Punishing the Developing Mind: The Legal and Ethical Dilemma of Youth Sentencing

In September 2024, fourteen year old Colt Gray, alleged Apalachee High School shooter, was charged with four counts of murder in adult court [1]. This event sparked public discourse on the youth-to-adult court framework in the US legal system. The legal and ethical debates of balancing public safety and rehabilitation recently emerged from this practice of charging minors as adults. While some proponents of this practice cite harsher sentencing as a deterrent to future crimes, recent advancements in psychological research regarding youth development suggests that the practice itself stifles minors’ capacity for reform while disproportionately affecting marginalized communities. This complex dilemma deserves a more nuanced legal framework that accounts for both a crime’s severity and a minor’s potential for rehabilitation.

In order to understand the legal issues that juveniles face in modern times, it is important to understand the history of the US Juvenile Justice System with respect to the prosecution of minors. In 1899, Chicago established the first Juvenile Court, which gave jurisdiction over “neglected, dependent, and delinquent” children under the age of sixteen [2]. The US Juvenile Justice System was ultimately a product of progressive era reforms and was built on the ideals of child protectionism and delinquent rehabilitation. Further, the courts placed emphasis on an individual’s background, personality characteristics, and “social environmental positivism” [3]. For nearly fifty years, the Juvenile Justice System was largely unchecked by the federal government, as juvenile justice was considered to be a state-dependent system. However, in the landmark U.S. Supreme Court case in re Gault (387 U.S. 1, 1967), the Court ruled that due process applies similarly, but not necessarily equally, to juveniles as it does adults [4]. For instance, in McKeiver v Pennsylvania (403 U.S. 528, 1971), the Court ruled that a minor is not constitutionally entitled to a trial by jury in Juvenile Court, citing that because Juvenile Courts are neither civil, nor criminal, the 6th amendment does not fully apply. Indeed, in the majority opinion of McKeiver, the Court also recognized the “idealistic” prospect of the Juvenile Courts stating that “the jury trial, if required as a matter of constitutional precept, will remake the juvenile proceeding into a fully adversary process and will put an effective end to what has been the idealistic prospect of an intimate, informal protective proceeding” [5].

This notion of a protective Juvenile system saw a significant shift during the “tough-on-crime” era in the 1980s and 1990s. Political scientist John J. Dilulio Jr.'s coining of the term “superpredator” in 1995 led to public hysteria about youth with “moral poverty” flooding the streets with crime [6]. Consequently, many states adopted harsher and more rigid laws, such as automatic transfer laws, which increased the juvenile to adult court pipeline’s use and power. This characterization of juveniles would fundamentally redefine the Juvenile Justice System in America from protection and reformation to punishment and retribution, which set the stage for an increase in minors being charged as adults.

The legal framework that surrounds the juvenile to adult court jurisdiction is inconsistent from state to state, leading to racial and socioeconomic disparities in the justice system. There are four primary pathways that lead youth into adult courts. First, jurisdictional boundaries provide each state the ability to determine the age at which children can be held criminally liable. In forty-seven states, this age of criminality is set at 18 years old; the remaining three states (Georgia, Texas, and Wisconsin) have set this age at 17 years old [7]. Secondly, the discretionary waiver, which grants a judge full discretion as to which court a juvenile is tried in, exists in forty-six states [8]. Similarly, thirteen states and the District of Columbia provide for prosecutorial discretion, by which a prosecutor has discretion to bring charges against a minor in either juvenile or adult court [9]. Lastly, twenty-six states have statutory exclusion laws, which exclude certain classes of cases from juvenile court depending on the severity of the crime [10]. Georgia, the jurisdiction under which the aforementioned Colt Gray is being charged in, is one state that has a statutory exclusion law. GA Code § 15-11-560, commonly known as the “seven deadly sins” law, requires that any minor, accused of murder, kidnapping, armed robbery, rape, aggravated sodomy, aggravated sexual battery, and aggravated child molestation, above the age of fourteen, must be charged as an adult [11]. While these are considered to be the most serious of crimes, some automatic transfer laws include offenses of lesser crimes such as property offenses and misdemeanors, including Alabama Code § 12-15-204, which is a statutory exclusionary rule for a 16 year old who commits burglary, even if non-violent [12,13].

There is a significant impact when criteria and procedures vary from state to state, especially on minority and low income communities. In California, youth of color are more likely to be tried as adults as compared to White youth, even when being charged with similar crimes. For instance, in 2015, 88% of juveniles tried as adults in California were youth of color [14]. Similarly, a 2016 study of the Washington State Juvenile Rehabilitation Administration (JRA) revealed that african americans, multiracial, and hispanic youth were seven times, three times, and one and a half times, respectively, more likely to be in JRA custody than caucasians [15]. It is thus evident that the structural inconsistencies are leading to disparities in juvenile justice.

Developments in psychological research have advanced our understanding on adolescent brain maturation, which must be taken into account when considering whether a minor should be charged as an adult. A longitudinal neuroimaging study published by child psychiatry experts revealed that the frontal lobe, responsible for decision making, is not fully developed until one’s mid-twenties [16]. Indeed, the Court accepted this psychological maturation argument in Roper v Simmons (543 U.S. 551, 2005) in which they ruled that execution of minors is unconstitutional under the 8th amendment. Specifically, Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, stated, “[minors’] comparative lack of control means juveniles have a greater claim than adults to be forgiven” and that “the diminished culpability of juveniles is recognized” [17]. This was reaffirmed in Graham v Florida (560 U.S. 48, 2010) a case that ruled life-long sentences without the possibility of parole for minors was unconstitutional under the 8th amendment. Justice Kennedy, again writing for the majority, claimed that “developments in psychology and brain science continue to show fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds” [18]. These developments in the understanding of youth functioning and decision making has fundamentally altered the way we view juvenile culpability. Thus, youth should be entitled to be charged in juvenile court and be sentenced to rehabilitative programs, rather than punitive ones. For instance, states should consider replicating the Missouri model, a promising pathway for juvenile rehabilitation. In Texas and Arizona, 43% and 52% of youths, respectively, end up reincarcerated within 3 years, as compared to the 24% in Missouri [19]. In 2008, 85.3% of youth exiting Missouri facilities were “actively and positively engaged” in the community, which highlighted the positive outcomes of this model [20].

Many people still believe that minors should be charged as adults, especially for violent crimes, yet they often base their beliefs on unsubstantiated claims about public safety and deterrence. A 2023 Gallup poll found that Americans are nearly perfectly split on the treatment of violent juvenile offenders: 46% of respondents supported treating these minors as adults, while 47% supported more lenient juvenile sentences [21]. Most proponents of harsher sentences cite retribution and public safety as justification. Interestingly, some also argue that certain crimes require an “adult-like” premeditation and thus those offenders should be charged as adults. However, psychological research cited in Roper v Simmons does not support this claim. In his majority opinion in Roper, Justice Kennedy wrote that “it is difficult even for expert psychologists to differentiate between the juvenile offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption” [22]. Lastly, there is a genuine belief among many that harsh sentences deter crime. However, viewing deterrence in criminal law with the lens of economic analysis reveals that sending an offender to prison is not always the best way to deter crime. In fact, this lens highlights that criminals are usually not aware of specific punishments, and for them, the perceived probability of being caught is more influential than the sanctions written down in criminal codes [23]. But, this overwhelming evidence against the effectiveness of deterrence is not just theoretical: the U.S. Department of Justice itself admits that both sending a person to prison and increasing the severity of punishment “do little to deter crime” [24]. Recent large scale studies have also consistently shown that trying juveniles in criminal court or incarcerating them in adult facilities increases recidivism, the tendency to reoffend [25]. Furthermore, in a study of minors convicted of adult felonies, juveniles whose jail experience were worse than expected, or those who reported witnessing or experiencing violence, were less likely to say that their incarceration would deter them from committing future crimes [26]. Justice Kennedy also provided a logical argument against life-sentences for minors in Graham: “a young person who knows that he or she has no chance to leave prison before life’s end has little incentive to become a responsible individual” [27]. Thus, it is evident that the foundational backbones of harsh punishment arguments are founded upon unsupported beliefs of deterrence, rendering those arguments invalid and baseless.

Reforms to the Juvenile justice system are thus of paramount importance, and the focus must be placed on developing a more nuanced perspective of minors and their inherent capability for reform and rehabilitation. Special attention and studies should be conducted on the success of the Missouri Model, which has shown to be extremely effective in restorative justice practices and minor rehabilitation. Most importantly, however, it’s time that we revisit and reaffirm the progressive, humanistic ideals of the foundational Juvenile Justice System, established over 124 years ago. By treating minors as “superpredators” and career criminals, our current Justice System underestimates and undermines a minor's inherent capacity for growth and change, thereby perpetuating a cycle of shame, marginalization, and criminality. That needs to change.

References

[1] Treisman, Rachel, and Jonathan Franklin. "The Georgia High School Shooting Suspect Won't Face Death Penalty, Judge Says." NPR, September 6, 2024. Accessed October 2, 2024. https://www.npr.org/2024/09/05/nx-s1-5101890/apalachee-high-school-shooting-charges-investigation.

[2] "The Juvenile Justice System." National Research Council and Institute of Medicine. 2001. Juvenile Crime, Juvenile Justice. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/9747.

[3] Shichor, D. "Historical and Current Trends in American Juvenile Justice." Juvenile and Family Court Journal 34, no. 3 (1983): 61-75. Accessed October 2, 2024. https://www.ojp.gov/ncjrs/virtual-library/abstracts/historical-and-current-trends-american-juvenile-justice#:~:text=The%20juvenile%20justice%20system%20was,characteristics%2C%20and%20social%20environmental%20positivism.

[4] in re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967)

[5] McKeiver v Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971)

[6] The Sentencing Project. "Youth in Adult Courts, Jails, and Prisons." News release. December 2021. Accessed October 2, 2024.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Ibid.

[11] GA Code § 15-11-560 (2023)

[12] The Sentencing Project. "Youth in Adult Courts, Jails, and Prisons." News release. December 2021. Accessed October 2, 2024.

[13] Alabama Code § 12-15-204

[14] Human Impact Partners. "Juvenile InJustice: Charging Youth as Adults is Ineffective, Biased, and Harmful." Human Impact Partners. Last modified February 2017. Accessed October 2, 2024.

[15] Robles-Ramamurthy, Barbara, and Clarence Watson. "Examining Racial Disparities in Juvenile Justice." Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law, February 2019. Accessed October 2, 2024.

[16] Johnson, Sara, Robert Blum, and Jay Giedd. "Adolescent Maturity and the Brain: The Promise and Pitfalls of Neuroscience Research in Adolescent Health Policy." Journal of Adolescent Health 45, no. 3 (2009): 216-21. Accessed October 2, 2024.

[17] Roper v Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005)

[18] Graham v Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010)

[19] Mendel, Richard. Missouri Model: Reinventing the Practices of Rehabilitating Youthful Offenders, Summary Report. 2010. Accessed October 2, 2024.

[20] Ibid.

[21] Jones, Jeffrey. "Americans Divided on Treatment of Violent Juvenile Offenders." Editorial. Gallup News. Last modified December 4, 2023. Accessed October 2, 2024.

[22] Roper v Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005)

[23] Elgendashvili, Gvantsa. "Economic Analysis of Deterrence through Criminal Law." Georgian Law Journal. Accessed October 14, 2024.

[24] Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice. "Five Things about Deterrence." Office of Justice Programs. U.S. Department of Justice. Last modified May 2016. Accessed October 2, 2024.

[25] Redding, Richard. "What Do Juvenile Offenders Know about Being Tried as Adults? Implications for Deterrence." Villanova University School of Law, 2005, 1-11. Accessed October 2, 2024.

[26] Ibid.

[27] Graham v Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010)