The Silence of Half a Nation: Women’s Rights After the Taliban’s Return to Power

Introduction

The Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan in August 2021 marked a significant regression in the status of women’s rights in the country [1]. Afghan women have been subjected to one of the most extreme and systemic erasures of basic human rights in modern history. First, women’s education was attacked. They were then stripped of all forms of fiscal independence, freedom of speech, freedom of movement, and now must be fully covered—prohibited from letting their eyes be shown in public [2]. As of 2024, when the Taliban outlawed women’s right to speak, the human rights crisis in Afghanistan far outgrew gender-based repression, becoming an institutionalized silencing of half of a nation.

Such grave restrictions can be traced by the historical trajectory of women's rights in Afghanistan. Afghan women actively participated in public life during the 1960s and 1970s, particularly in urban centers like Kabul.[3]. Women attended graduate programs, becoming doctors, lawyers, judges, professors, and public servants. Afghan women held political offices and dressed as they pleased [4]. They had the right to vote as stipulated in the Constitution of 1964 [5], and by the 1970s, they were the representatives of Afghanistan on the threshold of progressive change in lab coats within university lecture halls [6].

Under the first Taliban occupation of Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001, women were rendered almost invisible from public life, enforced by a stringent interpretation of Sharia law [7]. Schools were off-limits; women were forbidden from working, and dress code violations were dealt with—public flogging and execution became instruments of enforcement, and within just a few years, the rights and visibility Afghan women had worked towards and enjoyed vanished. The period following the Taliban’s ousting in 2001 saw incremental progress in the empowerment of Afghan women, with increased opportunities for education, employment, and political engagement. However, the withdrawal of the United States from Afghanistan in 2021 marked a turning point, which shortly followed the resurgence of the Taliban in August [8]. Within three and a half years, the previous two decades of development for Afghan women have dissolved like sugar in a cup of tea. The Taliban have specifically targeted the freedoms of movement and expression, along with other fundamental human rights that are essential to the pursuit of gender equality in Afghanistan. The resulting regression has been so total that the rights landscape for Afghan women has not merely reversed—it has collapsed [9].

This article relies on international legal instruments to argue that the Taliban regime has established a legal order characterized by gender apartheid that systematically oppresses Afghan women under international law. Through an examination of the CEDAW, ICCPR, and Rome Statute frameworks, it contends that such violations not only contravene Afghanistan's binding human rights commitments but also constitute crimes against humanity. Despite the Taliban’s de facto status, the article makes the case for invoking international accountability mechanisms already within reach.

These instruments include the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) [10], and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) [11], which play a distinct role in codifying the obligations of states and their accountability as actors under international law. Taken as a whole, they constitute binding obligations and customary norms categorically forbidding such systematic denial of freedoms of expression, gender equality, and access to public life to nation-states that have ratified them to their respective governments.

The International Criminal Court (ICC) was created by the 1998 adoption of the Rome Statute [12]. The Rome Statute establishes a permanent, treaty-based court with the authority to look into and try those who commit them, including state and non-state actors. One of the fundamental agreements of the international human rights system is the ICCPR, which was ratified by the UN General Assembly in 1966 [13]. It affirms the fundamental civil and political rights of every individual and requires state parties to uphold and protect those rights without discrimination as part of the International Bill of Human Rights. It imposes positive obligations

on governments to uphold fundamental freedoms within their borders and sets legal standards for them, including freedom of expression, association, religion, and due process [14].

The most extensive international legal document devoted to promoting women's rights and gender equality is the 1979 CEDAW. Often referred to as the "international bill of rights for women," CEDAW requires states to take proactive measures to guarantee women's full participation in political, social, economic, and cultural life as well as to eradicate discrimination against women "in all its forms"[15]. CEDAW requires states to address both de jure and de facto inequality, including through policy changes, legal reforms, and the removal of structural and cultural barriers to equality, in contrast to treaties that only focus on discrimination [16].

Applying the ICCPR, CEDAW, and the Rome Statute to Afghanistan

Afghanistan is a state party to all three of these foundational instruments. It ratified the Rome Statute in 2003, the CEDAW Convention in 2003, and the ICCPR in 1983 [17]. Afghanistan has made legally binding promises under international law to uphold the entire range of rights and obligations outlined in these treaties by ratifying them. These pledges include actively promoting and defending protected rights within its purview, besides abstaining from their infringement.

Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties enshrines the principle of pacta sunt servanda, which requires states to fulfil their obligations under treaties in good faith [18]. This implies that Afghanistan is still subject to the terms and provisions of these treaties in their entirety, irrespective of the government currently in power—the Taliban's current de facto control over the state apparatus does not lessen Afghanistan's responsibilities. According to international law, treaty obligations endure even in the face of illegal regimes or changes in government [19]. As a result, these legally binding international commitments must be taken into consideration when assessing the rights abuses committed against women during Taliban rule.

The Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice Law: Theological Justifications and Human Rights Manipulation

Based on conservative interpretations of Islamic principles, the Law on the Propagation of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice (Vice Law) is a domestic legal framework that permits the enforcement of moral behaviour [20]. The law, which was first put into effect during the Taliban's first rule in the 1990s and then reinstated after their comeback in 2021, gives power to the Ministry for the Propagation of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice, which serves as a “moral police force” [21].

The Taliban’s foundation of religious-legal rhetoric is rooted in the invocation of four core Islamic concepts: Fitna (moral or social disorder), munkar (vice), maʿrūf (virtue), and taʿzīr (discretionary punishment) [22]. The Vice Law mandates full body covering (Article 13(1)) and compulsory face veiling to prevent “fitna” (Article 13(2)), and restricts women’s voices from being heard in public—deeming them as immodest and sinful (Article 13(3)) [24]. The Vice Law also outlines the conduct under scrutiny and penalty by virtue of the enforcers in Article 22, "The Enforcer's Obligations with Respect to Individual Wrongdoing"[25]. For example, this article criminalizes any act by a woman of not covering herself as required by the Taliban, instituting a regime of forced concealment with no exception or contextual judgment [26]. These actions are a direct contravention of Afghanistan's ICCPR and CEDAW obligations [27].

Afghanistan and CEDAW Violations

Article 1 of the CEDAW defines discrimination against women as "any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status on a basis of equality of men and women (...)" [28]. The Vice Law visibly falls under this definition. They burden women with obligatory full-body covering (Art. 13(1), (2), (4), (8)), speech and voice restriction (Art. 13(3), 22(10)), and exclusion from appearance in the public space unattended or under escort by men [29]. They are not gender-neutral legislation with disproportionate consequences—they are overt gendered legislative mandates. For this reason, the law addresses both the form and impact of discrimination under Article 1 [30].

Article 2 commits states’ obligation to eliminate discrimination. States parties to CEDAW are not only to refrain from discriminatory acts, but are instructed to condemn and "pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating discrimination against women" [31]. It involves the duty to reform or enact laws that eliminate existing discriminatory practices and to provide equal legal protection for women's rights, ensuring they are on par with those of men. There are no judicial protections, complaint mechanisms, or accessible institutions through which women can contest these legal restrictions. By having a legal system that structurally bars women from the judicial process, Afghanistan is in explicit contravention of its Article 2 obligations. Part IV of CEDAW, Article 15 pertains to equality between men and women before the law. It provides that "States parties shall accord to women equality with men before the law" and equal legal capacity [32]. Under the Taliban, women cannot bring legal actions in their own name, are excluded from complete legal representation, and lack equal access to courts and institutions. Legal personhood itself is intermediated by male guardianship, violating both the letter and spirit of Article 15 and reinforcing the complete subordination of women in the legal order [33].

The imposition of speech restrictions based on gender, dress, and mobility limitations legalizes the stereotype through law. CEDAW General Recommendation No. 25 reaffirms that states must go beyond non-discrimination and take positive steps to transform the social arrangements causing inequality [33]. The Taliban regime not only does not dismantle discriminatory cultural norms, but it writes them into binding legal norms, hence violating Article 5(a) of CEDAW.

The Taliban’s institutionalization of gender discrimination includes broader exclusions from political and civil society. Article 7 of CEDAW requires states to ensure women's right to participate in political and public life, including the right to vote, stand for election, and participate in civil society [34]. Pursuant to the Vice Law, women cannot participate in government, speak to the public, politically organize, or even enter public places without a male escort [35].

Article 13 mandates states to eliminate discrimination in economic and social life, for instance, the right to work, education, economic independence, and access to cultural activities [36]. Women cannot work in most occupations, continue their studies beyond the primary school level, engage in business, or attend public places necessary to participate in social or cultural life. The requirement that women be accompanied by a male chaperone outside not only limits their physical movement, but also renders impossible their unfettered exercise of social or economic life.

Afghanistan and ICCPR Violations

New Afghan legal codes under the Taliban, and the Vice Law specifically, contravene several provisions of the ICCPR. These violations are not formally superficial in nature but constitute a systematic negation of substantive rights and legal guarantees owed to Afghan women under international law. Each violation is addressed below in a separate legal argument substantiated by treaty text and jurisprudence.

Article 2(1) of the ICCPR covers discrimination in the enjoyment of Covenant rights and requires states to respect and ensure the Covenant rights without any distinction, including sex [37]. Imposing limitations on freedom of expression, movement, dress, and participation only on women, the Vice Law inserts discrimination on the basis of sex into access to ICCPR rights.

It has been reaffirmed by the Human Rights Committee that states must “ensure that all persons enjoy the rights set forth in the Covenant, on an equal footing” and that equal legal formality is insufficient where differential impact persists in fact [38]. The enforcement of Articles 13 and 22 of the Vice Law—including the mandatory veiling, prohibition on women's voices, and ban on public appearance without male guardianship—effectively bars women from exercising all the Covenant rights elaborated below, solely on the basis of their sex [39].

Article 2(2) covers the failure to adopt legislative and other measures and creates a positive duty for states to adopt legislative or other measures to give effect to the rights in the ICCPR. Not only has Afghanistan not done this, but it has legislated to defeat Covenant protection. This is a backward implementation: far from promoting ICCPR compliance, the Vice Law gives violations force. Absence of remedies or institutional mechanisms for protesting enforcement, given the Taliban's abolition of judicial appeal, compounds the violation of Article 2(2).

Article 3 ensures equal access of men and women to the civil and political rights included in the Covenant. It affirms substantive, not merely procedural equality. The Human Rights Committee has made it clear that states are obligated to eliminate "legal and social barriers" that prevent women from exercising their rights [40]. The Taliban's gendered surveillance and punishment regime establishes a situation in which women are not able to exercise any political or civil right without male permission, surveillance, or threat of punishment. These limitations are contrary to the very essence of Article 3 [41].

Beyond the denial of equal rights, the Taliban’s practices also implicate necessary protections against mistreatment under Article 7 of the covenant, which forbids “torture or (…) cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment” [42]. Although applied mainly in the context of detention or punishment, the Human Rights Committee has interpreted that treatment humiliating or debasing an individual's dignity can amount to degrading treatment under this article [43]. Afghan women are subjected to being beaten, arrested, publicly humiliated, and verbally abused for not adhering to dress codes or virtue enforcement [44].

The Vice Laws strike at the core of expressive freedoms protected under Article 19 of the ICCPR. Articles 19(1) and 19(2) essentially outline the protections of the right everyone has to hold an opinion, and express such opinion “without interference” [45]. Article 19(1) safeguards the right to hold opinions free from interference; and Article 19(2) safeguards the right to freedom of expression, including “receiving and imparting information and ideas ‘irrespective of frontiers’” [46]. These rights are indispensable to upholding democratic participation and personal autonomy, which the Vice Law criminalizes.

The ICCPR does, however, allow for certain restrictions on freedom of expression under Article 19(3). Still, these restrictions must meet a strict criteria—limitations are only lawful if they (1) are prescribed by law, (2) promote a legitimate interest (national security, public order, public health/morals), and (3) are necessary and proportionate. The Taliban limitations pass none of these tests [47]. The measures are not proportionate, nor are they necessary in a democratic society; instead, they are aimed at reinforcing the Taliban’s control and perpetuating gender inequality. Consequently, the Taliban’s actions represent a clear violation of the ICCPR.

Afghanistan and Rome Statute Violations

The Taliban’s Vice Law may amount to a crime against humanity of persecution on grounds of gender, in terms of Article 7(1)(h) of the Rome Statute. According to the Rome Statute, persecution is "the intentional and severe deprivation of fundamental rights against international law on account of the group or collectivity's identity" [49]. So, to constitute persecution under the Statute, three legal elements must be satisfied: (a) There must be a severe deprivation of fundamental rights; (b) The deprivation must be committed against an identifiable group, here, women; and (c) It must be committed intentionally, as part of a widespread or systematic attack, pursuant to a state or organizational policy [48]. All these conditions are met in relation to the Taliban's implementation of the Vice Law: as outlined already, women have been subjected to a severe denial of elementary rights.

International criminal law has determined that system-based exclusion of women from public life, work, and education can amount to persecution on gender grounds. In the The Prosecutor v. Al Hassan Ag Abdoul Aziz Ag Mohamed Ag Mahmoud [51] case currently before the ICC, the Court accepted that system-based imposition of laws requiring forced veiling and exclusion of women from public life can amount to a crime of persecution under Article 7 [52]. The factual parallels with Afghanistan are telling.

The final requirement is that the acts of persecution must be part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population and must be done pursuant to a policy [53]. The Ministry for the Propagation of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice enforces in every province that the Taliban controls, structured through public decrees, announcements, and policing. They form the center of the regime's system of governance and form part of an overall campaign of ideological control. The "attack" under Article 7 is not required to be of a military nature; it encompasses any systematic pattern of conduct involving the repeated perpetration of acts such as imprisonment, persecution, or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading acts [54]. Despite the Taliban being a de facto government, these actions by a state organ, against a defined civilian population on the basis of gender, fulfill the requirements of the Statute.

Accountability Mechanisms and Conclusion

International law still offers avenues for holding the Taliban responsible for abuses of women's rights, even in the face of Afghanistan's local court system's collapse. Afghanistan is still subject to the ICC’s jurisdiction as a State Party to the Rome Statute. The ICC has the authority to pursue crimes against humanity, including gender persecution, in accordance with Article 7(1)(h) [55]. The legal requirements for such prosecution are met by the Taliban's systematic denial of women's fundamental rights, which is carried out in accordance with the official Vice Law. Although the ICC does not need state approval to look into crimes that have occurred within its borders, the Court has significant enforcement obstacles because it is dependent on member nations for assistance and lacks the authority to carry out arrest warrants. While these enforcement limitations constrain the Court’s operational reach, they do not negate the legal responsibilities of individual perpetrators.

De facto control does not, however, absolve Taliban commanders of responsibility. Despite unconstitutional changes in government, treaty commitments are recognized by international law. Where jurisdictional criteria are met, the absence of a functioning state apparatus does not impede the prosecution of individuals for violations of international law [56]. There are still complementary methods available. States have the authority to pursue prosecution for crimes against humanity under the principle of universal jurisdiction, regardless of the location of the offense or the nationality of the offenders [57]. If domestic law permits, this doctrine, which has been used in other cases involving gender-based persecution, could be used here. Furthermore, independent fact-finding mandates can be started by the UN Human Rights Council and other treaty bodies in order to record violations and save evidence for later procedures.

Although ICC arrest warrants may currently be difficult to enforce in Afghanistan, their issuance would be crucial from a legal and diplomatic standpoint. The issuance of such warrants legally establishes the status of the Taliban leadership as suspects of international crimes, bringing them under the jurisdiction of the Court and obligating all Rome Statute states parties to arrest and surrender them if they enter their territory. This restricts their international mobility, triggers automatic asset freezes under such linked multilateral sanctions regimes, and stigmatizes them with a lasting disdain that guarantees international non-recognition and political isolation [58].

The United Nations Security Council possesses other tools, including the provision to impose selective sanctions and even the potential for creating a hybrid or ad hoc tribunal under powers of Chapter VII [59]. A tribunal specifically designated to try Afghan violative acts would offer a focal judicial forum where senior Taliban representatives could be made accountable for acts involving jus cogens norms [60].

To conclude, the legal frameworks for accountability are already in place, and their enforcement is not optional—international law, as it stands, demands action. The Taliban’s codification and enforcement of gender-based subjugation through its Vice Law constitutes direct and sustained breaches of Afghanistan’s obligations under the ICCPR and CEDAW. Moreover, the Taliban’s systematic and international nature satisfies the definitional elements of gender persecution under Article 7(1)(h) of the Rome Statute. These violations are prosecutable. The frameworks, including the ICC’s jurisdiction, the doctrine of universal jurisdiction, and mechanisms under the UN Charter, provide concrete paths for accountability. The question is not whether the Taliban infringes international law—it is whether the international community will pursue the remedies already at hand, and have the will to do so.

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[22] Ibid., 20.

[23] Ibid., 20.

[24] Ibid., 20.

[25] Ibid., 20.

[26] Ibi.d, 20.

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[28] “Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, New York, 18 December 1979,” United Nations.

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[30] “Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, New York, 18 December 1979,” United Nations.

[31] Ibid., 30.

[32] Ibid., 30.

[33] “General Recommendation No. 25, on Article 4, Paragraph 1, of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, on Temporary Special Measure,” United Nations, https://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/recommendations/General%20recom mendation%2025%20(English).pdf.

[34] “Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women New York, 18 December 1979,” United Nations.

[35] “Unofficial AAN Translation the PROPAGATION of VIRTUE and PREVENTION of VICE LAW Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan Ministry of Justice Official Gazette,” Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan Ministry of Justice Official Gazette.

[36] “Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women New York, 18 December 1979,” United Nations.

[37] “International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,” OHCHR.

[38] “OHCHR | Human Rights Committee,” United Nations.

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[41] “International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,” OHCHR.

[42] Ibid., 41.

[43] “Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,” OHCHR, United Nations, December 10, 1984, https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/convention-against -torture-and-other-cruel-inhuman-or-degrading.

[44] “Afghanistan: Taliban’s Arbitrary Arrests and Detention of Women and Girls over Dress Code Must End Immediately, UN Experts Say,” OHCHR, 2024.

[45] “International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,” OHCHR.

[46] Ibid., 45.

[47] Ibid., 45.

[48] Ibid., 45.

[49] Ibid., 45.

[50] Judge Luz del Carmen Ibáñez Carranza, Presiding, Judge Piotr Hofmański, Judge Solomy Balungi Bossa, Judge Rosario Salvatore Aitala, Judge Gocha Lordkipanidze, “THE APPEALS CHAMBER: IN the CASE of the PROSECUTOR v. al HASSAN AG ABDOUL AZIZ AG MOHAMED AG MAHMOUD,” May 13, 2022.

[51] “Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,” International Criminal Court.

[52] Ibid., 51.

[53] “Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,” United Nations.

[54] “Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,” International Criminal Court.

[55] Ibid., 54.

[56] “Universal Jurisdiction | International Justice Resource Center.” International Justice Resource Center, 2012, https://ijrcenter.org/cases-before-national-courts/domestic-exercise-of-universal-ju risdiction/.

[57] Ibid., 56.

[58] Federica Paddeu and Niko Pavlopoulos, “Between Legitimacy and Control: The Taliban’s Pursuit of Governmental Status,” Just Security, September 7, 2021, https://www.justsecurity.org/78051/between-legitimacy-and-control-the-talibans-p ursuit-of-governmental-status/.

[59] “Sanctions and Other Committees,” Security Council, 2020, https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/content/repertoire/sanctions-and-other-committees.

[60] Sarah Reis, “Pritzker Legal Research Center: International Criminal Law: Hybrid Courts & Tribunals,” https://library.law.northwestern.edu/IntlCrimLaw/Hybrid.