Power, Papers, and the Digital Warrant: ICE’s Unchecked Hunt for Data

As the Trump administration continues to enact policy and reinforce its agenda, a startling reality crystallizes: Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) will stop at nothing to fulfill its mission of finding and deporting every undocumented individual residing in the United States. From infiltrating schools to hospitals, ICE agents have proven to be undoubtedly committed to exploring any and all channels that could potentially lead them to their “suspects.” [1] This goal to localize and capture thousands of people has naturally been strengthened by the vast technological developments at the disposal of the federal agency. [2] Some of these tools, however, pose a serious threat to the privacy protections enshrined in the Constitution.

Throughout the course of the last few years, ICE has honed in on information that is uniquely positioned to expose the precise locations of residents: the utility bills, license plates, and cell phone records that make up commercial databases. Specifically, large corporations responsible for providing electricity, heat, and water record their utility bills and volunteer their private records to the government agency, allowing ICE to seamlessly track the clients of these major companies. [3] Corporations such as NCTUE have provided the aforementioned data without an existing warrant. Instead, the commercial information has been entirely at the disposal of the federal agency as ICE signed contracts with the companies, yielding access to the databases. [4] Living in a society without subscribing to utilities is virtually impossible due to the irrefutable need for electricity, water, and gas. Nonetheless, the need for these resources hardly equates to consent to be tracked and traced by the government. The information collected by commercial databases is meant to be treated as a private good. Private goods are defined as products that are exclusive and consumed individually, whereas public goods are non-exclusive and provided by the government. [5] As electricity, water, and gas are not subsidized by the government, they can be qualified as private. Thus, ICE’s use of this data violates the principles of the Fourth Amendment, which states that people have the right to be “secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” [6] These categories can be understood through a modern lens that elucidates the relevance of the clause in relation to the commercial data dilemma. “Persons” refers to anything directly on one’s body; “Houses” includes one’s home; “Papers” alludes to personal data, records, or documentation; and “Effects” encompasses personal property or belongings. Under these specifications, ICE’s use of commercial databases violates individuals’ right to security in their papers as the agency explicitly inspects bills and cell phone records containing sensitive personal information.

In 2018, Carpenter v United States (“Carpenter”) discussed the issue of privacy in relation to location and tracking under similar conditions. The case addressed whether Carpenter’s right to remain secure in his papers and effects was violated through a warrantless search of his cell phone records and the location services found via cell data. The evidence retrieved from the cell data substantiated the charges against the defendant, who then argued that the evidence was inadmissible because it was obtained without a warrant. In a 5-4 decision, the Court held that the warrantless search and seizure of cell phone records violates the Fourth Amendment, which extends its bounds to protect reasonable expectations of privacy, especially in the digital age. [7] This precedent indicated that with few exceptions, the government will always need a warrant to access cell-phone location records. [8] The Court also ruled that information granted to a third-party — like the corporations collecting the utility bills — does not absolve one’s reasonable expectation of privacy, defined as both the individual and societal belief that something should be considered private. [9] In the context of Carpenter, the third party was the cell phone providers. The Court correctly argued that users hardly affirm explicit consent for providers to keep thorough location logs. Thus, cell phone users can rightfully retain an expectation of privacy, protected by the Fourth Amendment.
Several parallels can be drawn between cell phone data and commercial information, as both are monitored by third parties that must be bound by certain user protections. In the case of cell phones, all carrier services are required by the Federal Communications Commission to protect certain information, among which includes the location of an active device. [10] Similarly, while the privacy protections of utility companies may differ in specific detail, the collective policy is to protect customer information, barring client consent or legal order. [11]

Consequently, to truly uphold the ideals of the Constitution, the unwarranted search of commercial data must be protected by the reasonable expectation of privacy outlined in Carpenter.

A crucial facet of the commercial data dilemma is the involvement of third parties in the diffusion of valuable information. Considering the fact that the data being provided to ICE stems from third-party software, some claim that privacy protections are not as impenetrable. Under the third-party doctrine, information disclosed to a third party retains no reasonable expectation of privacy. This doctrine was established through United States v Miller (“Miller”) (1976), a case involving a defendant whose bank accounts were examined and used during trial as evidence. [12] The Supreme Court questioned whether the bank records were illegally seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment. In a 7-2 ruling, the Court falsely held that Miller had no right to privacy because the records in question were provided by a third party (the bank). [13] The reasoning behind this opinion fails to consider that Miller’s personal bank records ought to be protected as part of his “papers” regardless of the fact that the papers were in the possession of a third party. This opinion further established a parameter in which third parties were no longer bound by explicit privacy provisions. Under this line of reasoning, one could argue that ICE’s use of commercial data is entirely constitutional, seeing as the locations are being provided by the third-party companies collecting utility bills or phone records. In this sense, Supreme Court precedent could justify government access to information sourced from third-party corporations. Miller provides the theoretical framework to defend ICE’s use of utility bills while refuting any claims of unconstitutionality under the Fourth Amendment.

Though the precedent set in Miller serves as a compelling counter to the accusation against ICE in relation to privacy, the Case was somewhat qualified in recent years through Carpenter. While individuals paying utility or phone bills likely sign contracts before processing payments, these contracts hardly announce that their personal information, such as a home address, can or will be shared with partnering companies or agencies. Instead, the privacy policy of most utility companies is that customer information is protected unless the client clarifies consent or legal orders have been presented and verified. [14] Carpenter established that in an age of vast technological developments, reasonable expectations of privacy must be upheld, regardless of third-party involvement. Specifically, the Majority argued that the doctrine strictly applies to voluntary exposure of information. [15] The voluntary element of this definition is crucial in the context of commercial data. Signing contracts with utility companies hardly serves as an affirmative act when these contracts function under the assumption that data will only be shared under legal order. If ICE were strictly using commercial information with documented warrants, constitutionality would not be in question. It is because ICE uses the software to indiscriminately track thousands of people that the practice violates the Fourth Amendment.

Commercial information is one of the most accurate indicators of people’s residency because utility payments are frequently attached to an address using the relevant services. The National Consumer Telecom and Utilities Exchange (NCTUE) is a third-party data exchange that collects utility payment intel on millions of consumers with the intention of serving as a credit/risk assessment. [16] With a myriad of utility companies feeding their records into this system, NCTUE has become the most robust source of commercial data. The company retains access to the utility records of over 218 million customers, averaging to around 3 in 4 adults in the U.S. [17] ICE has gained access to these large margins thanks to the Thomas Reuters Corporation. In 2010, ICE signed a contract with Thomas Reuters in order to access the corporation’s database named CLEAR. [18] CLEAR was established with the intention of becoming a cutting-edge tool for fraud detection, identity verification, and location services. Initially, CLEAR was meant to serve as a resource for law enforcement officers in pursuit of suspects who were extremely difficult to locate. The use of this technology would have ideally been triggered by an official warrant. Large sums of the information fed to CLEAR come directly from NCTUE, as the corporation retains highly accurate location data. As a result, when ICE gains permission to investigate via CLEAR, they gain the ability to locate nearly anyone in the country.

The far-reaching scope of the CLEAR database at the disposal of ICE agents allows the agency to use the information without abiding by the law. Rather than establishing probable cause before using the search engine to locate potential deportees — via obtaining a warrant — ICE can simply consult CLEAR at its convenience. Their access to this wide net of information challenges the Fourth Amendment as it entirely forgoes the protections against unreasonable searches and seizures of a person’s papers. Without an established warrant, ICE would have no grounds to inspect and benefit from the commercial data. Moreover, consumers who subscribe to utility services retain a legitimate expectation of privacy as their bills must be treated as “papers” which are protected under the Fourth Amendment. Hence, the expectation of privacy should be upheld unless there is a justified basis for law enforcement to access their personal records. Systems like CLEAR expose intimate information on every person paying commercial bills, regardless of the existence of probable cause. The undefined regulations on commercial intel have thus created a loophole wherein ICE has seamlessly been able to track people without following the bureaucratic processes of obtaining a warrant.

ICE’s unrestricted access to such valuable information raises multiple red flags. When ICE’s contract to access CLEAR was terminated in 2021, mere weeks later, the agency replaced the subscription with a new corporation named Lexis Nexis Special Services, which vowed to produce similar datasets that include the utility records of 210 million consumers. [19] This vendor transition illustrates ICE’s strategic adaptability in ensuring uninterrupted surveillance capabilities, underscoring the resilience and persistence of its data access infrastructure. Retaining access to such valuable information remains at the forefront of ICE’s priorities because these databases serve as a powerful resource in locating the agency’s suspects. The lack of regulation on ICE’s access to these types of software encourages the agency to continue seeking corporations that can fulfill the need for location tracking. Consequently, it is vital for the Supreme Court to draw definite boundaries as it relates to utility bills. Boundaries must be fostered by expanding the reasonable expectation of privacy to include warrantless searches of commercial data.

ICE’s access to vast amounts of commercial data could potentially have far-reaching consequences that extend beyond the confines of the Fourth Amendment. The use of utility bills, cell phone data, or license plate location as a means to track down civilians can create serious tension with First Amendment rights. The First Amendment asserts that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” [20] As ICE continues to feed on commercial information, it threatens the outlined freedom of assembly, speech, and religion. As people gradually become more aware of ICE’s tendency to meticulously inspect accurate indicators of location, they will likely refrain from congregating in public places. Restricting someone from engaging in political discourse, practicing their religion, or interacting in a group setting fundamentally undermines the First Amendment, as individuals would fear that any sort of movement could result in deportation.

Under the Trump administration and its immigration policies, this domino effect has already erupted across the country. Sergio Elias, the pastor of the Brazilian Free Methodist Church in Connecticut, commented on the decline in attendance at services. Specifically, he expressed that “[w]e have people who are locked in their homes out of fear, or only leaving to go to work. No leisure, no outings with their families, no vacations – sometimes not even coming to church.” [21] In Washington, D.C., pastors from churches with large Central or South American populations have also reported a 20% decline in Mass attendance. [22] The levels of fear associated with ICE’s policies and practices are evidently potent enough to paralyze civilian life. Thus, in an effort to ensure that the federal agency ceases the type of tracking that infringes on civilian liberties, the Supreme Court must address the root of the issue: unmonitored and unrestricted access to commercial data.

The immigration agenda put forth by the Trump administration has encouraged ICE to pursue the mission of rounding up as many undocumented individuals as possible across the U.S. [23] This mission has only been aided by readily available information at the disposal of ICE agents. Most recently, commercial information has been a leading tool in accurately locating potential detainees. [24] As commercial databases can track hundreds of millions of consumers, they present a unique opportunity to easily target a surplus of immigrants, regardless of cause or criminal conviction. This ability to access such personal information without a warrant, however, poses a serious threat to the protections of the Fourth Amendment’s right to privacy. ICE has used this sea of information at its discretion, bound by no definite restrictions or regulations. [25] This level of unchecked power violates the privacy rights granted to all civilians. To rectify this imbalance of power, the Supreme Court needs to establish clear boundaries on commercial data. Drawing upon legal precedents from Carpenter would enable the Court to extend the reasonable expectation of privacy to commercial information.

Footnotes:

[1] COPAA, “ICE in School,” COPAA, https://www.copaa.org/page/ICE_in_School#:~:text=On%20January%2021%2C%202025%2C%20the,%2C%20playgrounds%2C%20and%20childcare%20centers. [2] David J Bier, “65 Percent of People Taken by ICE Had No Convictions, 93 Percent No Violent Convictions,” Cato.org, June 20, 2025, https://www.cato.org/blog/65-people-taken-ice-had-no-convictions-93-no-violent-convictions. Data collected and reported on June 14, 2025 indicated that ICE had detained 204, 297 individuals since October 1, 2024. 65% of detainees had no criminal convictions and more than 93% had never been convicted of violent offenses. [3] “ICE Exploits People’s Basic Needs for Heat, Electricity and Water by Collecting Utility Records through Opaque and Unregulated Data Brokers,” Georgetown Law’s Center on Privacy & Technology, May 10, 2022, https://americandragnet.org/finding3. [4] “ICE Exploits People’s Basic Needs,” Georgetown Law’s Center on Privacy & Technology. [5] Priyakant Charokar, “Economics & Finance: Public Goods, Private Goods, Mixed Goods, and Merit Goods,” The Leadership Nexus (Medium, September 5, 2024), https://medium.com/the-leadership-nexus/economics-finance-public-goods-private-goods-mixed-goods-and-merit-goods-%EF%B8%8F-490e06f5fb3e. [6] U.S. Congress, “Fourth Amendment,” Constitution Annotated, Constitution, https://constitution.congress.gov/constitution/amendment-4/. [7] Carpenter v. United States. 138 U.S. 2206, Oyez, https://www.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-402. [8] “Can the Police Search My Phone without a Warrant?,” Cohen Law Offices, March 8, 2025, https://www.eauclairecriminaldefense.com/can-the-police-search-my-phone-without-a-warrant#:~:text=Exceptions%20to%20the%20Warrant%20Requirement,justify%20their%20actions%20in%20court. Exceptions include users granting the police consent to search their phone (this is the most common occurrence) or imminent threat to public safety. [9] Carpenter v. United States [10] Federal Communications Commission (FCC), “Protecting Your Personal Data,” last updated May 22, 2023, https://www.fcc.gov/protecting-your-personal-data. [11] “Model Data Privacy Guidelines for Large Utilities,” Washington Public Utility District Association, September 8, 2016, https://www.wpuda.org/assets/Energydocs/model%20data%20privacy%20guideline%20for%20large%20utilities%2009%2008%2016.pdf [12] United States v. Miller. 425 U.S. 435 (1976), Oyez, https://www.oyez.org/cases/1975/74-1179. [13] United States v. Miller [14] “Model Data Privacy Guidelines for Large Utilities,” Washington Public Utility District Association, September 8, 2016, https://www.wpuda.org/assets/Energydocs/model%20data%20privacy%20guideline%20for%20large%20utilities%2009%2008%2016.pdf [15] *Carpenter v. United States. * [16] National Consumer Telecom & Utilities Exchange (NCTUE), “Homepage,” https://nctue.com/ [17] “ICE Exploits People’s Basic Needs,” Georgetown Law’s Center on Privacy & Technology. [18] Ibid. [19] Ibid. [20] U.S. Congress, “First Amendment,” in Constitution of the United States, accessed October 19, 2025, https://constitution.congress.gov/constitution/amendment-1/ [21] Helen Teixeira and Aleja Hertzler-McCain, “As Deportation Fears Keep Immigrants from Work, Their Churches Feel Financial Strain,” National Catholic Reporter, July 27, 2025, https://www.ncronline.org/news/deportation-fears-keep-immigrants-work-their-churches-feel-financial-strain [22] Aleja Hertzler-McCain and Ayesha Rascoe, “D.C. Churches See a Drop in Attendance as Congregants Fear Immigration Action,” NPR, August 24, 2025, https://www.npr.org/2025/08/24/nx-s1-5508346/d-c-churches-see-a-drop-in-attendance-as-congregants-fear-immigration-action [23] Heidi Altman, Tanya Broder, and Ben D’Avanzo, “The Anti-Immigrant Policies in Trump’s Final ‘Big Beautiful Bill,’ Explained,” National Immigration Law Center (August 20, 2025), https://www.nilc.org/resources/the-anti-immigrant-policies-in-trumps-final-big-beautiful-bill-explained/ [24] “ICE Exploits People’s Basic Needs,” Georgetown Law’s Center on Privacy & Technology. [25] Ibid.