Dred Scott: Why the Supreme Court Should Not Have Deprived a Black Man of His Liberty

I. Introduction

The United States has long grappled with racial conflict. A critical Supreme Court case that determined African Americans’ legal status was Dred Scott v. Sandford (1857). The enslaved Dred Scott sued for his freedom when his master took him from Missouri, a slave state, to Wisconsin, a free state, and back. Chief Justice Roger Taney’s majority opinion proclaimed that because African Americans were not intended to be U.S. citizens by the Constitution, they could not sue in federal court, ruling in Sandford’s favor. Major debates in the case pertained to three provisions: whether African Americans have the potential for U.S. citizenship or federal trials, which legislative bodies could regulate slavery and whether slaves were property, and whether granting a slave freedom deprives his owner of due process for his property. The Supreme Court should have ruled in favor of Dred Scott because the Constitution does not deny citizenship or federal trials to African Americans. The unconstitutionality of the Missouri Compromise proves slaves are not property, and subjecting Dred Scott to slavery upon return to Missouri deprives him of his liberty without due process.

II. Historical Context

The debate between moral arguments against slavery and dependence on slaves for the agricultural economy caused the Framers to not address the slavery issue explicitly in the Constitution, leaving the decision to each state. However, conflict arose about whether slavery should be legal in new territories, prompting federal legislation like the Missouri Compromise of 1820 that admitted Missouri as a slave state and Maine as a free state. Abolitionists and slave owners were unsatisfied with the federal guidance that states should decide whether to allow slavery: “Politicians had begun to look to the Supreme Court to resolve the issue” [1]. However, the purpose of our Supreme Court is to interpret the Constitution based on the explicit provisions in the text; it cannot assume unstated intentions. The era’s political tensions pressured the Court to make a decision to quell political strife, which is extremely shameful given it subjected African Americans to slavery until the end of the Civil War.

III. The Potential for African American Citizenship and Right to a Federal Trial

Although Taney argued slaves were property rather than American citizens, the Constitution does not exclude them from unenumerated rights. American citizens are guaranteed the rights defined in the Constitution and Bill of Rights: Only the federal government can define and provide U.S. citizenship as this body protects it. However, the Constitution did not define federal citizenship in 1857. Despite the lack of explicit provisions defining U.S. citizenship, Taney held that the Framers, by allowing slavery in states, did not intend for Black people to obtain citizenship.

I strongly disagree with this argument. The Three-Fifths Compromise reveals that the Framers explicitly intended for slaves to be considered persons who would receive representation in Congress — a right that not even immigrants are guaranteed today. Article II, Section 2 declares: “A state’s representation in the House of Representatives [will be based] on its free population and three-fifths of ‘all other Persons’ within its territory” [2]. The Framers prove that slaves were not intended just to be property; they would contribute to representation in Congress like citizens. Furthermore, as the Constitution never explicitly defines citizenship for white people, it does not deny it to African American slaves. Thus, the Court overreached when it proclaimed — without explicit constitutional basis — that African Americans were never intended to be citizens and would never be. Although political pressures urged the Court to decide the issue of slavery, politics should never interfere with a decision this way. Supreme Court Justices have the independent role of interpreting explicit provisions in the Constitution; they cannot assume the Framers’ intentions as Taney did in this decision. A significant part of the decision rationale was that Dred Scott was not considered a citizen and could not pursue a federal trial — racial attitudes of the era defined this ruling, not the Constitution.

Justices Curtis and McLean’s dissents argued that the Constitution did allow for the possibility of African American U.S. citizenship, validating Scott’s claim to a federal trial. More so, the Constitution does not prohibit states from granting state citizenship to African Americans. Justice Curtis revealed that Black men could vote in five colonies when the Constitution was ratified [2]. These states considered these free men to be citizens of their states. Thus, Scott argued that he gained state citizenship by entering a free territory. Given Sandford was a New York citizen, Scott justified his right to sue in federal court by citing the diversity of citizenship clause: “The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases [including] between citizens of different States” [2]. Regardless of if Scott was a U.S. citizen, he could sue in federal court by this clause: Taney’s primary argument is refuted as the Court does have jurisdiction over cases with parties who are citizens of two American states. The lack of a definition of U.S. citizenship before the 14th Amendment further supports Scott’s right to a federal trial. The dissenting opinions also argued that if the Court did not have jurisdiction to hear a case from a non-U.S. citizen, it should not have provided a ruling.

IV. How the Unconstitutionality of the Missouri Compromise Proved Slaves were Not Property

If the Missouri Compromise was unconstitutional according to the Dred Scott decision, as the Framers did not intend for Congress to regulate slavery under the Property Clause, Dred Scott and other slaves were not property. The lack of an enumerated power for Congress to regulate slavery provides this right only to the states by police power. With their emphasis on federalism, the Framers intended for state legislatures to make sovereign decisions about slavery; the legality of slavery in states other than Missouri would not affect the ability of Missouri to allow slavery. Declaring the Missouri Compromise unconstitutional preserved Missouri’s rights, and it created the possibility for the U.S. government to refrain from considering Dred Scott property.

When the Taney Court struck down the Missouri Compromise, the Court should have affirmed that slaves, including Dred Scott, were not property. Congress’s basis for enacting the Missouri Compromise was the Property Clause of the Constitution: “Congress shall have Power to […] make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory belonging to the U.S.” [2]. This empowers Congress to regulate territories belonging to the U.S., including Missouri and Wisconsin. One could argue that slaves were considered belongings of the U.S. when the Constitution was ratified in 1787 to justify the Missouri Compromise. However, by striking down the Missouri Compromise, the Taney Court holds that Congress cannot regulate slavery because the Framers did not intend for slavery to be federally regulated: Congress had been regulating slavery without the enumerated power to do so. After all, slavery is not stated as an exception to the property clause. Most importantly, by preventing Congress from regulating slavery, the Court unintentionally proves that slaves are not the property of the U.S. to be regulated. This supports Dred Scott’s case for constitutional rights, including liberty and a federal trial, which he is not excluded from as the Supreme Court affirms he is not property.

V. Dred Scott and his Master were Denied Due Process by the 5th Amendment

Although the Court ruled in favor of Sandford since freeing Scott would deprive his master Sandford of his property without due process, the same can be argued for Scott. The Due Process Clause “provides that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, and property, without due process of law” [2]. Due process is indeed applicable to Sandford’s defense: He is arbitrarily deprived of his property for crossing state lines without the due process of law. However, protecting Sandford’s property comes at the expense of Scott’s liberty. By entering the Wisconsin territory, Scott earned the right to liberty and state citizenship, guaranteeing him the right to sue in federal court. However, the Court deprives Scott of his liberty to cross state lines by calling him property.

Although Taney would argue that Scott did not gain any rights because he was not intended to be a U.S. citizen, African Americans have the potential for protected rights under the Constitution, and they are not property: because of the lack of explicit provisions denying protection and how the Court’s denial of Congress’s right to regulate slavery proved slaves were not the property of the U.S. Shamefully, we observe an inconsistency in the Dred Scott ruling: The Court demonstrates their opinion that while white people cannot be denied their right to due process, Black people can. We continue to observe how political pressures and racial attitudes warped the Court’s perception of the Constitution like they envelop politics today through modern issues pertaining to racial discrimination and inequality.

VI. Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s errors in Dred Scott by inconsistently interpreting the Constitution warn us that the judicial branch is not insulated from politics, despite the Framers’ intent. Supreme Court justices’ decisions have the potential to radically alter the lives of so many Americans like Dred Scott, who was subjected to slavery after losing in court. Tragedies like Dred Scott demonstrate the responsibility of our government to insulate the Court from politics as the Framers intended.

References

[1] Friedman, Barry. 2010. The Will of the People: How Public Opinion Has Influenced the Supreme Court and Shaped the Meaning of the Constitution. New York: Farrar, Straus And Giroux.

[2] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Cases, Comments, and Questions 2019 Supplement. 2019