsider the relationship between affirmative action and substantive equality. The present article, therefore, advances two principal arguments. Firstly, that the breach of the fifty percent threshold sits in congruence with the constitution's mandate and secondly, that "adequate representation" must be understood and read as requiring "proportionate representation." In doing so, it challenges Sawhney's reading of Article 16(4) [7]. The article proceeds as follows—Part II briefly examines the Patna High Court's judgment, while Part III provides a brief overview of India's reservation jurisprudence. Part IV evaluates the constitutional legitimacy of reservation ceilings, while Part V develops the argument for reading "adequate representation" as mandating proportional representation. Part VI concludes.

II. Understanding The Patna High Court Judgement

The High Court, in its 87-page judgement, invalidated the Bihar Government's amendments on three primary grounds [8]. Firstly, the concerned amendments violated the upper reservation limit [9]. Secondly, doing so resulted in "the total frustration of merit" [10]. Thirdly, in its adherence to Sawhney [11], the court reasoned that the requirement of "adequate representation," as under Article 16(4) of the Indian Constitution, which empowers the State to introduce affirmative action, does not equate to "proportionate representation" [12].

In doing so, the High Court thus struck the very underpinning rationale of the Bihar Census, which was based on claims of proportionate representation [13]. However, critics contend that the judgement suffers from an overemphasis on merit [14]. This overemphasis, in turn, it is argued, reflects a fundamental misinterpretation of substantive equality [15], and resides on the bedrock of Sawhney's interpretative errors and a wrongly set premise of substantive equality. Admittedly, the High Court had limited scope of augmenting any change, with the mandate of the corpus of reservation jurisprudence lurking in its shadow. This merely shows how the interpretative error in Sawhney still continues to shape, and arguably, erroneously distort India's affirmative action jurisprudence.

III. Tracing India's Affirmative Action Jurisprudence

The Indian Supreme Court first engaged with affirmative action in The State of Madras v. Champakam Dorairajan (1951) [16], where it examined the validity of a pre-constitutional order prescribing quota based on caste and religious lines. In considering the matter, the Indian Apex Court held Article 16(4) of the Indian Constitution to being an exception to Article 16(1), which guarantees equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters concerning public employment [17]. It therefore, followed, that the Supreme Court had subscribed India's affirmative action paradigm to formal equality which would go on to influence a catena of judgements [18]. Dorairajan [19], therefore, was ridden with a problematic interpretation [20], and laid the foundations of judiciary's perennial dialogue with reservations. As a response to the primitive approach adopted in Dorairajan [21], the provisional Parliament, in disagreement with the view, introduced the first amendment to the constitution [22], inserting sub-clause 4 to Article 15 [23]. However, despite the amendment, which effectively barred viewing special provisions for the backward as being discriminatory, the judiciary's critical view of reservations continued [24]. In Rangachari [25], for instance, the Supreme Court reiterated the exception principle, initially espoused in Dorairajan, which views affirmative action as sitting inconsistently with the notion of equality [26].

Subsequently, the principles of Rangachari [27], were elaboratively fleshed out in M.R Balaji v. State of Mysore (1962) [28]. Here, the court not only reiterated formal equality, but also imposed the infamous fifty percent threshold on reservations, where any deviation was considered to contravene merit [29]. The underpinning rationale, appears to be that reservations of more than half of the vacancies, is per say, violative of the equality principle—a premise that remains heavily unfounded [30, 31]. The court arrived at this conclusion despite its acknowledgement that advancement of weaker sections of society serves the society at large [32]. This commitment to formal equality was subsequently reaffirmed in T Devdasan v. Union of India (1964) by a 4:1 majority [33].

However, in a characterisation which could be described as being proto-Thomas, Subba Rao questioned these very premises [34]. In particular, he cast skepticism over the legitimacy of the threshold as laid in Balaji [35], and engaged with the broader judicial uneasiness surrounding reservations [36]. In contrast to previous decisions, the bench in State of Kerala v. N.M Thomas ("N.M Thomas") (1976) understood affirmative actions as an emphatic facet of equality, than as an outlier [37]. The court held that it was rather axiomatic that a provision enabling upliftment of backward classes was not antithetical to equality, given that achievement of this guarantee requires differential treatment when underlying circumstances remain materially different [38]. In embracing substantial equality, the Apex Court in N.M. Thomas also set aside the rigid reservation threshold [39]. This line of jurisprudence, ultimately, came to a head in the judgement of Indra Sawhney v. Union of India (1992) [40], concerning the extension of affirmative action to Other Backward Castes (OBCs). While the bench here upheld substantial equality, it paradoxically subscribed to the fifty percent threshold in Balaji [41]. This interpretative bedlam is further explained in Part IV of the paper where the author contends that the existence of this ceiling is a direct consequence of this interpretative misstep and which runs at odds with the idea of substantive equality.

IV. Reassessing The Legitimacy Of Reservation Ceilings

The primary criticism of the reservation ceiling is its straight jacket formula and an inflexible constraint, which relies on no substantial basis to determine quantum of reservations and contravenes the very notion of substantive equality [42]. This limitation finds no textual ground [43], and on the contrary, restricts the ability of states to assess the inadequacy of representation and implement reservations in accordance with the socio-political realities, as vested in the Constitution [44]. While it is argued that Sawhney has balanced both versions of equality [45], the vision of substantial equality cannot be meaningfully realised without invading formal equality [46]. Substantive equality therefore, is achieved only when there is an absolute absence of all systematic social impediments to each and every member of the society [47].

To that end, the current part discusses the tenability of breaching the reservation ceiling. Part A of this section aims to showcase the interpretative errors of Indra Sawhney while Part B attempts to argue against the arbitrary distinction that caste-based reservations are subjected to, owing to the judgement in Janhit Abhiyan.

A. Rethinking The Fifty Per Cent Rule In Indira Sawhney

The court in Indra Sawhney attempted to reconcile two fundamentally opposite concepts in the same breath [48]. Firstly, it affirmed N.M Thomas [49], and therefore, substantive equality while secondly, simultaneously affirming the fifty percent rule as opined in Balaji [50]. In this light, this paper contends that the judgement in Indira Sawhney suffers from a "jurisprudential double blind." The fifty percent threshold and Article 16(4) being an exception to Article 16(1) are closely affiliated and reflect formal equality [51]. Imposition of such rigidness, lacks a reasonable footing [52].

While some posit that Indira Sawhney has created a balance with the conception of the threshold [53], other scholars contend that the "balance" in Sawhney, perpetuates and entrenches the dual hierarchy of caste and privilege, as historically marginalised communities, despite their numeric majority, are subjected to an arbitrary and unscientific threshold [54]. Although the decision does acknowledge that proportional representation was relevant in advancing equality, it nevertheless deemed the limitation to be reasonable [55]. The very basis of this threshold, is therefore, based on an understanding of formal equality [56]. Yet, if the threshold (X) is derived from formal equality (Y), and the Court has since rejected Y in favor of substantive equality, then X loses its foundational basis. And once the premise is no longer valid, the conclusion it supports must also fall. Thus, once the court acknowledges that proportional representation holds normative relation to equality, it sufficiently undercuts the threshold logic. For if the underlying principle stands invalidated, the conclusion (the rigid threshold) must also be abandoned.

The court's omission in engaging/acknowledging this inherent inconsistency, which cannot reside together, and its failure to articulate why any breach of the threshold amounts to it being unreasonable is highly troubling [57]. This balancing approach is conceptually muddled and tilts towards a Balaji philosophy [58]. The repercussions of this patch work jurisprudence are clearly evident in subsequent decisions. Notably, in the Maratha Reservation case [59], concerning the Maharashtra Reservation Act aimed at increasing the total reservation to over fifty per cent [60], Justice Bhat implicitly characterised reservations to being an exception to equality [61].

It is therefore, that the author contends, the very existence of the fifty percent threshold stems not from the uniform adherence to an approach, but rather, as an error emerging in Sawhney through its proposition of a patch work jurisprudence. The judgment asserts that the scale of social disadvantage and the numeric composition of the class becomes irrelevant in determining the quantum of reservations. It is marked by interpretative, conceptual and philosophical slippages, reeks of casteism, and merits reconsideration in Gaurav.

B. Janhit Abhiyan And The Arbitrary Distinction

In Janhit Abhiyan v. Union of India (2022) [62], the Indian Supreme Court upon examining the 103rd Amendment [63], concerning economic reservations, upheld its validity by a slim 3:2 majority and marked a rare instance of a sanctioned trespass of the mandate in Sawhney by purporting a sixty percent reservation scheme. However, in upholding the constitutionality of the 103rd Amendment, the court has effectively laid out that non-caste-based schemes are not subject to the fifty per cent threshold. Thus, while a breach has been allowed in instances concerning extraordinary circumstances [64], caste-based reservations have received a much higher scrutiny [65]. While much of existing literature focuses on the dissenting opinion which focuses on the exclusion of Scheduled Castes ("SCs") and Scheduled Tribes ("STs") from the Economically Weaker Section ("EWS") Scheme [66], this paper here contends that by subjecting caste based schemes to a more rigid cap, the Apex Court, has inadvertently, made an arbitrary distinction which is prima-facie discriminatory and which are prohibited since judicial decision must not be discriminatory [67].

V. Reading Adequate Representation as Proportional Representation under Article 16(4)

The present section advances the paper's second core argument—that "adequate representation" must be read as "proportionate representation" under Article 16(4) [68]. In Part A of this section, the author argues for the adoption of an originalist reading of Article 16(4) while Part B focuses on extending the underlying logic in Articles 330 and 332 to the paradigm of Article 16(4).

A. An Originalist Reading Of Article 16(4)

While constitution provisions are dynamic and continue to evolve [69], the interpretations must not be divorced from the informed intent behind the enactment [70]. Therefore, the ever-changing nature must engage with intentionalism and not render the text redundant as if effectively drains and disregards the problem the provision was enacted to remedy [71]. This paper, therefore, contends that in the context of Article 16(4) [72], the judiciary has displayed a failure to give due-effect to the underlying intent. As such, such an artificial imposition makes the remedy under-inclusive when read narrowly and also produces remedying outcomes that fall substantially short of its intended constitutional function. Such an argument, is buttressed from the Constitutional Assembly Debate, which is reproduced below:

“Ujjal Singh: I want this clause 'who is in the opinion of the state are not adequately represented' to be deleted.
Chairman: The result would be, even if inadequate representation is made, it will be enough.
Chairman: You say 'remove the word adequate.' Although you are 20%, they will say, 'reserve only 5%.' What can you do? C Rajagopalachari: He is under the impression that reservation is limited to the proportion of the population. K.M Panikkar: […] Therefore, you are adequately protected under this clause, while if you take it away, what happens? Any provision that is made goes up to the court and the court may say, look here, 13% population, 13% has been provided, it is adequate representation. For your security, it is absolutely necessary to state whether you are adequately represented” [73].

Therefore, an originalist reading of Article 16(4), reveals that the deliberate choice of preferring adequate representation, was driven from a conscious decision to not subject reservations to a community's numeric strength. The objective, therefore, stemmed from an understanding that affirmative action was intended to extend beyond demographic proportion. However, in its imposition of a rigid fifty percent cap on reservations, the Indian judiciary has transgressed this originalist intent , curtailing the scope of representation much below any individual's demographic weight. While courts have been wary of the Originalist approach recently [74], in this context, adoption of an Originalist reading reveals a fundamental conflict in the judiciary's interpretation of Article 16(4). In doing so, the author argues, the judiciary has committed a disservice to Originalism, which it has an occasion to rectify in Gaurav.

B. Rethinking Merit and Proportionality in Reservation Jurisprudence

In Gaurav Kumar v. State of Bihar, the Patna High Court opined that a breach of the mandate of Sawhney, amounts to a frustration of merit [75]. In this light, this paper asserts that this understanding of the Divisional Bench resides in an entrenched vacuum of merit-jurisprudence. The merit argument is emblematic of India's allegiance to Doraijan [76], which stems from the conceptual muddling propositioned in Sawhney. This unreasoned attachment runs completely antithetical to the conceptual understanding of substantive equality [77]. The merit argument has previously been repudiated in Akhil Bhartiya Soshit Karamchari Sangh v. Union of India (1981), where the court renounced meritocracy as defined by elitist undercurrents [78]. Similarly, in B.K Pavitra v. Union of India- II (2019), the court reconceptualised merit as a social construct needing to be recognised as context-specific [79]. It thus rejected the conventional understanding of meritocracy, which continues to favour the privileged [80].

This now positions us to argue for an import of the proportionate logic, already present in an alternative context in the constitutional text. While proportional representation as present in Articles 330 and 332 of the Constitution [81], providing for such proportionality in the Lok Sabha and State Legislative Assemblies, is duly confined in its application; its underlying premise has previously been extended to Article 16 [82]. It is here that this paper contends that the idea of extending proportional representation to Article 16(4), is not unknown in India's jurisprudence and can be easily traced to Justice Fazal Ali's opinion in N.M. Thomas, where he opined that even an overwhelming eighty percent reservation would be entirely defensible, if the backward classes constituted eighty percent of the population [83]. Moreover, this impetus of extending proportionality to Article 16, at its core, is premised in the inability of political representation to translate to social mobility [84]. This also validated by Bihar Caste Census [85], which provides that around thirty three, forty three and forty three per cent of OBCs, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes suffered from extremely high poverty respectively [86]. Accordingly, there exists a compelling appeal to subject material distribution of resources to at the very least, as being reflective of the community's population [87]. Another counter-argument emerging from this extension is that of undermining administrative efficiency under Article 335, which mandates that affirmative policies in the context of employment be subjected to administrative efficiency [88]. This argument has also been advanced previously by a catena of Supreme Court judgements [89]. This paper, in that regard, argues based on two counts. Firstly, that such a concern is addressed and neutralised by a prior Supreme Court ruling [90], and secondly, that to read Article 16 to the limitation of Article 335 is to attach an erroneous, forceful limitation to Article 16, in light of no established relationship between the two provisions [91].

Therefore, the Patna High Court, in propounding a "merit argument," reflects a superficial understanding of merit and substantial equality. It is against this backdrop that the Indian Apex Court has an opportunity to rectify and reconsider its Equality Jurisprudence.

6. Conclusion

The Supreme Court's fidelity to the fifty percent threshold stems from a misinterpretation in Sawhney in its erroneous conflation of formal and substantive equality. The paper seeks to challenge this understanding based primarily on an originalist approach and seeks to advocate for the adoption of the proportionality standard under Article 16(4). In doing so, the paper attempts to advance a more substantive view of equality. Gaurav Kumar therefore, offers the apex court an opportunity to reconsider and rectify its understanding of equality jurisprudence.

Footnotes

[1] The Bihar Reservation of Vacancies in Posts and Services (Amendment) Act, 2023; The Bihar (In admission in Educational Institutions) Reservation (Amendment) Act, 2023.

[2] Indira Sawhney v. Union of India, (1992) 1 SCT 448 ("Indira Sawhney").

[3] Department of Planning and Development, Bihar Caste Survey, 2023.

[4] The Maharashtra State Reservation (of seats for admission in educational institutions in the state and or appointments in the public services and posts under the state) for Socially and Educationally Backward Classes Act, 2018; The Haryana State Employment of Local Candidates Act, 2020.

[5] Jaishri Laxmanrao Patil v. The Chief Minster, Maharashtra, (2021) 15 S.C.R 715 ("Jaishri Laxmanrao").

[6] Gaurav Kumar v. State of Bihar, (2024) Case No. 16760/2023 ("Gaurav Kumar").

[7] Indira Sawhney, supra note 2, ¶807.

[8] Gaurav Kumar, supra note 6.

[9] Gaurav Kumar, supra note 6, ¶¶65, 72,82.

[10] Gaurav Kumar, supra note 6, ¶77.

[11] Indira Sawhney, supra note 7.

[12] Gaurav Kumar, supra note 6, ¶84.

[13] Nachiket Deuskar, Explainer: Why Bihar is conducting a caste census, Scroll, January 9,2023, available at https://scroll.in/article/1041451/explainer-why-bihar-is-conducting-a-caste-census (Last visited on March 13, 2025).

[14] Faizan Mustafa, An Overemphasis on Merit, The Indian Express, June 22, 2024, available at https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/faizan-mustafa-patna-high-court-ruling-judiciary-anti-reservation-bias-9407216/ (Last visited on March 15, 2025).

[15] Surendra Kumar, The Problem with Merit : A Patna HC ruling reflects double standards on reservations, Scroll, August 6, 2024, available at https://scroll.in/article/1071558/the-problem-with-merit-a-patna-hc-ruling-reflects-double-standards-on-reservations (Last visited on March 12, 2025).

[16] The State of Madras v. Srimathi Champakam Dorairajan, (1951) S.C.R 525 ("Dorairajan").

[17] Dorairajan, supra note 16, ¶9.

[18] Dorairajan, supra note 16; The General Manager, Southern Railway v. Rangachari, (1962) 2 S.C.R. 586; M.R Balaji v. State of Mysore, (1962) S.C.R. SUPL 1; T. Devadasan v. Union of India, (1963) 4 S.C.R. 680; C.A. Rajendran v. Union of India, (1967) S.C.R. 1 721.

[19] Dorairajan, supra note 16.

[20] Bastin Steuwer, Constitutional Crossroads: The shadow of the First Amendment, The Caravan, April 30, 2021, available at https://caravanmagazine.in/books/law-first-amendment-constitution (Last visited on March 15, 2025).

[21] Dorairajan, supra note 16.

[22] The Constitution of India, 1950, Article 15(4), inserted vide The Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951 (w.e.f. June 18, 1951).

[23] The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 15(4).

[24] Anurag Bhaskar, Reservation as fundamental right : Interpretation of Article 16(4), Vol. 10, Indian Journal of Constitutional Law; 25 –33 (2023) available at https://nalsar.ac.in/images/IJCL\_Vol.10.pdf (Last visited on March 16, 2025).

[25] The General Manager, Southern Railway v. Rangachari, (1962) 2 S.C.R. 586 ("Rangachari").

[26] Rangachari, supra note 25, ¶ 12.

[27] Rangachari, supra note 25.

[28] M.R Balaji v. State of Mysore, (1962) S.C.R. SUPL 1 ("Balaji").

[29] Balaji, supra note 28, ¶ 34.

[30] Ajit Warrier, Reservation: How and Why, Vol. 1(1), National Law School of India Review; 4 (1989) available at https://repository.nls.ac.in/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1214\&context=nlsir (Last visited on March 15, 2025).

[31] Amartya Sen, Merit and Justice, Princeton Edu, available at https://assets.press.princeton.edu/chapters/s6818.pdf (Last visited on March 10, 2025); Kenneth Arrow "et. al.," Meritocracy and Economic Inequality, 25 (Princeton University Press, 2000).

[32] Balaji, supra note 28, ¶ 31.

[33] T. Devadasan v. Union of India, (1963) 4 S.C.R. 680 ("Devadasan").

[34] Devadasan, supra note 33, ¶¶ 26, 33 (per Subba Rao J.).

[35] Balaji, supra note 28.

[36] Devadasan, supra note 33, ¶¶ 26, 27,28,29, 33 (per Subba Rao J.).

[37] State of Kerala v. N.M Thomas, (1975) 1 S.C.R. 906, ¶ 78 ("N.M. Thomas").

[38] Id.

[39] N.M. Thomas, supra note 37, ¶¶ 54, 55, 42, 191.

[40] Indira Sawhney, supra note 2.

[41] Indira Sawhney, supra note 2, ¶ 162.

[42] K.V. Aditya Bharadwaj, "The Clamour for reservation signals a deeper crisis elsewhere," The Hindu, April 11, 2021, available at https://www.thehindu.com/society/the-clamour-for-reservation-signals-a-deeper-crisis-elsewhere-justice-hn-nagamohan-das/article34279549.ece (Last visited on March 16, 2025); Aachman Shekhar, The 50% ceiling : Bulwark of Substantive Equality of Opportunity, Nls Ac, available at https://www.nls.ac.in/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Aachman-Shekhar.pdf (Last visited on March 11, 2025).

[43] Alok Prasanna Kumar, Revisiting the Rationale for Reservations, Vol. 51(47), E. P. W., 5 (2016) available at https://www.epw.in/journal/2016/47/law-and-society/revisiting-rationale-reservations.html (Last visited on March 12, 2025).

[44] The Constitution of India, 1950, Arts.15–16; Suresh Kumar Gautam v. State of UP, (2016) 11 SCC 113; State of Punjab v. Hira Lal, (1970) 3 SCC 567.

[45] Shinde Sheetal, Reservation in Promotion : Merit or Social Justice, Vol. 2(4), Indian Journal of Integrated Research in Law, (2022) available at https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/injloitd3\&div=43\&id=\&page= (Last visited on March 15, 2025).

[46] Sandra Fredman, Substantive Equality revisited, Vol.14(3), International Journal of Constitutional Law (2016) available at https://academic.oup.com/icon/article/14/3/712/2404476 (Last visited on March 14, 2025).

[47] N.M. Thomas, supra note 37, ¶¶ 193, 87.

[48] Indira Sawhney, supra note 7.

[49] N.M. Thomas, supra note 37.

[50] Indira Sawhney, supra note 40.

[51] Gautam Bhatia, A Critique of the Supreme Court's Maratha Judgement- I: Equality, Indian Constitutional Law and Philosophy, May 6, 2021, available at https://indconlawphil.wordpress.com/2021/05/06/a-critique-of-the-supreme-courts-maratha-reservation-judgment-i-equality/ (Last visited on March 13, 2025).

[52] Id.

[53] Shinde Sheetal, supra note 45.

[54] K.V. Aditya, supra note 42; Ashwini M Sripad, If Centre can cross 50% quota cap, why not state?, Indian Express, October 9, 2022, available at https://www.newindianexpress.com/states/karnataka/2022/Oct/09/if-centre-can-cross-50-quota-cap-why-not-statejustice-nagamohan-das-2506197.html (Last visited on March 16, 2025).

[55] Indra Sawhney, supra note 2.

[56] Gautam Bhatia, Reservations, Equality and the Constitution-V: Indra Sawhney, Indian Constitutional Law and Philosophy, March 1, 2014, available at https://indconlawphil.wordpress.com/2014/03/01/reservations-equality-and-the-constitution-v-indra-sawhney/ (Last visited on March 16, 2025).

[57] Id.

[58] Sujit Choudhry, The Oxford Handbook of Indian Constitution, Chapter 40, 747–765 (Madhav Khosla & Pratap Bhanu Mehta., Oxford University Press, 2016).

[59] Jaishri Laxmanrao, supra note 5.

[60] The Maharashtra State Reservation for Socially and Educationally Backward Classes Act, 2018.

[61] Jaishri Laxmanrao, supra note 5, ¶ 34 (per Bhat J.).

[62] Janhit Abhiyan v. Union of India, (2023) 5 SCC 1 ("Janhit Abhiyan").

[63] The Constitution (One Hundred and Third Amendment) Act, 2019.

[64] Indira Sawhney, supra note 2, ¶ 810.

[65] Shrutika Pandey, No Special Case Made out for Breaching Ceiling Limit of 50%, Live Law, September 20, 2022, available at https://www.livelaw.in/news-updates/no-special-case-is-made-out-for-breaching-the-reservation-ceiling-limit-of-50-chhattisgarh-high-court-strikes-down-58-reservation-in-education-jobs-209761 (Last visited on March 14, 2025).

[66] Janhit Abhiyan, supra note 62, ¶¶168, 169,170,176,179,187,194,195.

[67] H.M Seervai, Constitutional Law of India, Vol.3, 390–399 (Law & Justice Publishing Co., 4th edn., 2023); Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra, (1966) S.C.R. 3, ¶¶87, 94,98 (per Hidayatullah J.).

[68] The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 16.

[69] Xenophon Contiades, Routledge Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Change, 140–165 (Routledge Handbooks, 2020).

[70] Id.

[71] Id.

[72] The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 16(4).

[73] Shiva Rao, The Framing of India's Constitution- Select Documents, Vol. 2, 276–277 (Lexis Nexis,1st ed.,2015).

[74] Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) S.C.R. 2 621; Justice K S Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India, (2017) INSC 801.

[75] Gaurav Kumar, supra note 10.

[76] Dorairajan, supra note 16.

[77] Fredman, supra note 45; Bob Hepple, Discrimination and Equality of Opportunity—Northern Irish Lessons, Vol.10(3), Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 411 (1990) available at https://academic.oup.com/ojls/article-abstract/10/3/408/1399160 (Last visited on March 16, 2025); Gautam Bhatia, Merit, Equality and Reservations: The Supreme Court's NEET Judgement, Indian Constitutional Law and Philosophy, February 4, 2022, available at https://indconlawphil.wordpress.com/2022/02/04/merit-equality-and-reservations-the-supreme-courts-neet-judgment/ (Last visited on March 14, 2025).

[78] Akhil Bhartiya Soshit Karamchari Sangh v. Union of India, (1981) 1 SCC 246.

[79] B.K. Pavitra v. Union of India, (2019) 16 SCC 129, ¶¶45, 24.

[80] Id.

[81] The Constitution of India, 1950, Arts. 330, 332.

[82] N.M. Thomas, supra note 37, ¶73 (per Mathew J.).

[83] N.M. Thomas, supra note 37, ¶191 (per Fazal Ali J.).

[84] Itishree Pradhan et al., Caste-Based analysis of multidimensional early childhood poverty in India : Patterns and determinants, Vol. 155, Children and Youth Services Review (2023) available at https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0190740923004164\#:\~:text=(2022)%20suggests%20STs%20are%20the,with%20only%2014.9%20%25%20multidimensionally%20poor (Last visited on March 15, 2025); Times of India, In India, 5 out of 6 multidimensionally poor are from lower tribes or castes, available at https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/in-india-5-out-of-6-multidimensionally-poor-are-from-lower-tribes-or-castes-un-report/articleshow/86843808.cms (Last visited on March 15, 2025); International Dalit Solidarity Network, UN Report : One third of India's Dalits remain poor, available at https://idsn.org/one-third-of-indias-dalits-remain-poor/ (Last visited on March 15, 2025); Ground Report, Poverty level is highest among SC, ST, and OBCs in India, available at https://groundreport.in/poverty-level-is-highest-among-sc-st-and-obcs-in-india/ (Last visited on March 15,2025).

[85] Department of Planning and Development, supra note 3.

[86] Amit Bhelari, Bihar caste-based survey report, The Hindu, November 8, 2023, available at https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/bihars-caste-based-survey-report-shows-yadavs-hold-most-govt-jobs-among-obcs/article67509087.ece (Last visited on March 12, 2025); Kishan Kumar & Nitish Kumar, Bihar Caste Survey: Analysing the Larger Patterns in the Released Data, The Quint, November 17, 2023, available at https://www.thequint.com/opinion/bihar-caste-survey-anaylsing-the-larger-patterns-in-the-released-data (Last visited on March 13, 2025).

[87] Shyam Babu, Times Face-off: Is it time to lift the 50% ceiling on total reservation?, Times of India, March 26, 2021, available at https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/times-face-off-is-it-time-to-lift-the-50-ceiling-on-total-reservation/articleshow/81699189.cms (Last visited on March 15, 2025).

[88] The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 335; M. Nagraj v. Union of India, (2006) 4 SCT 664, ¶122.

[89] Rangachari, supra note 25.

[90] State of Punjab v. Harilal, (1970) 3 SCC 567.

[91] Arpita Sarkar, Judicial Review of Reservation in Promotion: A Fading Promise of Equality in Services Guaranteed by the Indian Constitution, Vol. 11(2), Nujs L. Rev., 13 (2018).