The Wrench in Racial Justice: How the Supreme Court is Inapplicable and Counterproductive
Despite half a century of efforts to racially integrate schools, American schools have seen little progress. In fact, “69% of Black students and 87% of White students attend a school where they are the predominant race”[1] as of 2022. Children are misleadingly taught that the Supreme Court closed the racial gap in public education with their decision in Brown v. Board of Education (1954) [2]. It is time, however, to recognize that this one case is not a holistic nor accurate representation of the Court’s role in the promotion of civil rights. Indeed, the Court denied the legitimacy of affirmative action, the consideration of race in college admissions, in Students for Fair Admissions v. Harvard (2023)[3] and Students for Fair Admissions v. University of North Carolina (2023)[4]. This decision has raised immense public discourse at an alarming time, as trust in the Court has dropped to its lowest point in three decades [5]. However, this decision is far less shocking after acknowledging the Supreme Court’s priority is to defend the Constitution, which not only results in a lack of requisite for the Court to forge civil rights, but also in the Court historically institutionalizing discrimination.
The Supreme Court’s choice of “colorblind approaches” in modern issues ignores previous consequences it has caused by offering harsh racial delineations in judicial decisions. For centuries, the nation’s top court has classified the population by race, creating a legally-defined separation between racial groups. A prominent example is the denial of citizenship according to racial eligibility clauses. The Court declared, “A free negro of the African race, whose ancestors were brought to this country and sold as slaves, is not a ‘citizen’ within the meaning of the Constitution of the United States” in Dred Scott v. Sandford (1857) [6]. With the influx of new immigrant groups, the Justices have attempted to define the boundaries of races. Critically, their endeavor to neatly fit individuals in have resulted in inconsistent and questionable decisions. For example, Takao Ozawa had adopted American culture by attending school, working, and raising his family in the US for two decades. He was denied citizenship in the state of Hawaii. Ozawa v. United States (1922)[7] then reached the Supreme Court, in order to contest the definitions in the Naturalization Act of 1906. Ozawa’s lawyers argued that the framers of that law only specified “free white people” to exclude Black Americans and not others that did not fit into the White-Black dichotomy of race. The Court, however, upheld that white persons referred exclusively to those of the Caucasian race, and Ozawa was “one of the Japanese race,”[8] thus ineligible for naturalization. This decision permanently changed common law by ingraining the existence of multiple, separate races. Additionally, the Court treated Ozawa’s birth country as a racial rather than ethnic identifier, despite later referring to the “brown or yellow races of Asia.”[9] This is critical because the very next year, in United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind (1923) [10], the Justices contradict their former interpretation of “white people.” The District Court of Oregon had originally granted Thind citizenship on the basis that one born in Northern India is Caucasian. The Supreme Court overturned with the justification that “white peoples are words of common speech, to be interpreted in accordance with the understanding of the common man.”[11] Hence, the determination of whether one is white enough to become a citizen is completely arbitrary and malleable according to the Court. Society cannot pretend race does not exist when the courts have extensively attempted to define race. Race is not merely a social construct but also a legal one with precedents that it attempts to abide by.
Even when the Supreme Court seems to promote integration, they establish dubious restrictions, interpretations, and reasonings. Akins v. Texas (1945) is clear evidence of this [12]. A grand jury of 11 White men and one Black man had indicted Akins, a Black man for murder. The Supreme Court had the burden of deciding whether the jury commissioner had discriminated against Akins by limiting the number of Black jurors. They concluded, "A purpose to discriminate must be present which may be proven by…unequal application of the law to such an extent as to show intentional discrimination."[13] There are two implications. First, the consequences of ignorance and compliance with white supremacy are enabled because they are not ‘intentional’. Moreover, purpose is subjective and abstract; the intent of a transgressor cannot be wholly known or proven by any lawyer or even the individual themself. The Court hence drastically reduced accountability for racial discrimination. Likewise, the Court limited themselves in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke (1978) [14]. Allan Bakke had applied twice to the University of California Medical School at Davis, which reserved 16 positions for minority students to counter systemic barriers to higher education. Despite having superior scores to many minority students, Bakke was denied both times. The Court agreed it was acceptable to consider race when reviewing applications; however, an institution could not predetermine a quota of seats to fill with minority students. The university defended itself with four main arguments, with the first three relating to the need to address opportunity and achievement gaps between students of different races. Ironically, the only reasoning the Justices found sufficient was the fourth stating that a racially diverse student body would be beneficial for higher education, which highlights the differences of students of color. The Justices did not buy the claim that affirmative action reversed past societal discrimination because of how hard it is to define. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. wrote in the majority opinion, “Those whose societal injury is thought to exceed some arbitrary level of tolerability then would be entitled to preferential classifications at the expense of individuals belonging to other groups… As these preferences began to have their desired effect, and the consequences of past discrimination were undone, new judicial rankings would be necessary. The kind of variable sociological and political analysis necessary to produce such rankings simply does not lie within the judicial competence -- even if they otherwise were politically feasible and socially desirable.” These two cases are relevant because our common law system relies on not only the final decisions but also the reasoning of former cases. It is necessary for Court justifications to align with and support goals of racial integration, or else they may be used against endeavors to minimize racial chasms, which will be explained later.
Opponents of the belief that judicial hypocrisy exists may suggest that the legal courts metamorphose along with social norms. Seemingly hypocritical decisions are merely the Court’s attempt to correct their wrongs, such as in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka (1954) [15]. There is no denying that Brown was a revolutionary moment in the civil rights movement, establishing legal precedent that separate was not equal. Yet, there are two main arguments why the Court’s decision in Brown does not exemplify an allegiance to promoting racial justice. First, the Court has no intrinsic duty to implementing change, thus their rhetoric does little to change tangible conditions. A mere year later, the Court declared through Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka (2) (1955) [16], that local school authorities and courts would be responsible for integrating schools with deliberate speed. They abstained, however, from ordering states to start immediately. In fact, they did not set any deadline. Similarly, integration plans were enacted across the country; cities like Boston and Denver tried busing minority students to different neighborhood schools. Unfortunately, in Board of Education of Oklahoma City Public Schools v. Dowell (1991) [17], the Court allowed local schools to terminate integration efforts as long as they demonstrated “earnest compliance” with original efforts. The Court’s progressiveness is too fragile to be beneficial. This is a positive when considering the Court’s goal to stand true to the Constitution by maintaining states’ rights. Subsequently, the public must acknowledge that this does not align with goals of racial integration. Finally, the most well-known outcome of Brown was the requirement that public schools admit students “on a racially nondiscriminatory basis.”[18] This statement has only been weaponized by the court, however, as the distinction between nondiscriminatory and non discretionary is ignored. Referring to the Supreme Court’s most recent ruling from Students for Fair Admissions [19], the court exposed its hypocrisy by deciding that consideration of race in affirmative action is a violation of the Equal Protections Clause because it inherently divides students by their race. Critically, affirmative action does not separate but rather brings to light that students of different races are already separate as established by former legal and social systems. The Supreme Court ignores its own part in inciting that separation while denying those minority groups equitable resources.
The Supreme Court’s main priority is constitutionality — adherence to laws written by the one race unharmed by racial discrimination — so their decisions may inherently contradict with racial justice efforts. In the opinion of the Court for SFFA, the Justices outline, “Universities may define their missions as they see fit. The Constitution defines ours.”[20] Consequently, the Court has repeatedly made decisions that exacerbated discrepancies in access to education, employment, and citizenship for non-White individuals. That history must be recognized before the Court overturns all their precedents that are imperative for civil rights. In order to address this, the people must attempt to direct their attention towards changing legislation directly. It will be far more powerful to lobby for permanent and enforceable laws that ensure greater civil rights, than to continue expecting the Court to fulfill that role and being disappointed.
Bibliography
Kalinda Ukanwa, “School Choice Increases Racial Segregation Even When Parents Do,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, (August 22, 2022): https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2117979119.
Brian Duignan, “Brown v. Board of Education,” Britannica, Oct 17, 2023, https://www.britannica.com/event/Brown-v-Board-of-Education-of-Topeka
Students for Fair Admissions v. President and Fellows of Harvard College, 600 US _ (2023)
Students for Fair Admissions v. University of North Carolina (2023)
Katy Lin, “Favorable Views of Supreme Court Fall to Historic Low.” Pew Research Center, July 21, 2023, https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2023/07/21/favorable-views-of-supreme-court-fall-to-historic-low/.
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 US 393 (1857)
Takao Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178 (1922)
Ibid.
Ibid.
United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind, 261 U.S. 204 (1923)
Ibid.
Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398 (1945)
Ibid.
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978)
347 U.S. 483 (1954)
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka (2), 349 US 294 (1955)
Board of Education of Oklahoma City Public Schools v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991)
347 U.S. 483 (1954)
600 US _ (2023)
Ibid.