The Missing Condition in John Rawls’ “The Justification of Civil Disobedience”

According to political philosopher John Rawls, civil disobedience is “a public, nonviolent, and conscientious act contrary to law usually done with the intent to bring about change in the policies or laws of the government.”1 Rawls posits that there are three conditions that justify civil disobedience: it is the last resort when other appeals have failed, there is clear and substantial injustice, and the agent engaging in civil disobedience is willing for others to also engage in similar acts. However, there should be an additional justification condition: civil disobedience should not impose an excessive cost on a targeted and specific agent or group unless that party is more liable to incur the costs of civil disobedience knowingly. This is a crucial condition because there are forms of civil disobedience that are currently justified that should not be. Furthermore, there are unjustified forms of civil disobedience that should be justified by being clarified through this condition.

There are certain instances where civil disobedience is justified under the other conditions, but I believe should not be. As an example, imagine civilians are engaging in civil disobedience to change government policy towards the beef industry because it is a large source of carbon emissions. In order to do so, the civilians target a small burger chain by protesting and blocking the entrance to the restaurants. This action should not be a justified form of civil disobedience. The agents imposed excessive costs on a targeted and specific group that were not liable to incur the consequences of the protest and boycott. This example would be justified under the other justification conditions, as it is aimed at a clear and substantial act of injustice; if other agents were to engage in equivalent actions it would benefit their cause and would not lead to complete political disarray. For the purpose of the argument, we can also assume that this was a last resort act for justice. Even if the protest of a small burger chain would be successful in the cause of changing policy on carbon emissions, it should be unjustified due to the disproportionate and unfair effect on the employees and the owners of the small burger chain. It would put innocent agents who should not be held liable in danger of unemployment. Rather, to justify civil disobedience in relation to CO2 and meat companies, civil disobedience should target the lawmakers who allowed for this to occur. It is crucial to distinguish what is justified in order to protect third parties who may incur the cost of civil disobedience.

There are also acts of civil disobedience that may not be considered civil disobedience but could be if further clarified with this condition. For example, as Rawls states, “the non-violence nature of civil disobedience refers to the fact that it is intended to address the sense of justice of the majority as as such is a form of speech, an expression of conviction. To engage in violence acts likely to injure and to hurt is incompatible with civil disobedience as a model of address.”2 However, Rawls does not specify what acts of violence would be justifiably considered civil disobedience while also maintaining within the scope of justification conditions. The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines violence as “the use of physical force as to injure, abuse, damage, or destroy.” While the definition of civil disobedience is seemingly straightforward there are some acts that, clarified under this justification condition, should then be included in the definition. In 2010, Mohamed Bouazizi, a fruit and vegetable vendor from Tunisia, set himself on fire in front of a government building to protest the corruption of the Tunisian dictator at the time. While this would not be considered civil disobedience due to the non-violence condition, the very vague non-violence condition would be clarified by a new condition: self-harm. Although vaguely fitting into the definition of violence, self-harm should be justifiable through this additional condition as a legitimate form of civil disobedience.

A legitimate concern with this additional condition would be the question of whether it is wrong to consider an act of civil disobedience unjustified if it affects innocent bystanders. For example, hundreds of protesters halted traffic in Hong Kong as a protest against the government and police force. This action is a legitimate and justifiable form of civil disobedience and is still valid under the proposed condition. The condition states that civil disobedience should not impact excessive cost on a targeted and specific agent or group unless that party is more liable to incur the costs of civil disobedience knowingly. Although being stuck in traffic is an annoyance, it is neither a targeted nor excessive cost. Even if an ambulance were stuck in traffic, although unfortunate and maybe even tragic in some cases, the protest still would not be a targeted act on a specific group and therefore would be justifiable. The condition is a question of the degree of impact on a targeted and specific agent or group of people. For example, looking at the first example given, it would have an unfairly and disproportionate impact on the small chain of burger employees in comparison to their culpability.

In conclusion, the additional condition is crucial in determining whether acts of civil disobedience can be justified or not. Rawls does not consider a crucial condition that explains that repercussions caused by civil disobedience cannot be disproportionate on a party that is not responsible for the injustice. It is wrong to disproportionately impact a person or party when they are not culpable or liable for the injustice being protested. Furthermore, there are some acts of civil disobedience that are not considered civil disobedience but should be when clarified with the fourth condition. With the additional condition, it can further clarify vague terms used by Rawls that make it unclear whether an act could be considered civil disobedience or not.


References

  1. Rawls, John. “The Justification of Civil Disobedience.” In Philosophy of Law: Classic and Contemporary Readings with Commentary, by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Frederick F. Schauer. Oxford University Press USA, 1996.  

  2. Ibid. 261. 

Mariam Sousou

Mariam Sousou is a member of the Harvard Class of 2023 and an HULR Staff Writer for the Spring 2021 Issue.

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