South Korea: Is Martial Law Warranted?
On 3 December, 2024, South Korea was subject to an event that, to many, was limited to history. Using emergency powers rarely seen since the military dictatorships, President Yoon Suk Yeol imposed martial law on the nation. This was the first time in 40 years that martial law was declared. Police and military blocked legislatures, tanks encircled the National Assembly — all while fundamental rights were suspended. The reason provided was overblown, asserting that the legislature had been infested by pro-North Korean criminals and he had to “immediately eradicate the unscrupulous pro-Pyongyang antistate forces that pillage the freedom and happiness of our people and to protect free constitutional order” [1]. It is integral to understand the background of the heightened political polarization in South Korea when discussing President Yoon’s decision to invoke martial law [2]. In recent years, South Korea has witnessed deep divisions between rival political factions, leading to legislative gridlock and contentious public debate [3]. This provided context for the president’s extraordinary measure of invoking martial law. However, such an event posed a pertinent legal question: can such a declaration ever be justified within the framework of South Korea's constitutional commitment? Although emergency powers are lawful, they are limited to legitimate necessity and proportionality. President Yoon’s December 2024 martial law order, issued without invasion, war, or rebellion, was not founded on factual necessity and was, therefore, unlawful under both constitutional and international law. Far from a legitimate emergency measure, it was an unconstitutional attempt at self-coup.
Martial Law and Is Constitutional Restriction
While martial law is permitted in the Constitution of South Korea under strict conditions, its authority has previously been abused — most notably during Park Chung Hee and Chun Doo-hwan's totalitarian rule [4]. In this case, martial law was used to justify violent action. This abuse of emergency powers highlights the risk that arises when too much authority is concentrated in the executive [5]. Under Article 77 of South Korea’s Constitution, the executive is authorised to proclaim martial law under specific conditions, including “military necessity or to maintain the public safety and order by mobilisation of the military forces in time of war, armed conflict or similar national emergency” [6]. One notable case was during the Gwangju Uprising in 1980. Following the assasination of former president Park Chung Hee, Chun Doo-hwan gained power through a coup and declared martial law to suppress civilian rights and democratic protests [7]. In May of 1980, citizens of Gwangju stood up to protest against this totalitarian regime, resulting in military intervention and civilian deaths estimated to be upwards of 2,000 people [8].
The implementation of martial law in these cases frequently consolidated state power at the cost of civil liberties, resulting in considerable human rights abuses and the repression of democracy itself [9]. These instances lead to the application of martial law in contemporary democracy being met with suspicion by the public.
The December 2024 incident should be weighed up against the following legal framework of Article 77: was it a “time of war, armed conflict or similar national emergency” [10]? Did an armed insurrection occur? Was there an alarming national crisis comparable to war or an uprising? No evidence of such conditions existed. The country had an assembly in action, and no tangible overthrow of the popular order was impending. It was not a civil war; rather, it was political polarization. The National Assembly cut all major budgets for essential infrastructure and systems, prohibiting President Yoon and the incumbent party from operating [11]. Exploiting constitutional emergency authority to address political disagreements undermines its significance.
The state of the law of human rights strengthens this perspective. South Korea is obligated by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which stipulates that rights may only be suspended during public emergencies that threaten the nation's existence [12]. President Yoon's action to issue an order suspending parliamentary operations and infringing the lives of healthcare officials through forced labor clearly exceeded established limits. Article 4 of the ICCPR, which states that only “in time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the existence of which is officially proclaimed, the States Parties to the present Covenant may take measures derogating from their obligations under the present Covenant to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation” [13]. This very article limits the suspension of rights to genuine public emergencies that threaten the life of the nation [14]. Consequently, both local and international legislation affirm the illegitimacy of the proclamation.
The Juridical Nature of the December 2024 Martial Law
In addition to being unconstitutional, the martial law decree is a characteristic of what a jurist would call a “self-coup.” In comparative constitutional analysis, such a coup involves a leader exploiting emergency powers to disband or shut down democratic institutions to consolidate their power [15]. This description best applies to the televised speech of Yoon, as he claims that the National Assembly is a “den of criminals, paralyzing the nation's judicial and administrative systems through legislative dictatorship and planning for the overthrow of our liberal democratic system” [16]. President Yoon’s rhetoric and actions thus align closely with the classic pattern of a self-coup, where democratic norms are subverted under the pretext of safeguarding the very order they undermine.
The legal discourse of emergency powers emphasizes that their legitimacy is not reduced only to the textual contents of the law but also to their purpose. A martial law addressing democratic institutions in general cannot be viewed as a legitimate emergency measure in that its aim contradicts the constitutional order it purported to afford. This paradox unveils why the decision of martial law in December 2024 was unconstitutional, not only by the action itself but also by design itself.
In accordance with the theory of sovereignty, it is suggested that in real crises, the sovereign makes decisions that can be unlawful [17]. However, modern constitutionalism denies such an absolutist conception. Emergency powers are open to principles of necessity and proportion, as the Constitutional Court of South Korea stresses. Applying Schmitt to defend the actions of President Yoon would mean retracting decades of democratic gains.
Human Rights Violations under Proclamation No. 1
Illegality of invoking Martial Law is further explained in Proclamation No. 1 of the Martial Law Commander Park An-su. The order cancelled parliamentary operations, suppressed freedom of expression, and most astonishingly, enforced striking doctors back to work lest they face punishment [18]. The final action directly violates the South Korean Constitution and international labor law.
Article 32 of the Constitution assures the right to work with dignity, and Article 33 to collective action [19]. Pressurizing healthcare workers into service contravened both. At the international level, the ILO clearly forbids all forms of forced labor except in armed conflict or natural calamity [20]. South Korea was not experiencing either. Proclamation No. 1 went far beyond the most generous definition of legitimate emergency action.
The political character of the martial law is also foreshadowed by how the doctors were targeted. The government’s proposal to increase medical school admission led to doctors and medical workers going on a prolonged strike [21]. For months, they were at a stalemate where doctors refused to return while the government threatened to cancel their licenses [22]. President Yoon employed martial law to dissolve the strikes and forced the doctors to return to work [23]. This is not a national emergency, but rather, partisan politics. Policy disagreements resolved through the abuse of constitutional limits by invoking emergency powers are precisely the definition of abuse of constitutional powers.
Democratic Resiliency and the Institutional Response
When martial law was utilized under illegitimate circumstances, the institutional reaction of South Korea showed how strong constitutional democracy could be. Only hours later, legislators met despite martial law annulment by the military and dismissed a resolution of the assembly [24]. Civil society and social media rapidly organized to oppose the declaration, while the military demonstrated notable reluctance to implement it. This reluctance was evident as “commanders in both the military and police forces not only exhibited a lack of enthusiasm for the operation but also intentionally delayed its execution” [25].
This measure was further enabled by the constitution under Article 77: “When the National Assembly requests the lifting of martial law with the concurrent vote of a majority of the total members of the National Assembly, the President shall comply” [25]. The National Assembly carried the jurisdiction to review whether or not the use of martial law is warranted, resulting in190 out of 300 legislators storming the assembly to rescind the President’s decision to invoke the martial law. This decisive legislative intervention not only reaffirmed the constitutional system of checks and balances, but also ensured the prompt restoration of democratic order.
Rapid turnaround shows that democracy, however stretched, worked. The legislature played its constitutional mandate role of restraining the executive's overreach. Citizens demanded their democracy. The military, which was influenced by decades of reform after democratization, refused to repeat its authoritarian traditions [26]. Legally, such acts state that emergency powers do not override constitutional governance; rather, they operate strictly within and form part of the constitutional framework designed to safeguard democratic order.
Counterarguments: Justification in Yoon’s Perspective
A fair-minded critic could opine that there was some legal logic to President Yoon's proclamation, as Article 77 of the South Korean Constitution provides the president with broad emergency powers in the event of war or comparable national crisis [27]. President Yoon argued that parliamentary gridlock and threats to public order constituted such an emergency, thereby justifying the declaration on constitutional grounds [28].
Moreover, the martial law was temporary, suspended in a few hours. In contrast to the long dictatorships of the 1970s and 1980s, Yoon’s order was not fixed into a long-term dictatorship. Given the relative shortness of this authoritarian term, it may be perceived as a legitimate exercise of emergency powers to establish order and prevent the creation of escalations.
Rebuttal: Why the Thesis Still Stands
Such an argument, however, does not stand in a court of law. First and foremost, the Constitution does not enable the president to declare martial law under the reason of disloyalty or political aggression. A grave national emergency needs to be factual, not merely theoretical. Otherwise, any political opposition may be described as a security threat that will threaten democracy.
Second, proportionality is not determined based on the result but on the intention and magnitude. The fact that martial law ceased quickly does not deny its illegal character. The suspension of parliament and compulsion of doctors to practice were unconstitutional when proclaimed. The fact that the abuse was temporary may take the edge off the harm, but does not legalize it retrospectively.
Lastly, applying the existence of North Korea as a blanket faculty to warrant martial law would produce a state of continuous emergency. The law is precise in its definition: martial law can be invoked only when a threat of a military attack or a national emergency is real. Otherwise, the people will live under a constant state of fear, which is what the painful history of South Korea already tells us [29].
Conclusion
The martial law declared in December 2024 by President Yoon was not only unwarranted through South Korea’s constitution, but also international human rights law; in particular, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) [30]. It was not necessary and disproportionately targeted democratic institutions. Although proponents of the Martial Law may argue that it represents a temporary adjustment or response to the necessity to tighten the belt against an increased need to step up security, the law cannot be bent to suit political expediency.
In the meantime, the pace of the response to the events presented by the National Assembly, citizens, and even military forces proves the strength of democratic resilience. Scalded despite the protests of the authoritarian regimes in the preceding times, South Korea proved able to stand up against the attempt of another unconstitutional attitude to power. The spirit of the lesson is quite clear: martial law must not be employed to assist in solving a political dispute but must be in the nature of last resort employed against a real existential threat.
Lastly, this essay insists that, despite preoccupation, the state must operate under democratic policy and rule of law [31]. A different strategy would amount to a repetition of South Korea’s most troubling historical periods.
References
[1] Lim, A., Ji, S. and Cha, V. (no date) Yoon declares martial law in South Korea, CSIS. Available at: https://www.csis.org/analysis/yoon-declares-martial-law-south-korea
[2] Kim, Hyun Su, and Hyeok Yong Kwon. 2025. “Partisan Sorting, Affective Polarization, and Democratic Backsliding: Evidence from South Korea.” Democratization, July, 1–24. doi:10.1080/13510347.2025.2525554.
[3] Ibid
[4] Yi, K. M. (2022). The Fragility of Liberal Democracy: A Schmittian Response to the Constitutional Crisis in South Korea (1948–79). The Journal of Asian Studies, 81(2), 305–321. https://doi.org/10.1017/s002191182100231x
[5] Gurung, Binamra. “Martial Law in South Korea: A Constitutional Crossroad.” King’s Think Tank Spectrum (blog), December 12, 2024.
[6] Republic of Korea. Constitution of the Republic of Korea. Adopted July 17, 1948, amended October 29, 1987. Article 77
[7] Jung, M. “South Korea Declares Martial Law for the First Time in Decades.” The Korea Herald, December 3, 2024. https://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20241203050121.
[8] Ibid
[9] Gurung, Binamra. “Martial Law in South Korea: A Constitutional Crossroad.” King’s Think Tank Spectrum (blog), December 12, 2
[10] Republic of Korea. Constitution of the Republic of Korea. Adopted July 17, 1948, amended October 29, 1987. Article 77
[11] Korea JoongAng Daily. ‘Transcript: President Yoon Suk Yeol’s Speech to Declare Emergency Martial Law.’ December 4, 2024. https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2024-12-04/national/politics/Transcript-President-Yoon-Suk-Yeols-speech-to-declare-emergency-martial-law-/2191990.
[12] United Nations. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Adopted December 16, 1966. United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 999, p. 171.
[13] United Nations, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 4, adopted December 16, 1966, United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 999, p. 173
[14] Ibid
[15] Baek, S.-U. (2024). Declaration of martial law in South Korea: a threat to democracy. The Lancet, 0(0). https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(24)02792-2
[16] Korea JoongAng Daily. ‘Transcript: President Yoon Suk Yeol’s Speech to Declare Emergency Martial Law.’ December 4, 2024. https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2024-12-04/national/politics/Transcript-President-Yoon-Suk-Yeols-speech-to-declare-emergency-martial-law-/2191990.
[17] Yi, K. M. (2022). The Fragility of Liberal Democracy: A Schmittian Response to the Constitutional Crisis in South Korea (1948–79). The Journal of Asian Studies, 81(2), 305–321. https://doi.org/10.1017/s002191182100231x
[18] Baek, S.-U. (2024). Declaration of martial law in South Korea: a threat to democracy. The Lancet, 0(0). https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(24)02792-2
[19] Republic of Korea, Constitution of the Republic of Korea, Articles 32–33, adopted July 17, 1948, amended October 29, 1987
[20] International Labour Organization (ILO), Forced Labour Convention (No. 29), adopted June 28, 1930, entered into force May 1, 1932, Article 2(2)(d)
[21] “Martial Law Targets Resident Physicians: Implications for the Healthcare Crisis in South Korea.” Onyx Newsroom, December 4, 2024.
[22] Ibid
[23] Ibod
[24] Baek, S.-U. (2024). Declaration of martial law in South Korea: a threat to democracy. The Lancet, 0(0). https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(24)02792-2
[25] Lee, J., & Lee, D. (2025). 2024 South Korean martial law crisis: lessons for democratic resilience. Australian Journal of International Affairs, 79(2), 1–8.
[26] Republic of Korea, Constitution of the Republic of Korea, Article 77, adopted July 17, 1948, amended October 29, 1987
[27] Lee, J., & Lee, D. (2025). 2024 South Korean martial law crisis: lessons for the democratic resilience. Australian Journal of International Affairs, 79(2), 1–8. https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2025.2458697
[28] Republic of Korea, Constitution of the Republic of Korea, Article 77, adopted July 17, 1948, amended October 29, 1987
[29] Korea JoongAng Daily. ‘Transcript: President Yoon Suk Yeol’s Speech to Declare Emergency Martial Law.’ December 4, 2024. https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2024-12-04/national/politics/Transcript-President-Yoon-Suk-Yeols-speech-to-declare-emergency-martial-law-/2191990.
[30] Engel, B. A. (2024). Making Sense of South Korea’s Senseless Martial Law Declaration. Asia-Pacific Journal, 22(12). https://doi.org/10.1017/s1557466024038221
[31] United Nations. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Adopted December 16, 1966. United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 999, p. 171.
[32] United Nations Human Rights Committee. “General Comment No. 29: Article 4: Derogations during a State of Emergency.” July 31, 2001. Refworld.