An Inclusive Approach to Climate Migration 

Rising sea levels and temperatures, raging wildfires, intensifying stress on water resources, habitat destruction and degradation of land, and pollution are just some of the devastating effects anthropogenic climate change has inflicted on the planet. The increasing prominence of climate disasters and the failure of developed nations to make significant progress in reducing carbon emissions and curtailing the effects of global warming have fueled the migration of displaced individuals. This wave of movement has occurred mainly internally within nations, but also notably across international borders [1]. According to estimates by the World Bank in 2018, the three most vulnerable regions — Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa, and Southeast Asia — “will generate 143 million more climate migrants by 2050,” where these regions encompass half of the developing world’s population [2]. Currently, there is no legal recourse for climate migrants seeking support and protection when crossing borders. As such, governments avoid responsibility and deny entry to those fleeing climate-related conflicts and disasters [3]. The 1951 United Nations Refugee Convention narrowly defines a refugee as a person who “owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality,” failing to consider those forcibly displaced by the climate crisis [4]. The lack of any international, legally-binding agreement granting access to legal services and planned relocation for climate migrants has prompted many experts to advocate for expanding the refugee definition [5]. Terminology in the law matters, and a multilateral effort is vital to ensure government support of climate migrants and their ability to rebuild their livelihood after being displaced. However, simply expanding the legal definition of a refugee does not go far enough to protect the most vulnerable individuals displaced by this existential threat, since it would exclude protections for the majority of climate migration that happens internally and it ignores how motivating factors for climate migration exist on a broad, complex spectrum that is not easily pinpointed to one causal element [6]. Instead, a new, legally-binding international convention and institutional framework to specifically address the rights and needs of all climate migrants is critical to establishing an inclusive approach to the intersection of the climate crisis and its impacts on human mobility.

The lack of protections for climate migrants seeking support by crossing borders is exhibited in the landmark 2015 case Ioane Teitiota v. Chief Executive of the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment in the Supreme Court of New Zealand. In this case, the Teitiota family sought asylum in New Zealand after fleeing from the sinking island of Tarawa in the Republic of Kiribati in 2007. Ms. Teitiota explained that people forced to move due to rising sea levels had seen an increase in violent conflicts and disease, with children “getting diarrhea and even dying because their already scarce drinking water had become contaminated.”[7] The Supreme Court of New Zealand dismissed the case and deported the family, citing that they did not meet the UN Refugee Convention definition for asylum [8]. That same year, Mr. Teitiota filed a complaint with the UN Human Rights Committee, claiming that New Zealand violated his right to life “because the sea level rise had shrunk habitable space in Kiribati, resulting in violent land disputes and environmental degradation.”[9] The Committee held that “the threats to life posed by rising sea levels and other effects of climate change necessitate a broadening of refugee law,” where the body did not rule that the family’s right to life had been violated [10]. Another key element of the Committee’s ruling was that the threats of sea level rise did not put the Teitiota family in imminent danger and that the Kiribati government still had “time to intervene to protect its citizens through relocation and other measures,” even though Kiribati will be uninhabitable within the next ten to fifteen years [11]. Since the Teitiota family was forced out of their nation by rising sea levels and not the political persecution by their government and imminent threats to life the definition of a refugee is exclusively tied to, there seems to be a convincing case to expand the definition of refugee to include the fear of forced removal from climate-related harms. The claim might apply in the case of the Teitiota family, but what about those who are internally displaced by climate disasters?

According to a brief by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, most climate migrants are and will continue to be displaced internally within nations, “placing them into an already wide gap in international forced migration frameworks.”[12] Even though the “UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement covers all manner of internal displacement,” the provisions offer extremely insufficient protections for climate migrants [13]. It is also relevant to consider that those who can cross borders to escape detrimental environmental situations do not encompass all individuals who wish to leave or are in need of legal rights claims, as the ability to immigrate is often restricted by costs as a long and tedious undertaking [14]. Therefore, even if the definition of a refugee was broadened to include those seeking asylum from climate disasters, a majority of individuals who are most vulnerable to the impacts of climate-related damages would be left without any expanded legal protections.

The failure of international law to safeguard both climate migrants seeking to cross borders like the Teitiota family as well as the majority of cases where migrants are internally displaced demonstrates the necessity of a binding convention specifically focused on climate migration for individuals to seek legal recourse and how establishing a new legal category would aid the multitude of unique needs of climate migrants, both internal and external. A legal framework that includes protections for internal climate migrants would also provide opportunities to strengthen institutional capacities for nations most likely to have internal migration. Bearing in mind that climate migration disproportionately affects developing nations even though they contribute little to global greenhouse gas emissions, policies to strengthen response measures might constitute reparations from developed nations [15]. A new convention could provide a space to hold significantly polluting countries morally accountable for past harms and the resulting destruction of entire homes and landscapes.

Further complicating the expansion of the definition of refugee is the fact that the motivating factors for climate migration exist on a broad spectrum. Contributing circumstances range from temporary displacement — typically from extreme weather events like floods or wildfires — to permanent displacement, often due to sea level rise and agricultural tipping points that make returning to one’s home significantly less likely or impossible. There is also indirect displacement, where individuals aim to escape greater instances of violent conflicts and community-level instability that are exacerbated by climate change’s increasing competition for resources like crop yields or water availability [16]. Expanding the definition of refugee to encapsulate the full complexities of decision-making and causal factors that trigger climate migration would be overwhelming. The breadth of hardships faced by migrants highlights how climate migration requires its own legally binding agreements and legal status separate from the requirements dealing specifically with refugees. The multidimensional nature of climate migration underscores that a new convention and legal framework would serve to identify the unique challenges faced by these broad groups, and form plans of action and legal support for every life touched by climate change harms in an inclusive approach. Not only do the multifaceted factors of climate migration pose significant challenges to broadening the qualifications for refugees, but many refugee advocates are also hesitant to revisit discussions of the 1951 UN Refugee Convention terminology because of the risks of governments opting to limit protections and the scope of the definition of refugees [17]. According to an analysis conducted by the Pew Research Center, extreme anti-immigrant rhetoric has increased across Europe with the rise of far-right populist movements, exhibiting the considerable hazards of renewed discussions of the legal architecture of refugee status [18]. However, this fear should not be used as an excuse to prevent additive reforms for climate migrants. The danger of scaling back protections of refugees would be avoided by holding a separate, new convention to address the specific needs of all climate migrations and creating a legal status to hold nations accountable for providing climate migrants with safeguards, conveying its promise as part of a comprehensive strategy to confront the dual crises of climate change and human mobility.

Ultimately, to tackle the climate crisis and its impacts on migration in an inclusive manner, a new international climate migration convention and legal status framework must be implemented that is beyond the scope of merely expanding the definition of a refugee. A legally binding agreement that outlines the legal protections and expands institutional capacity to assist both internal and external climate migrants is crucial in ensuring that all conditions of climate migration are thoroughly addressed. The creation of a new convention would also present a forum to hold developed governments accountable to international investments in resettlement efforts, and highlight the ethical and moral obligations of developed nations that disproportionately contribute to carbon emissions triggering migration. Only then will meaningful policy action to reduce fossil fuel dependence be catalyzed.

Bibliography

  1. “Climate Change Is Fueling Migration. Do Climate Migrants Have Legal Protections?,” Council on Foreign Relations, accessed October 10, 2023, https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/climate-change-fueling-migration-do-climate-migrants-have-legal-protections.

  2. “The Climate Crisis, Migration, and Refugees,” Brookings, accessed October 10, 2023, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-climate-crisis-migration-and-refugees/.

  3. “Climate Change Is Fueling Migration. Do Climate Migrants Have Legal Protections?,” Council on Foreign Relations, accessed October 10, 2023, https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/climate-change-fueling-migration-do-climate-migrants-have-legal-protections.

  4. “What Is a Refugee?,” UNHCR, accessed October 10, 2023, https://www.unhcr.org/what-refugee.

  5. “Climate Change Is Fueling Migration. Do Climate Migrants Have Legal Protections?,” Council on Foreign Relations, accessed October 10, 2023, https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/climate-change-fueling-migration-do-climate-migrants-have-legal-protections.

  6. Ibid

  7. “It Is Time to Change the Definition of Refugee | Human Rights Watch,” January 28, 2020, https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/01/28/it-time-change-definition-refugee.

  8. Ibid

  9. Ibid

  10. Ibid

  11. Ibid

  12. Erol Yayboke et al., “A New Framework for U.S. Leadership on Climate Migration,” October 23, 2020, https://www.csis.org/analysis/new-framework-us-leadership-climate-migration.

  13. Ibid

  14. Ibid

  15. Ibid

  16. Ibid

  17. “Climate Change Is Fueling Migration. Do Climate Migrants Have Legal Protections?,” Council on Foreign Relations, accessed October 10, 2023, https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/climate-change-fueling-migration-do-climate-migrants-have-legal-protections.

  18. Laura Silver, “Populists in Europe – Especially Those on the Right – Have Increased Their Vote Shares in Recent Elections,” Pew Research Center (blog), accessed October 10, 2023, https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2022/10/06/populists-in-europe-especially-those-on-the-right-have-increased-their-vote-shares-in-recent-elections/.

Zophia Cherrier

Zophia Cherrier is a staff writer for the Fall 2023 Harvard Undergraduate Law Review

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