The Issue of Opting Out: Mahmoud v. Taylor and the Erosion of Public Education

Mahmoud v. Taylor (2025) is just one of many in the long line of Supreme Court cases concerning the First Amendment’s free exercise clause of religion. Yet, the subject remains just as legally contested as it was in Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972) over 50 years ago. In Yoder, the Court ruled that the state of Wisconsin could not compel Amish children to attend school past eighth grade, as doing so violated their parents’ First Amendment right to freely exercise their religion [1]. In the more recent (and momentous) 6-3 decision in Mahmoud v. Taylor, the Court ruled again in favor of parents’ right to freely exercise their religion under the First Amendment, allowing them to opt their children out of instruction involving LGBTQ-themed storybooks [2]. However, by relying heavily on case-specific factors, rather than articulating a consistent test for evaluating free exercise claims like Yoder before it, Mahmoud v. Taylor demonstrated that America is far from having a clear legal standard for future rulings concerning the free exercise clause within the public school system. Through granting parents excessively broad discretion to opt out of school curriculum, the Court set a troubling precedent that risks creating a society in which virtually any parent can tailor public education to fit their own specific beliefs. With education’s pivotal role in sustaining our democracy, such a precedent threatens to weaken the very civic and social fabric that underlies our Nation.

Permitting parents to unilaterally exempt their children from classroom materials for individual religious reasons erodes the legal authority and democratic legitimacy of elected public school officials, who represent the electorate’s collective will and stand at the core of the U.S. democratic system. As Justice Sotomayor emphasized in her dissenting opinion of Mahmoud v. Taylor, “the Court’s ruling, in effect, thus hands a subset of parents the right to veto curricular choices long left to locally elected school boards” [2]. Her observation underscores the democratic danger of shifting curricular authority from publicly accountable school boards to individual parents acting through the courts. From the standpoint of democratic governance, school boards are designed to serve as local governing bodies through which voters hold school boards accountable through accessible, transparent elections and deliberative processes, thereby representing the public’s voice in public education and embodying the community’s values [3]. This view aligns with earlier precedent set in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez (1973), in which the Court emphasized that, regarding education policy, “the ultimate solutions must come from the lawmakers and from the democratic pressures of those who elect them” [4]. In doing so, the Court affirmed that curriculum decisions are the responsibility of state and local officials rather than the judiciary. However, in Mahmoud, the Court departed from both this precedent and the principle of stare decisis by transferring decision-making power from democratically elected school boards to individual parents asserting religious objections. In doing so, the Court weakened the traditional link between educational policymaking and democratic accountability. When parents disagree with the school board’s decisions, they should use the democratic systems available—such as school board elections and public comment forums—to represent their opinions instead of going through the courts.

Expanding parents’ ability to opt out of curriculum, solely on religious grounds, threatens to destabilize the education system by inviting continual legal challenges to school curricula. In, Brown v. Hot, Sexy and Safer Productions, Inc. (1995), a First Circuit case similar to Mahmoud, the court rejected parents’ claims that a controversial sex-education program violated their rights, noting that “If all parents had a fundamental constitutional right to dictate individually what the schools teach their children, the schools would be forced to cater a curriculum for each student” [5]. In effect, Mahmoud amplifies this problem by giving parents curriculum accommodations on the basis of constitutional rights.

This situation has proven difficult for the school system in the past, as seen in the various challenges to Critical Race Theory (CRT): an academic framework developed in the 1970s that examines how laws and institutions perpetuate racial inequality [6]. With parental activism at the forefront of the anti-CRT movement, 20 states have enacted legislation limiting the teaching of CRT in schools [7]. Consequently, in Tennessee, one of the states with legislation against CRT, “teachers [are hesitant] to discuss racial justice with students … and [those] with justice commitments [are] struggling to remain in (or enter) the profession,” illustrating how disputes over who controls the curriculum can undermine the integrity and morale of teachers [8]. For this reason, debates over CRT pose serious challenges to the structure of public education. Mahmoud v. Taylor, likewise, allows for parents, instead of professionally trained educators, to shape educational curriculum, thereby inviting comparable disruptions to educational governance.

Many proponents of the decision in Mahmoud v. Taylor have rightly argued that parents have a fundamental right to direct their children’s upbringing and religious education without government interference, drawing on precedent established in Pierce v. Society of Sisters (1925) and Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972). However, this argument overlooks crucial differences between those cases and Mahmoud, rendering the comparison obsolete. In Pierce v. Society of Sisters (1925), the U.S. Supreme Court struck down an Oregon law requiring all children to attend public schools through the age of 16, recognizing a constitutional protection for parents’ freedom to choose private or religious education for their children [9]. Similarly, in Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972), the Court emphasized how a Wisconsin law that mandated all children to attend school until 8th grade was “inescapable” specifically for members of the Amish religion, thereby in clear violation of parents’ liberty to shape their children’s education [1]. Undeniably, both cases affirm the constitutional right of parents to determine the manner and setting of their own children’s education.

However, Mahmoud effectively permits parents to shape or restrict the education of others’ children by influencing the curriculum as a whole, extending parental power far beyond what was intended in Yoder and Pierce. As noted by the Montgomery County Public School Board in Mahmoud v. Taylor, allowing some parents to opt their children out of storybooks featuring LGBTQ+ characters “causes significant disruptions to the classroom environment” and “could expose LGBTQ+ students (and those with LGBTQ+ parents) to social stigma and isolation” [2]. Consequently, adjusting the school curriculum in Mahmoud to cater to the needs of one group of parents forcefully infringes upon the rights of all other parents to have their children educated under a consistent, inclusive curriculum. Thus, the ruling in Mahmoud goes beyond the limited personal parental right to direct their own children’s upbringing, clearly violating the constitutionally protected liberty initially asserted by Pierce and Yoder.

While the Supreme Court has been careful not to define a constitutional right to education in its decision in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez (1973), the Court has nevertheless made clear that education remains a vital interest within the framework of constitutional rights—an interest that Mahmoud v. Taylor actively undermines. In the landmark Supreme Court Case Brown v. Board (1954), the Court held that segregation in schools violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, with Chief Justice Earl Warren declaring that education is “the very foundation for good citizenship” [10]. The language in Brown places educational values at the heart of American ideals and democracy, affirming its role in cultivating civic equality and education. Yet, Mahmoud v. Taylor departs from this principle by allowing parents to reshape public education through the lens of individual religious belief, thereby eroding its broader civic purpose. Following Brown, in Stanley v. Georgia (1969), the Court underscored that children have a “right to receive information and ideas…regardless of social worth,” making it clear that public schools should be allowed to expose students to diverse ideas and knowledge regardless of a specific religious group’s preferences [11].

The Court further expanded on this principle in Island Trees Sch. Dist. v. Pico by Pico (1982), addressing the First Amendment’s limits on a school board’s power to remove books. In doing so, the Court expounded upon the right “access to ideas” in Stanley, affirming that the right is fundamental to “[prepare] students for active and effective participation in the pluralistic, often contentious society” [12]. By contrast, Mahmoud restricts the diversity of ideas within the classroom to satisfy particular religious objections, directly undermining the educational values and democratic ideals recognized in Brown, Stanley, and Pico.

Ultimately, the ruling in Mahmoud demonstrates a missed opportunity to articulate a stronger and more distinct precedent concerning parental religious rights in education than the standards established in Yoder and Pierce. An alarming future looms: one where parents, rather than professionally trained educators, dictate the curriculum students are taught. Though parents have and deserve the right to shape their children’s upbringing and education, by choosing to enroll their children in public schools, they forfeit any right to demand modifications to the established curriculum outside of the local democratic systems that are in place to represent their opinions. Rulings testing the First Amendment’s free exercise clause will continue long after Mahmoud v. Taylor. By continuing down the path of violating the crucial purpose of education in our country, America risks eroding the bedrock of democratic and civil values upon which our country stands.

References

[1] Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). Accessed October 5, 2025. https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/406/205/.

[2] Mahmoud v. Taylor, 606 U.S. ___ (2025). Accessed October 5, 2025. https://www.oyez.org/cases/2024/24-297.

[3] Sutherland, D. H. (2022). “Tell them local control is important”: A case study of democratic, community-centered school boards. Education Policy Analysis Archives, 30 No. 178 (2022): 4, accessed October 5, 2025, https://doi.org/10.14507/epaa.30.7439.

[4] San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). Accessed October 5, 2025. https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/411/1/#tab-opinion-1950218.

[5]* Ronald C. Brown, et Al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Hot, Sexy and Safer Productions, Inc., et Al., Defendants-Appellees*, 68 F.3d 525 (1st Cir. 1995). Accessed October 12, 2025. https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/68/525/537667/.

[6] Schwartz, Sarah. 2021. “Four States Have Placed Legal Limits on How Teachers Can Discuss Race. More May Follow.” Education Week, accessed October 12, 2025, https://www.edweek.org/policy-politics/four-states-have-placed-legal-limits-on-how-teachers-can-discuss-race-more-may-follow/2021/05.

[7] “Critical Race Theory (CRT).” 2021. Ballotpedia, accessed October 12, 2025, https://ballotpedia.org/Critical_race_theory_(CRT).

[8] Kelly, Laura, Laura Taylor, Cara Djonko-Moore, and Aixa Marchand. 2022. “The Chilling Effects of So-Called Critical Race Theory Bans.” Rethinking Schools, accessed October 12, 2025, https://rethinkingschools.org/articles/the-chilling-effects-of-so-called-critical-race-theory-bans.

[9] Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). Accessed October 12, 2025. https://www.oyez.org/cases/1900-1940/268us510.

[10] Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Accessed October 12, 2025. https://www.oyez.org/cases/1940-1955/347us483.

[11]* Stanley v. Georgia*, 394 U.S. 557 (1969). Accessed October 12, 2025. https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/394/557/.

[12] Island Trees Sch. Dist. V. Pico by Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982). Accessed October 12, 2025. https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/457/853/.